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Abstract. In 2016, the Transplantation Society of Australia and New Zealand, with the support of the Australian Government Or-
gan and Tissue authority, commissioned a literature review on the topic of infectious disease transmission from deceased donors
to recipients of solid organ transplants. The purpose of this review was to synthesize evidence on transmission risks, diagnostic
test characteristics, and recipient management to inform best-practice clinical guidelines. The final review, presented as a special
supplement in Transplantation Direct, collates case reports of transmission events and other peer-reviewed literature, and summa-
rizes current (as of June 2017) international guidelines on donor screening and recipient management. Of particular interest at the
time of writing was how tomaximize utilization of donors at increased risk for transmission of human immunodeficiency virus, hep-
atitis C virus, and hepatitis B virus, given the recent developments, including the availability of direct-acting antivirals for hepatitis C
virus and improvements in donor screening technologies. The review also covers emerging risks associatedwith recent epidemics
(eg, Zika virus) and the risk of transmission of nonendemic pathogens related to donor travel history or country of origin. Lastly, the
implications for recipient consent of expanded utilization of donors at increased risk of blood-borne viral disease transmission
are considered.
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2 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comhe unanticipated transmission of an infectious disease i. donor-derived infectious disease transmission events in re-T from an organ donor to recipient(s) is a rare event; how-
ever,when it does occur, it is associatedwith significantmorbid-
ity and mortality.1 Therefore, it is the goal of organ donation
and transplantation programs to minimize such events while si-
multaneously maximizing opportunities for transplantation.
This goal relies on (i) rational donor screening policies based
on an understanding of the epidemiology of infectious diseases
of interest and the performance characteristics of the tests used
to diagnose them, and (ii) evidence regarding patient outcomes
in the event of disease transmission, to facilitate informed de-
cision making with regard to the risk tradeoff between
accepting an organwith an increased risk of disease transmis-
sion versus remaining on the waiting list.
This literature review summarizes case reports, peer-
reviewed literature, and international guidelines on the fol-
lowing topics:23 Lung Transplant, Alfred Health, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia.
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© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 3(HCV), and hepatitis B virus (HBV)—is of particular con-
cern in the transplantation context, and HIV, HCV, and
HBVare the primary focus of this review. Other pathogens that
are discussed in detail include human T-lymphotropic virus-1
(HTLV-1), influenza, herpes simplex virus (HSV), Treponema
pallidum,Mycobacterium tuberculosis,multidrug-resistant bac-
teria, Strongyloides stercoralis, Toxoplasma gondii, malaria,
and transmissible spongiform encephalopathy disease.
Other pathogens of special interest that are also discussed
include West Nile Virus (WNV) and Zika virus.
The review excludes:
i. detailed discussion of the biological mechanisms of
disease transmission;
ii. cell and tissue donation;
iii. transmission of noninfectious diseases, such as cancers;
iv. discussion of recipient quality of life as a consequence of
disease transmission;
v. discussion of experimental interventions, drugs, or diag-
nostic tests still in the development pipeline (including ge-
nomic approaches to pathogen identification);
vi. vascularized composite allotransplantation (VCA): given
that the intended outcomes of VCA is quality of life (notTABLE 1.
Definitions of imputability for donor origin of disease transmissio
Terms
Proven Clear evidence of the same infectious disease in the
All of the following conditions must be met:
• Suspected transmission event
• Laboratory evidence of the suspected organism
• Laboratory evidence of the same organism (or m
• Laboratory evidence of the same organism or m
• If there is pretransplant laboratory evidence, it m
transplantationb
Probable Strong evidence suggesting but not proving disease t
Both of the following 2 conditions must be met:
• Suspected transmission event; and
• Laboratory evidence of the suspected organism
AND at least one of the following criteria must also b
• Laboratory evidence of the same organism or m
• Laboratory evidence of the same organism or m
If there is pretransplant laboratory evidence, it must i
Possible Used for all situations where data suggest a possible
or probably) and transmission cannot be formal
The following conditions must be met:
• Suspected transmission event; and
• Laboratory evidence of the suspected organism
• Data that strongly suggest but do not prove a tr
Unlikely Used for situations where it is possible that the disea
recipients but the available data suggests that d
Excluded Clear evidence of an alternative, nondonor origin of d
Intervention without documented
transmission
All or some of the recipients received an intervention
was recognized in any of the recipients
Positive assay without apparent
disease transmission
Used for instances in which a donor assay is positive
by the clinicians not to be clinically significant,
Not assessable When there are insufficient data available to assess im
a published document or insufficient donor and
a Sources are directly quoted, which is why malignancy is mentioned in this context despite not being a fo
b If there were only a single recipient of organs from the donor, there would have to be clear signatures tyin
was not possible, a lower grade classification would be used.survival), much stricter donor eligibility criteria apply
with regard to risk of infectious disease transmission;
vii. animal to human transmission of zoonotic disease;
viii. detailed review of protocols for adverse event reporting
(biovigilance is addressed in the Australian Vigilance and Sur-
veillance Framework forOrganDonation for Transplantation);
ix. explicit recommendations for policy and practice;
x. living donor transplantation.
Lastly, although our understanding of the microbiome
contained within specific organs, particularly lung and small
bowel, is growing, there are at present limited data on the impact
of its transfer on recipients, and transfer of microbiota is not
generally considered in donor evaluation. The transfer of the
microbiome is, therefore, not addressed, with the exception of a
brief discussion of current existing evidence regarding the impact
on recipient outcomes of the transmission of the lung virome.Definition of Donor-derived Infectious
Disease Transmission
The majority of donor-derived infectious disease transmis-
sion events are expected: that is, the donor is known to ben—United Statesa1,4
Definition
donor and at least one of the recipients.
(or malignancy) in a recipient
alignancy) in other recipients (if multiple recipients)
alignancy in the donor
ust indicate that the same recipient was negative for this organism before
ransmission.
(or malignancy) in a recipient
e met:
alignancy in other recipients
alignancy in the donor
ndicate that the same recipient was negative for this organism before transplantation
transmission but are insufficient to fulfill criteria for confirmed transmission (proven and/
ly excluded
or malignancy in a single recipient, or;
ansmission event
se in question could have been transmitted from the donor to at least one of the
onor origin is unlikely
isease
(ie, antimicrobial therapy, specific immunoglobulins or organ removal) and no disease
for infection (ie, coagulase-negative Staphylococcus in perfusate culture) that is felt
is not treated, and not associated with disease transmission
putability of the disease transmission (either from insufficient data being provided in
/or recipient testing)
cus of the current review.
g the donor and recipient pathogen to classify as proven (ie, molecular fingerprinting of bacteria). If this
TABLE 2.
Definitions of imputability for donor origin of infectious disease transmission—Europe5,6
Term Definition
Definite/certain Conclusive evidence beyond reasonable doubt for attribution to process or transplanted organ.
Likely/probable The evidence is clearly in favor of attributing the adverse reaction to the process or transplanted organ.
Possible The evidence is not clear for attributing the adverse reaction to the process or transplanted organ, or to alternative causes.
Unlikely Evidence clearly in favor of attribution to alternative causes.
Excluded Conclusive evidence beyond reasonable doubt for attributing adverse reaction to alternative causes—that is, there is evidence clearly in favor of attributing
the adverse reaction to other causes than the process or transplanted organ.
Not assessable Insufficient data for imputability assessment.
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or Epstein-Barr virus [EBV]). It is expected that this pathogen
will be transmitted to the recipient(s) of their organs, for
whom risk mitigation strategies will be used (eg, prophylaxis
and/or monitoring) to minimize the impact on graft and pa-
tient outcomes. On rare occasions, however, unexpected
transmissions occur. Unexpected transmissions are defined
as the transmission of a pathogen from donor to recipient,
despite donor screening to rule out the presence of donor in-
fection. Unexpected transmissions are most likely to occur if
the donor has recently acquired the infection and is still in the
eclipse period or serological window before detection is pos-
sible, if testing is not undertaken, if sensitive diagnostic tests
are not readily available, or if the donor is infectedwith a rare
or emergent pathogen that is not included in standard screen-
ing protocols. Unexpected transmissions may also occur due
to incomplete or inaccurate donor information, or due to
communication or system failures.2 Unexpected transmis-
sions are more likely to occur in the context of deceased do-
nation; however, they can also occur in living donor
transplantation. United States surveillance data collected
from 2008 to 2013 found that 0.16% of deceased donor or-
gan transplants and 0.01% of living donor transplants were
unexpectedly complicated by donor-derived infectious dis-
ease; the rate of mortality as a consequence of this disease
transmission was 22%.3
One of the difficulties when reviewing the evidence on un-
expected donor-derived infectious disease transmission
events is that attributing origin of disease to the donor is
not always straightforward. For this reason, standard defini-
tions of imputability for donor origin of infectious diseases in
transplant recipients have been developed in the United
States and Europe (see Table 1 and Table 2). Transmission
events reported in this review refer to proven/definite and
probable/likely cases unless otherwise specified.
Standardized definitions of imputability are an essential
component of biovigilance—without agreed upon criteria,
it is very difficult to determine which adverse events should
be counted by surveillance systems. Even with standardized
criteria for classifying donor-derived disease transmission, it
is not always possible to definitively classify reported cases.1
Some of the required confirmatory tests may not have been
performed or appropriate specimens or cultures may not be
available for retrospective testing. Pretransplant recipient
blood or sera are often not available, meaning it cannot be
definitively established whether the recipient had latent infec-
tion before transplantation, or cultures may not have been
maintained to permit molecular fingerprinting of donor and
recipient bacterial strains. It is, therefore, important thatfrozen serum and other samples be maintained for every do-
nor so that, if investigation is required, sufficient archived
samples are available to prove or exclude the donor as the or-
igin of the infectious disease transmission.5
Donor Risk Stratification
Donor-related infectious disease transmission risk can be
conceptually divided into 2 stages: the pretransplant phase
and the posttransplant phase. In the pretransplant phase,
the concept of “transmission risk” refers to the theoretical
probability of disease being transmitted from donor to recip-
ient based on what is known about the donor and the patho-
gen(s) in question. In the pretransplant phase, risk mitigation
practices consist of1:i. risk assessment of the donor based on their medical and social
history, in the context of local epidemiological information;
ii. careful physical examination of the donor and the
donor organs;
iii. laboratory screening of biological samples taken donor for
evidence of infection.
In the posttransplant phase, “transmission risk” (or “potential
transmission”) refers to the potential for live donor cells capa-
ble of transmitting a known infectious pathogen to result in an
infection in the recipient. In the posttransplant phase, riskmit-
igation practices consist of:
iv. prophylaxis in the recipient (including antimicrobials, im-
munoglobulin and/or vaccination),
v. additional screening of donor samples (eg, finalizing blood
and urine cultures and drug sensitivity testing if these were
not completed before transplant),
vi. posttransplant monitoring of recipients,
vii. adverse event reporting and biovigilance systems.
Risk stratification of the donor is a triage step that iden-
tifies donors who should undergo additional screening tests,
and also flags when specific recipient consent may be re-
quired. In the United States, donors are dichotomized as be-
ing either at increased risk or without identified risk.7 In
Europe, a graded system specifying 5 levels of risk, originally
developed for donor evaluation by the Italian National Cen-
tre for Transplantation, was used until recently (see Table 3);
Europe has now also transitioned to a system of dichotomous
categorization of donor risk.8 The approach currently used in
Australia similarly defines potential donors as either increased-
risk or non–increased-risk.
The categorization of donors according to the degree of in-
fectious disease risk associated with their medical and social
history can be useful for several reasons. First, it identifies
donors forwhommore sensitivediagnostic testsmaybewarranted
TABLE 3.
Risk levels for potential organ donors, as defined by the Italian National Transplant Centre8
Category Definition
Unacceptable risk Includes HIV-1/2–positive donors, current neoplastic conditions with some precisely defined exceptions, present nontreatable systemic infection,
and prion disease.
Increased but acceptable
risk
Although the risk of infection is present, organ use is acceptable in the light of a risk-benefit assessment, for example, in cases of patients with
fulminant hepatitis, liver primary nonfunction, or patients undergoing hepatectomy for trauma with organ function loss. In such cases where there
is no chance of survival, the use of an organ with increased risk of transmission of infectious or neoplastic disease is justified by the clinical
urgency. Appropriate prophylaxis should be administered to the recipient where possible.
Calculated risk If the presence of a specified pathogen or the serological status of the donor (HBsAg+, anti-HCV+, or HBcAb+) is compatible with transplantation
into recipients with the same disease or serological status, this is considered calculated risk. This category of risk includes donors with meningitis
submitted to targeted antibiotic therapy for at least 24 hours and donors with bacteremia who have started target antibiotic therapy.
Not assessable risk Defined as where 1 or more assessment elements are missing (eg, failure to collect an accurate medical history, unavailability of microbiology data
despite well-grounded suspicion of infectious pathology) and the evaluation process does not allow an appropriate risk assessment for
transmittable diseases. In such cases, tests and checks have to be performed to consider the donor as suitable and identify those conditions
that represent an absolute or relative contraindication to donation (biomolecular tests, autopsy). If they cannot be performed, donor organs can
only be used in case of emergency, after informed consent of the recipient.
Standard risk When the evaluation process does not identify any risk factor for transmittable disease. However, because null risk does not exist, infectious or
neoplastic pathologies can still be transmitted even if guidelines and good clinical practice are followed.
HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; HBsAg, hepatitis B surface antigen; HCV, hepatitis C virus.
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 5(eg, nucleic acid testing [NAT]), and gives appropriate context to
the interpretation of results from serological tests, which might
yield false-positive or false-negative results and cannot detect very
recently acquired infectionswhere the individual is still within the
serologicalwindow/eclipse phase. Second, by assigning a risk cat-
egory to potential donors, this facilitates discussions with the po-
tential recipient about the risks associated with a particular
donor organ and may, therefore, simplify the consent process.
On the other hand, a “labeling effect” has been described
whereby describing donors as either “standard risk” or “in-
creased risk” may lead to higher rates of organ discard. In
the United States, for example, up to 20% of organs fall un-
der the United States Public Health Service (PHS) criteria for
high risk of HIV, HBV, and HCV (labeled PHS-IR), and the
utilization rate for these organs is significantly lower than
for non–PHS-IR organs. This is despite the absolute risk of
disease transmission being extremely low and posttransplant
survival being equivalent for recipients of PHS-IR and non–
PHS-IR organs.9,10 Patients and their physicians may be reluc-
tant to accept organs labeled with pejorative descriptors, such
as “increased-risk,” if they have the possibility of waiting for
an organ perceived to be without risk of HIV, HBV or
HCV.11-13 Patient education and consent processes, therefore,
need to provide patients with an objective understanding of
the infectious disease risks associated with organ transplanta-
tion, framed in terms of the trade-off between potential risks
and potential benefits involved in organ acceptance decisions.
In 2017, the Victorian and Tasmanian Renal Transplant
Advisory Committee established a new waiting list for pa-
tients awaiting a deceased donor kidney transplant who have
consented to receive a kidney from a donor at increased risk
of HIV, HBV, and HCV (referred to as an increased viral risk
(IVR) donor). IVR donors are defined as (i) having known in-
creased risk behavior and (ii) risk behavior being within the
NAT window for HIV, HBV, or HCV detection (defined as
22 days from admission to hospital) and (iii) having no evi-
dence of active infection (negative serology/NAT).More infor-
mation on the patient education and consent process to join
the IVR donor waiting list is given in Recipient Consent.As of November 2017, the surveillance of adverse events
after organ transplantation in Australia and New Zealand
was performed at the individual jurisdictional level; however,
a framework for an integrated, nationwide biovigilance, and
surveillance system has been developed and is in the process
of being implemented (see Vigilance and Surveillance). The
historical absence of an integrated biovigilance and surveil-
lance system means that a central database of infectious dis-
ease transmission events occurring in Australia and New
Zealand does not currently exist. Table 4was compiled based
on expert consultation and summarizes occurrences of seri-
ous adverse events involving infectious disease transmission
from organ donors to recipients from 2008 onward (no cases
older than 10 years were reported by any of the expert con-
sultants and the most recent reported case occurred in
2016; no cases were reported from New Zealand). Details
were obtained for a total of 18 transplants complicated by
donor-derived infections between 2008 and 2016, from
which there were 8 deaths (mortality rate of 44%). No 2
cases involved the same pathogen. Assuming that the list of
cases in Table 4 is relatively comprehensive, then this indi-
cates that approximately 0.18% of deceased donor organ
transplants in Australia were unexpectedly complicated by
donor-derived infectious disease transmission between 2008
and 2016 (18 transmission events vs approximately 10000
solid organs transplanted from deceased donors in Australia).
This rate is similar to the reported rate of donor-derived infec-
tious disease transmission in the United States of 0.16%.3Current Utilization of Increased-risk Donors
In 2015, 2.7% of actual organ donors in Australia and
New Zealand had drug overdose listed as a cause of death
(P. Clayton, personal communication). The corresponding
proportion in the United Kingdom was 0.3%, whereas in
the United States, it was 9.3% (see Figure 1). Although the
very large proportion of donors derived from drug over-
dose deaths in the United States might suggest a case for
greater utilization of increased-risk donors in Australia and
TABLE 4.
Clinical characteristics and outcomes of unexpected infectious disease transmission events in Australia (published and unpublished
reports) involving deceased donors
Author Year Pathogen
Organ
transplanted Recipient details Clinical course/symptoms
Acute
rejection
Graft
lost Death
Le Page et al14 2010 Influenza B virus Kidney 14-y-old male Severe respiratory distress and fever Day 14 No No
Lung 17-y-old female No (vaccinated and received
oseltamivir prophylaxis)
No No No
Pilmore et al15 2009 HHV-6 Kidney 47-y-old male, second
transplant
Severe diarrhea, liver dysfunction,
pancytopenia, acute abdomen
No No Day 31
Kidney 33-y-old male, combined
heart/kidney transplant
Severe musculoskeletal pain, liver
dysfunction, pancytopenia,
thrombocytopenia
No No No
Jensen et al16 2016 M. tuberculosisa Lung 31-y-old woman Cough No No No
Palacios et al17 2008 Arenavirus Kidney 63-y-old woman Fever, sepsis, encephalopathy, acute
tubular necrosis, chest infiltrates
Yes No Day 36
Liver 64-y-old woman Fever, confusion, encephalopathy with
myoclonus, chest infiltrates
No No Day 30
Kidney 44-y-old woman Fever, intraabdominal hematomas and
effusion, encephalopathy
Yes No Day 29
Personal communication
(K Wyburn)
2008/2009 HCV Kidneyb 28-y-old woman — No No No
Personal communication
(P Clayton)
2009 Pseudomonas Kidney — Fever, sepsis, cardiac arrest due to
pseudomonal mycotic aneurysm
in the transplant renal artery
anastomosis, hypoxic brain injury
No Yes No
Macesic et al18 2017 HSV-2 Kidney/pancreasc Male, 30s Initial AMI and cardiac arrest, intermittent
fever and critically ill. Declared brain
dead and donated lungs and
transplanted kidney
No No Day 9
Liver Female 20s Hepatitis noted day 12 posttransplant,
followed by a rash suggestive of
cutaneous HSV on day 19. Subsequent
resolution with antiviral therapy
No No No
Heart/lungs Female 40s Asymptomatic No No No
Kidney Male 40s Asymptomatic No No No
Kidneyc Male 60s Asymptomatic No No No
Lungsc Female 60s Asymptomatic No No No
Rogers et al19 2008 T. gondii Kidney 60-y-old male Kidney dysfunction, liver dysfunction,
tachypnea, hypoxia, hypotension,
cardiogenic shock
No No Day 30
Kidney 59-y-old female Fever, hypotension, thrombocytopenia,
liver dysfunction, multiorgan failure,
cardiogenic shock
No No Day 32
(Personal communication
A Webster & D Verran)
2015 Disseminated candidiasis Kidney — — — Yes Day 98
a Does not meet definition of proven/probable donor-derivedM. tuberculosis as laboratory evidence of the same pathogen in the donor was not available. Instead, investigation of the donor found a history of latent
tuberculosis, and contact tracing found the same strain of M. tuberculosis in the recipient and the index case.
b HCV was transmitted to the recipient of 1 kidney; however, the second potential recipient avoided transmission as results of retrospective NAT were available before the transplant surgery.
c The kidney-pancreas recipient of the original donation died 9 d posttransplant and his lungs and the previously transplanted kidney were retrieved and transplanted into 2 new recipients.
HHV, human herpes virus; HCV, hepatitis C virus; HSV, herpes simplex virus.
6 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comNew Zealand, international practice must be interpreted in
context, and benchmarking approached with caution. The
high proportion of drug overdose as a cause of death in the
United States donor population is a consequence of the cur-
rent opioid epidemic, which has caused a 2.5-fold increase
in drug-related deaths from 2000 to 2015. More than 6 of
10 drug overdose deaths in the United States were due to opi-
oids (including opioid pain relievers and heroin) in 2014.20
The number of organ donors in the United States with drugoverdose listed as the cause of death increased 350% be-
tween 2003 and 2014 (n = 138 vs n = 625).21
Compared with a drug-related mortality rate in the United
States population aged 15 to 64 years in 2014 of 233.8 per
million population, the drug-related mortality rate in
Australia in 2013 was 116.2 per million population aged
15 to 64 years; in New Zealand, it was 26.7 per million pop-
ulation aged 15 to 64 years.22 In the United Kingdom, the
drug-related mortality rate was 66.7 per million population
FIGURE 1. Twenty-year trends in the percentage of donors with
drug overdose (intended or unintended) as a cause of death in Australia
and New Zealand (ANZ) compared with the United Kingdom (UK) and
UnitedStates (data sources: Australia andNewZealandOrganDonation
Registry [ANZOD], Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network
[OPTN], National Health Service Blood and Transplant [NHSBT]).
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 7aged 15 to 64 years in 2014.22 In all 3 countries, opioids were the
number one drug causing death.22 Notably, the rate of deaths due
to opioids (including prescription opioids) in Australians aged 15
to 54 years has been increasing since 2007, reaching 44.7 deaths
per million population (n = 564) in 2012 versus 30.4 in 2007, al-
though rates are still far below their 1999 peak of 101.9 deaths
per million population.23,24 There has also been a spike in fatali-
ties related to methamphetamine use in Australia: between
2009 and 2015, the annual number of methamphetamine-
related deaths doubled, from around 150 to 300 per year.25
Also relevant whenmaking any international comparisons
with respect to utilization of increased-risk donors is the un-
derlying prevalence of BBV in the population. Among intra-
venous drug user (IVDU) populations in the United States,
United Kingdom, Australia, and NewZealand, the estimated
prevalence of HIV in 2016was 3.6%, 1.3%, 1.7%, and 0.2%,
respectively.26 Estimated prevalence of HCV in IVDU popula-
tions in 2016was 73% in theUnited States, 50% in theUnited
Kingdom, 57% in Australia, and 57% in New Zealand.22
Comparisons of BBV prevalence in the IVDU populations of
selected high-income countries are shown in Figure 2.FIGURE 2. Estimated prevalence of human immunodeficiency virus (HI
lected high-income countries. HCV prevalence estimates represent mid-
and Crime http://unodc.org; source of HIV data: UNAIDS aidsinfo. unaid
the year 2011. IVDU, intravenous drug users.Vigilance and Surveillance
Although cases of donor-derived disease transmission are rare,
the immediate reporting and investigation of any posttransplant
infection in the recipient and the notification of other recipients
of organs and tissues from the same donor is imperative to
prevent/minimize harm to those exposed.At the level of the trans-
plant center/jurisdictional health service, systemsmust be in place
to immediately notify the relevant physicians and to rapidly
assess recipients of other organs or tissues from the infected
donor. Ideally, centralized reporting of serious adverse events
should also occur to enable monitoring of frequency and out-
comes of infectious disease transmission and to facilitate contin-
uous improvement in safety standards and practices in donation
and transplant systems (involving the DonateLife agencies).
InMay 2010, Resolution 63.22 of theWorld Health Assem-
bly added 2 pertinent items to theWorldHealth Organization's
Guiding Principles on Transplantation:
Guiding Principle 10:
The level of safety, efficacy, and quality of human cells, tissues,
and organs for transplantation, as health products of an excep-
tional nature, must be maintained and optimized on an ongoing
basis. This requires implementation of quality systems including
traceability and vigilance, with adverse events and reactions re-
ported, both nationally and for exported human products.
Guiding Principle 11:
The organization and execution of donation and transplanta-
tion activities, as well as their clinical results, must be transparent
and open to scrutiny, while ensuring that the personal anonym-
ity and privacy of donors and recipients are always protected.
This Resolution, therefore, defines an international obligation
among countries with organ and tissue transplantation pro-
grams to have systems in place for quality assurance, traceability,
vigilance and surveillance, and transparent reporting of adverse
events. Not only is this critical to the continuing improvement
of individual transplantation programs but also the more data
that are available on adverse events and their outcomes, the
more that all transplant programs can improve policy and
practice. Serious adverse events are rare, which makes deci-
sion making complicated given a lack of prior experience or
existing evidence. Greater international reporting of such events
enables better decision making at the individual patient level inV) and hepatitis C virus (HCV) among people who inject drugs in se-
range estimates (source of HCV data: United Nations Office on Drugs
s.org). *HCVestimate for Germany represents high range estimate for
8 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comterms of risk mitigation and recipient management. It also im-
proves standards of informed consent as the trade-offs be-
tween transplantation with an increase-risk organ versus
nontransplantation will be better understood.
Internationally, however, centralized systems for sur-
veillance of donor-derived infectious disease transmission
events are still largely nonexistent or in developmental
stages.Well-established biovigilance systems currently exist only
in France, Italy, and the United States. Australia has been work-
ing toward the development of a vigilance and surveillance sys-
tem since 2011, and a formal framework for this system was
published in September 2016.27 Further development and
the implementation of this framework by the Vigilance and
Surveillance Expert Advisory Committee are underway.
The Australian vigilance and surveillance systemwill oper-
ate in parallel with existing, jurisdictional clinical incident
management systems, providing coordinated notification of
serious adverse events and handling data collection and anal-
ysis. The clinical management and investigation of serious
adverse events will remain the responsibility of the hospital
and jurisdictional health authorities where the incident occurs.
The objectives of the national vigilance and surveillance sys-
tem are to enable centralized collection and review of informa-
tion on serious adverse events, to coordinate interjurisdictional
notification where appropriate, and to share de-identified in-
formation on events and outcomes internationally. The 2016
framework document outlines a governance structure, system
requirements for vigilance and surveillance, performance
monitoring strategies, data collection requirements, and re-
quirements for linkages and harmonization of reporting with
international vigilance and surveillance systems.27
INTERNATIONAL VIGILANCE AND
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS
Europe
The European Union has implemented several pieces of
legislation with relation to the quality and safety of human
tissues and cells, including Directives issued in 2006 specify-
ing technical requirements for traceability and notification
of serious adverse events and reactions, and in 2010 specify-
ing standards of quality and safety of human organs intended
for transplantation. From 2009 to 2012, the Substances of
Human Origin Vigilance and Surveillance project developed
guidance documents for EUMember States for the establish-
ment of effective vigilance and surveillance systems for tissues
and cells for transplantation and assisted reproduction.28
In 2011, the European Framework for the Evaluation of
Organ Transplants project developed a framework for a
pan-European registry of organ and transplant registries,
including a set of recommendations with respect to vigilance
and surveillance in organ transplantation (http://www.
notifylibrary.org/content/european-framework-evaluation-
organ-transplants-efretos).
The European Directorate for the Quality of Medicines
& HealthCare (EDQM) makes the following recommen-
dations with respect to vigilance and surveillance in organ
transplantation5:
• governance structures must be defined and understood
by stakeholders;
• health authorities should develop reporting procedures, stan-
dardized notification forms, surveillance methods, acceptablerisk criteria, and examples of serious adverse events that must
be reported;
• operating procedures must be in place defining how trans-
plant centers are to identify, report, investigate, and communi-
cated adverse events;
• to assist the investigation of adverse events, frozen serum and
cell samples should be maintained for every donor;
• reporting should include a description of the adverse event, a
root cause analysis, and a description of steps taken to resolve
the problem/avoid similar events occurring in future;
• adverse events should be reported immediately, before investi-
gation and confirmation, with all health authorities, trans-
plant centers, and tissue establishments being alerted;
• ideally, transplant centers should have a designated
vigilance coordinator;
• central coordination and oversight should be in place for center
level vigilance and surveillance and qualitymanagement systems;
• regular audits should be conducted of data collection procedures
and the investigation of adverse events by transplant centers;
• computerized systems for data collection and management
should be established;
• data collection should be integrated with existing organ dona-
tion and transplant registries.
United Kingdom
United Kingdom Advisory Committee on the Safety of
Blood, Tissues and Organs (SaBTO) guidelines recommend
the routine screening of recipients at 1 year posttransplant
for presence of pathogens potentially transmitted from the
donor.29 Nucleic acid testing is preferred to account for the
effect of immunosuppression on serological test accuracy, and
ideally, samples from the recipient taken pretransplantation
would be available to differentiate between preexisting and
newly acquired disease. The SaBTOguidelinesmake the follow-
ing recommendations where there is potential transmission29:
• it is essential that confirmatory testing, including NATassays,
be undertaken on the donor sample to confirm specificity of
the serological reactivity and the likelihood of transmission;
• a risk assessment should be undertaken to identify the suscep-
tibility of the recipient to infection and to disease;
• expert advice should be sought and appropriate postexposure
prophylaxis administered to the recipient;
• prophylaxis should also be considered for close contacts of the
recipient where secondary transmission is possible;
• the exposed recipient should be enrolled for follow-up;
• it is goodmedical practice to refer an infected donor and close
contacts of any infected donor, living or deceased, to an
appropriate expert.
Where recipient infection is detected and indicates poten-
tial transmission from the donor, it is then the duty of the
recipient's physician to ensure that recipients of organs and
tissues from the same donor are notified as soon as possible
and made aware of the infection risk. The National Health
Service Blood and Transplant Directorate for Organ Dona-
tion and Transplantation (ODT) has a Duty Office that is
able to assist in informing the relevant clinicians. All incidents
reported to the ODTDirectorate are managed by the Clinical
Governance Team within ODT.30 The Clinical Governance
Team forms the Clinical Governance Improvement Group,
which is responsible for reviewing and monitoring serious ad-
verse events and reactions, and aims to complete investigations
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 9within 90 days or less. Once an incident has undergone a full
review, the individual who reported the incident will be sent
a summary of the outcome and any key actions or learning
that is required. The central remit of the Clinical Governance
Improvement Group is to (1) have oversight of all incidents,
review in detail individual incidents, and ensure areas of
concern are addressed, learning is shared, and practice is
changed as appropriate; and (2) identify and review key
themes and trends across incidents, and to develop key ac-
tions following these reviews.
Wider oversight of incidents is provided by the ODT Clini-
cal Audit, Risk and Effectiveness Group (CARE). ODTCARE
is chaired by the ODT Associate Medical Director, and its
members include senior operational, nursing and medical rep-
resentation, clinical governance, quality assurance and scien-
tists.30 The role of ODT CARE is to monitor and provide
oversight of clinical complaints and legal claims, Clinical Au-
dit, Clinical Risk Register, and the approval of clinical poli-
cies proposed by Advisory Groups. The ODT CARE group
ensures that:
• clinical governance requirements are met;
• opportunities to improve practice and compliance are identi-
fied and pursued;
• areas of clinical concern are addressed and lessons learned, iden-
tified, and,where appropriate, shared and changes implemented;
• lessons learned are shared among the donation, retrieval and
transplant community as appropriate;
• the regulatory requirements of the Care Quality Commission, the
Human Tissue Authority and other regulatory bodies are met.
ODT CARE in turn reports to ODT Senior Management
Team and the United Kingdom National Health Service
Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) CARE Committee, which
has oversight across NHSBT.30TABLE 5.
OPTN Transplant Program requirements for communicating post
Policy 15: Identification of Transmissible Diseases)32
15.5.A Transplant Program Requirements for Posttransplant Discovery of Donor Disease or M
(1) If the findings are from transplant program testing of the donor, then the transplant pr
(2) Notify the recipients under care at the transplant program, or the recipient's agents, o
(3) Document the new information about the donor and potential risk or confirmation of tr
(4) Follow the notified recipients for the development of disease or malignancy after trans
(5) Offer the recipients additional testing, monitoring, and treatment as appropriate, in add
15.5.B Transplant Program Requirements for Reporting Posttransplant Discovery of Recipien
When an organ recipient is suspected to have, is confirmed positive for, or has died from a
that it could be from the transplanted organ, then the transplant program must do all of t
(1) Notify host OPO or living donor recovery hospital that procured the organ without wai
program must notify the host OPO or living donor recovery hospital by phone and provide
(2) Report the event through the OPTN Improving Patient Safety Portal as soon as possibl
(3) Provide additional related information or specimens if requested
15.5.C Transplant Program Requirements for Postreporting Follow-Up
If the transplant program has a recipient that is involved in an OPTN Improving Patient Safet
(1) Submit any relevant test results including cultures, infectious disease testing results, im
living donor recovery hospital, and OPTN patient safety staff requests for information rega
test results, diagnosis, and plans for treatment and follow-up
(2) Contribute to a follow-up review of the event in partnership with OPTN patient safety staf
(3) Provide additional related information or specimens if requested.
OPTN, Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network; OPO, organ procurement organization.United States
The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984 legis-
lated for biovigilance in organ transplantation in the United
States, establishing standards for traceability and procedures
for the prevention of transplantation of organs infected with
HIV. Under the current system, the United States Organ Pro-
curement and Transplant Network (OPTN) requires that all
unexpected, potentially donor-derived disease transmission
events be reported to the OPTN/United States United Network
for Organ Sharing (UNOS), where cases are then reviewed by
the Disease Transmission Advisory Committee (DTAC). Dis-
ease Transmission Advisory Committee is then responsible for
(i) estimating the risk of donor-derived disease transmission,
(ii) reviewing cases reported to OPTN, (iii) notifying public
health agencies in the event of a suspected transmission, (iv)
reporting findings to the transplant community, and (v) provid-
ing policy recommendations to the OPTN.31 Details of the
reporting requirements for posttransplant discovery of disease
in donors or recipients are given in Table 5.32 When a notifica-
tion of a potential transmission event is received, a report with
all patient information redacted is delivered securely to DTAC
members, who are alerted of the new report. Disease Trans-
mission Advisory Committee then engages in an email-based
confidential medical peer review process. Organ procurement
organizations (OPOs) are subsequently required to submit a
follow-up report 45 days after the initial report with the results
of their investigation into the event.31
Since the implementation of the OPTN mandatory
reporting policy in 2005, several improvements have been
made to the reporting system, including the 2012 publication
of an algorithm to help the committee classify reports of poten-
tial donor transmission events as proven, probable, possible,
unlikely, or excluded from further review.3 This algorithm
can be viewed at the following link: http://bit.ly/2E2eQC7.3transplant discovery of disease ormalignancy (OPTNPolicies;
alignancy
ogram must notify the host OPO or living donor recovery hospital of the findings
f the risk or confirmation of transmissible disease or malignancy
ansmissible disease or malignancy in the recipient's medical records
plant
ition to routine follow up care
t Disease or Malignancy
potential transmissible disease, infection or malignancy, and there is substantial concern
he following:
ting for all medical documentation that may eventually become available. The transplant
documentation as soon as possible but no more than 24 hours after learning of the event
e by no more than 24 hours after learning of the event
y Portal report, then the transplant program must also do all of the following:
aging studies, or autopsy results to OPTN patient safety staff2. Respond to host OPO,
rding the recipient and communicate updated information regarding recipient condition,
f
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ported potential transmission events involved HCV, tubercu-
losis, HIV, Chagas, HBV, toxoplasmosis andWNV, aswell as
bacterial infections. Only approximately 12% of fully evalu-
ated reports of infectious disease transmission events in 2013
were ultimately classified as proven or probable (with ~10%
classified as possible, ~33%classified as intervention without
documented transmission, and 45% classified as unlikely/
excluded).3
Overall, the estimated rate of proven/probable unexpected
disease transmission events in the United States is low: from
July 1, 2015, to June 30, 2016, there were 19 proven/
probable infectious disease transmission events out of ~15
500 donors (9500 deceased donors), affecting 73 recipi-
ents.33 Death in association with a proven/probable infec-
tious disease transmission event occurred in 3 recipients in
this 12-month period.33 These numbers are likely, however,
to be affected by underrecognition and underreporting of in-
fectious disease transmission events, particularly in the case
of the transmission of bacterial pathogens, which may pres-
ent as transient fevers in the recipient. Infections caused by
common pathogens, such as S. aureusmay not be recognized
as donor-derived, yet transmission of methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-resistant en-
terococci (VRE) or multidrug-resistant Gram-negative rods
are among the most common type of bacterial transmission
event, against which standard antimicrobial prophylactic
treatment in the recipient is inadequate.1
NOTIFY
The NOTIFYproject, launched in 2010, was a joint initia-
tive of the World Health Organization, the Italian National
Transplant Center (CNT) and the EU-funded Vigilance and
Surveillance of Substances of Human Origin project. From
September 2010 to February 2011, global experts gathered
information on documented cases of adverse outcomes in
transplantation, and these cases were used as the basis for de-
veloping general principles on detection and investigation of
adverse events. The NOTIFY website (www.notifylibrary.
org) hosts the database of vigilance information collected
by the NOTIFY Project. The NOTIFY website is managed
by the Italian National Transplant Centre, a WHO Collabo-
rating Centre on Vigilance and Surveillance for HumanCells,
Tissues andOrgans, and the work of updating the database is
carried out by a large group of experts, regulators, and clini-
cians across the globe. The NOTIFY library is intended to fa-
cilitate access to information on vigilance and surveillance
derived from organ donation and transplantation programs
around the world.
In February 2015, the Spanish National Transplant
Organisation, ONT, and the Catalan Organisation for
Transplantation signed an agreement with CNT to sup-
port the work of the NOTIFY project, contributing re-
sources and expertise.
CHALLENGES FOR BIOVIGILANCE
One particular challenge for vigilance and surveillance sys-
tems is that the reporting of “donor-derived” transmission
events is subject to substantial bias. It will not be clear in
many cases whether infection is in fact donor-derived, and
whether reporting occurs will depend on the interpretation
of the treating physician. Whether notification occurs willthen depend on the subjective evaluation of the evidence of
a donor-derived transmission event. This may lead to un-
derreporting, or delays in reporting. Where organs are dis-
tributed across multiple transplant centers, this may make it
even more difficult for infection to be recognized as donor-
derived. This emphasizes the importance of a centralized, in-
tegrated vigilance and surveillance system, and the need for
that system to be capable of flaggingmultiple reports arising
from the same donor in real time.31 The longer that a system
is in place the more data inputs it will have to be able to
facilitate more accurate decision making in the future.
Therefore, the vigilance and surveillance system needs it-
self to be subject to continuous performance evaluation
and improvement.
Although vigilance and surveillance systems are primarily
concerned with unexpected serious adverse events, data
should also be collected for expected transmission events in
the case of diseases where the outcome of donor to recipient
transmission is incompletely understood, or in circumstances
where the epidemiology of the disease is changing.34 A topi-
cal example of this would be the transplantation of organs
from donors known to be HCV-positive, given the rapidly
changing treatment protocols in the event of disease trans-
mission. The data collection goals of the system must be
clearly defined and clearly understood by those responsible
for reporting events.
Lastly, initial reporting processes need to be easy and
quick, with full details to be submitted later. It is impera-
tive that the notification of a potential disease transmission
event is disseminated as early as possible, and that it not de-
layed by cumbersome form-filling requirements or system/
administrative issues.Data Sources
Major sources of information on international standards
and practices included theNOTIFY Library (TheGlobal Vig-
ilance and Surveillance Database for Medical Products of
Human Origin; www.notifylibrary.org), The European Di-
rectorate for the Quality of Medicines & Health Care Guide
to the quality and safety of organs for transplantation (Sixth
Edition), the SaBTO Guidance on the microbiological safety
of human organs, tissues and cells used in transplantation
(2011), and Transplant Infections (Fourth Edition, eds.
Ljungman, P., Snydman, D. and Boeckh M.).5,29,34,35 Epide-
miological data on infectious disease notification rates and
the underlying population prevalence of disease in Australia
were obtained from the Communicable Disease Network
Australia (CDNA) Australian National Notifiable Diseases
Surveillance System and other CDNA publications, and the
Annual Surveillance reports of The Kirby Institute.36,37 Epi-
demiological data for New Zealand were obtained from the
New Zealand Ministry of Health Institute of Environmental
Science andResearch Ltd PublicHealthObservatory, and the
Ministry of Health Communicable Disease Control Man-
ual.38-40 International statistics on the prevalence of selected
infectious diseases were obtained from the United Nations
World Drug Report, AIDSinfo (UNAIDS), and the World
Health Organization.22,26
Information on unexpected infectious disease transmission
events involving deceased solid organ donors was obtained
by a systematic review of the published literature. Articles
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 11reporting on cases of donor-derived infectious disease trans-
mission were identified using the search strategy outline in
SDC Materials and Methods 1, http://links.lww.com/TXD/
A152. Given the absence of biovigilence systems in most ju-
risdictions and a general underreporting of disease transmis-
sion events in the published literature, the reports identified
likely only represent a small proportion of actual disease
transmission events. In addition, establishing a true denomi-
nator for transmission events is not possible at this time, as
this would require the centralized recording of donor disease
status for all used donors. At this time, any information that
we have on the quantitative risk of disease transmission from
organ donors to recipients is based on retrospective record
reviews conducted in a research context (usually based on a
single center's experience). Given these limitations, reported
transmission events are summarized qualitatively. The cir-
cumstances of each case, donor characteristics and serologi-
cal profile, and the outcomes of the recipients are described,
and similarities and differences across cases are considered.
DECEASED DONOR EVALUATION FOR INFECTIOUS
DISEASE RISK
Donor Medical History and Behavioral Risk Evaluation
Infectious disease transmission risk is assessed via careful
review of the potential donor's medical and social history.41
The results of cultures and other assays to detect and diag-
nose infection must be interpreted in the context of the
patient's full history, and the probability of false-negative re-
sults needs to be considered against the donor's background
of any reported risk factors, such as IVDUor high-risk sexual
contact. Close attention must also be paid to travel history:
potential donors with recent travel to or previous residence
in areas where they may have been exposed to endemic
pathogens—Strongyloides stercoralis, Schistosoma spp.,
malaria, Trypanosoma cruzi, or endemic mycoses, for
example—warrant additional screening. It is, therefore, es-
sential that the social history is obtained from someone close
to the potential donor, and an assessment should be made of
how well the person knows the donor.7 The American Asso-
ciation of Tissue Banks has developed guidelines for donor
risk assessment interviews.42 In Australia, the social history
is captured in a nationally standardized form as part of the
electronic donor record (EDR) and is completed by the Do-
nor Coordinator (http://www.tsanz.com.au/downloads/
Protocols_Appendix1.pdf).
In the event of positive test results or the existence of be-
havioral risk factors, decisions about whether to use a po-
tential donor's organs need to be weighed in the context of
the risk tolerance and medical status of the potential re-
cipient(s).7 Different thresholds for an acceptable level of
risk will apply to a potential recipient for whom the trans-
mission of an infectious disease would be a devastatingFIGURE 3. Generalized diagram of eclipse and window periods.outcome versus a potential recipient for whom this may
be their only chance at transplantation and would other-
wise die on the waiting list.
Screening for Infectious Disease in Deceased
Donors: Overview
Pretransplant screening of both donors and recipients is
necessary to identify any diseases/conditions that (i) preclude
transplantation, or (ii) require treatment, prophylaxis, immu-
nization, and/or monitoring. It is necessary to test for both
active and latent infections in donors and recipients before
initiation of immunosuppression, though the implications
of a positive test will vary depending on the organ to be
transplanted. Routine donor screening generally includes
tests for CMV, EBV, HIV, hepatitis B (HBV), hepatitis C
(HCV), syphilis (T. pallidum), and Toxoplasma gondii in
the case of potential heart donors.
The goals and priorities of infectious disease screening in
organ donors differ from the screening of blood donors in
several important ways. First, the timeline for donor screen-
ing is restricted to less than 12 to 18 hours, whereas blood
donor screening can take place 24 to 48 hours after donation
and samples can be screened in batches. Second, blood do-
nors are able to give their medical and social history via stat-
utory declaration, whereas for deceased donors this is
provided by friends or family, who may be unaware of a his-
tory of drug use or high-risk sexual contact. Thirdly, the goal
of blood donor screening is to achieve zero risk of disease
transmission to recipients of blood transfusions, whereas in
the context of organ transplantation there is a trade-off to
be made between residual risk of disease transmission and
the urgency of organ transplantation.
Screening protocols in organ transplantation are,
therefore, required to reduce the risk of infectious disease
transmission to an acceptable level (without necessarily elim-
inating risk completely) while keeping turnaround time un-
der ~12 hours. Another key consideration for screening
protocols is the serological window for BBV—the period
from infection to the time that the individual develops anti-
bodies that can be detected by serological testing. During this
window, a potential donor may be seronegative (and, there-
fore, will test negative for disease based on serological tests)
but is still able to transmit infection (see Figure 3).
Figure 4 shows the serological and NATwindows for HIV,
HCV and HBV. The eclipse period refers to the preramp
phase and the portion of the ramp-up/exponential phase
where the viral titer in peripheral blood has not yet reached
levels that are detectable by NAT. Once the viral titer reaches
detectable levels (5–6 days postinfection for HIV, 3–5 days
for HCV, and 20–22 days for HBV), the viral load continues
to increase until the plateau phase is reached, after which se-
roconversion occurs. NAT, therefore, significantly reduces
the detection window for HIV and HCV, and to a lesser
FIGURE 4. Serological and nucleic acid testing (NAT) window for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), and hepatitis B
virus (HBV) (source: South Eastern Area Laboratory Services, New South Wales, Australia). RNA, ribonucleic acid.
TABLE 6.
Length of windowperiod for selected blood borne viruses under
different testing methods44
Pathogen
Standard
serology, d
Enhanced serology (fourth-generation or
combined antibody-antigen tests), d NAT, da
HIV 17–22 ~7–16 5–6
HCV ~70 ~40–50 3–5
HBV 35–44 Not applicable 20–22
a Based on Gen Probe TMA for HIV and HCV, and Roche Cobas MPX for HBV.
HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; HCV, hepatitis C virus; HBV, hepatitis B virus; NAT, nucleic acid testing.
12 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comextent for HBV. The serological window for HIV detection is
also reduced by the combined antigen/antibody test, which
identifies antibodies against HIV-1 and HIV-2 as well as the
presence of HIV-1 p24 antigen, which is shed into the blood-
stream at high levels shortly after infection.43NAT is additionally
useful in the context of HCV screening, as a positive HCV-NAT
distinguishes active HCV infection from an anti–HCV-positive,
NAT-negative result that is indicative of a previous infection that
has been cleared.The length of the serological andNATwindows
for HIV, HCVand HBVare further specified in Table 6.
Although permitting earlier detection of BBV, until rela-
tively recently the use of NAT in potential organ donors
was limited by assay cost, long turnaround times, and high
false-positives rates especially among average- to low-risk
donors.44 Recent development of new platforms has reduced
the cost of NAT and brought turnaround times down to 4 to
6hours, permitting repeat testing and reducing the false-positive
rate. Current international donor screening guidelines, how-
ever, retain some variation in their recommendations regard-
ing when NAT is appropriate at this time (see Table 7). UK
guidelines recommend NAT testing for HIV whenever this
is feasible (ie, where turnaround times and logistics permit),
and require all donors to be screened using the combined
anti-HIVantigen/antibody test at a minimum. European Di-
rectorate for the Quality of Medicines and Health Care
guidelines also require the combined anti-HIVantigen/antibody
test as a minimum requirement, but NAT is recommended only
for donors at increased risk of BBV.OPTNrequires the anti-HIV
antibody test alone for average-risk donors, with NATor thecombined anti-HIVantigen/antibody test required for donors
identified as being at increased risk for HIV transmission.
OPTN guidelines also allow for exceptions to the HIV
screening requirement for organs other than kidneys when
the medical urgency of the situation warrants the transplan-
tation of an organ that has not been tested for HIV (policy
2.7.A), provided that (i) all available deceased donor medical
information and social history information is provided to the
transplant program, and (ii) the deceased donor is treated as
having an increased risk for disease transmission in accordance
with the US Public Health Services Guidelines. In this circum-
stance the receiving transplant hospital must obtain docu-
mented informed consent from the potential recipient (or their
authorized agent) before transplantation can take place.32
Both OPTN and SaBTO guidelines require HCV-NAT
among mandatory tests for all donors, whereas EDQM
TABLE 7.
International protocols for infectious disease testing—mandatory testing requirements for potential deceased donors of solid
organs in the United States, United Kingdom, and Europe
OPTNa,b SaBTOc EDQMd
• Anti-HIV test OR anti-HIV Ag/Ab combination test*
• HBsAg and anti-HBc
Anti-HCV
• Hepatitis C ribonucleic acid (RNA) by donor screening
or diagnostic NAT
• Anti-CMV donor screening OR diagnostic test
• Anti-EBV donor screening OR diagnostic test
• Anti–T. pallidum donor screening or diagnostic test.
• Anti–T. gondii IgG
*For donors at increased risk for HIV, HBV and HCV transmissione,
either HIV RNA by donor screening, diagnostic NAT, or the HIV
antigen/antibody (Ag/Ab) combination test is also required, unless:
– The donor has already been tested for HIV using the HIV Ag/Ab
combination test
– The donor's only increased risk factor is having received hemodialysis
in the past 12 months.
• NAT test for HIV or anti-HIV
Ag/Ab combination testf
• NAT test for HCV or
anti-HCVf
• NAT test for HBV or
HBsAg and anti-HBcf,g
• Anti-HTLV1/2
• Anti–T. pallidum
• Anti–T. gondii IgG
• Anti-CMV
• Anti-EBV
Before organ recovery:
• Anti-HIV Ag/Ab combination test*
• HBsAg AND anti-HBc*
• Anti-HCV*
As soon as possible (not necessarily before recovery and transplant):
• Anti–T. pallidum ELISA
• Anti–T. gondii IgG
• Anti-CMV
• Anti-EBV-VCA-IgG
*Screening should be extended to NAT for donors with an increased
risk of HIV, HBV or HCV infection, with the results of NAT made
available before organ recovery.
EDQM guidelines recommend that all positive serological results be
confirmed on a second serological test before a decision is made
to NOT recover the donor organs.
a OPTN Policies: Policy 2.9 (effective date 10 November 2016).
b All tests must be FDA licensed, approved or cleared for screening organ donors.
c Advisory Committee on the Safety of Blood, Tissues and Organs (SaBTO): Guidance on the microbiological safety of human organs, tissues and cells used in transplantation. Department of Health, United
Kingdom Government. Published February 21, 2011.
d European Directorate for the Quality of Medicines & Health Care: Guide to the quality and safety of organs for transplantation, 6th Edition. Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2016.
e As defined under the U.S. Public Health Services (PHS) Guideline.45
f NAT tests for HIV, HBV and HCV are not mandatory for organ transplantation, but their use represents good clinical practice. Turnaround time will not always permit provision of NAT results before organ trans-
plantation, but they should still be performed to ensure the rapid identification of the recipients of potentially infectious organs. If NAT tests are either not done, or the results are not available before organ donation,
combined antigen and antibody assays (rather than testing alone) are required for HIV, and should be considered for HCV.
g Anti-HBc screening is indicated for liver and for tissues but not for other organ donation. As other organs or tissues may be taken from the same donor, in practice the results of this test will often be available.
Donors whose serum contains anti-Hbc in the absence of HbsAg should be tested for anti-Hbs to confirm immunity to HBV infection. Consideration should be given to confirming the specificity of sera which exhibit
anti-Hbc reactivity in the absence of other markers.
OPTN, Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network; SaBTO, Advisory Committee on the Safety of Blood, Tissues & Organs; EDQM, European Directorate for the Quality of Medicines and HealthCare; HIV,
human immunodeficiency virus; HBsAg, hepatitis B surface antigen; CMV, cytomegalovirus; EBV, Epstein-Barr virus; HBV, hepatitis B virus; HCV, hepatitis C virus; NAT, nucleic acid testing; HTLV1, human T-
lymphotropic virus-1; ELISA, enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; VCA, viral capsid antigen.
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 13only recommend NAT for donors at increased risk of HCV
infection and donors with an anti-HCVreactive result, to de-
termine whether clearance of viremia exists. Historically, a
positive HCV-NAT would have been a contraindication to
transplantation. However, with the advent of direct-acting
antiviral agents (DAAs) for HCV, this situation is rapidly
changing,46 and early trials have demonstrated successful
outcomes from the transplantation of HCV-infected kidneys
into HCV-negative recipients.47 For a detailed discussion see
Donor Screening and Utilization.
Only SaBTO guidelines recommend HBV-NAT as stan-
dard. OPTN, SaBTO and EDQM all require HBsAg and
anti-HBc screening tests at a minimum. Recently, in the
United States, however, there has been a significant increase
in HBV-NAT use concurrent with the requirement for
HCV-NAT, as most OPOs now use the triplex NAT assay
(personal communicationM Ison). A positive HBsAg test in-
dicates active infection, and HBV could be transmitted by
any organ or tissue in this context. A negative HBsAg test
but positive anti-HBc often indicates a cleared infection,
and organs from these donors may be transplanted in certain
cases with appropriate HBV prophylaxis.
Recommendations for EBV and CMV screening are simi-
lar in the United States, UK and Europe. Although CMV
and EBV infection are not contraindications to donation,
knowing the serostatus of the donor and potential recipient
is critical to the implementation of appropriate prophylaxisor other risk reduction strategies. Donor screening should
use assays with high sensitivity and specificity for anti-
CMV IgG.48 For EBV, assays testing for viral-capsid antigen
IgG (VCA IgG) are preferable.49
Similarly, screening for T. pallidum is mandated for all do-
nors by OPTN, SaBTO, and EDQM. The syphilis testing al-
gorithm described by the US Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) is as follows: an initial enzyme immunoassay (EIA)
treponemal test (TP-EIA) is performed, with a positive result
confirmed by a nontreponemal test such as the rapid plasma
reagin (RPR) test. In the event of a negative RPR test, a
second treponemal test should be performed such as the
T. pallidum particle agglutination (TP-PA) test. If this second
treponemal test is negative, then a third treponemal test should
be performed, such as the fluorescent treponemal antibody
(FTA-ABS). If either the second or third antibody tests are pos-
itive then a diagnosis of syphilis is made.50 A positive TP-EIA
but negative results on RPR, TP-PA, and FTA-ABS indicate a
false-positive result or resolved infection. Such reverse screen-
ing approaches are associated with a lower rate of false-
positive test results.51
OPTN, SaBTO, and EDQM additionally require testing
for anti–T. gondii IgG as standard. Only SaBTO guidelines
require testing for anti-HTLV1/2 as standard.
The TSANZ Clinical Guidelines for Organ Donation and
Transplantation fromDeceasedDonors (April 2016) broadly
outline the standard routine investigations and recommended
TABLE 8.
Policies for infectious disease screening in potential organ donors: Australia and New Zealand (see also Table 9)
TSANZ52 New Zealanda
Mandatory
• Anti-HIV-1/2
• HBsAg and anti-HBc and anti-HBs
• Anti-HCV
Recommended
• HIV-NAT*
• HCV-NAT*
• HBV-NAT*
• Anti-HTLV 1/2**
• Anti-CMV***
• Anti-EBV***
• Anti–T. pallidum ***
*NAT is recommended for HIV, HCV, and HBV using PCR assays in
donors at increased risk of infection, based on the definition of
increased risk developed by the United States PHS45
**Strongly recommended for potential donors from population groups
with a high prevalence of infection
***Recommended but not mandatory
Standard-risk donors
Prospective tests
• Anti-HIV-1/2 OR anti-HIV Ag/Ab combination test
• HBsAg and anti-HBc and anti-HBs
• Anti-HCV
• Anti-CMV
• Anti-HTLV 1/2
• Anti–T. pallidum (EIA)
Retrospective tests
• Anti-EBV (IgG and IgM)
• Toxo IgG and IgM*
• Anti-HSV 1 (IgG) and anti-HSV 2 (IgG)*
• Anti-VZV (IgG)*
Increased-risk donors
All prospective and retrospective tests as listed above, with the addition of HIV, HCV, and HBV NAT**
*Performed for heart donors and lung donors only
**All donors who donate heart valves or skin will also have retrospective NAT completed.
a Personal communication J Langlands, Organ Donation New Zealand.
TSANZ, Transplantation Society of Australia and New Zealand; HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; HBsAg, hepatitis B surface antigen; HCV, hepatitis C virus; NAT, nucleic acid testing; HBV, hepatitis B virus;
HTLV, human T-lymphotropic virus; CMV, cytomegalovirus; EBV, Epstein-Barr virus; PCR, polymerase chain reaction; PHS, Public Health Service; EIA, enzyme immunoassay.
14 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.cominvestigations for deceased donors in Australia and New
Zealand Table 8. Organ Donation New Zealand has their
own jurisdiction-specific donor screening policy (Table 8), as
do each of the Australian States and Territories (see Table 9).
Jurisdiction-specific policies are generally similar to/informed
by the TSANZ guidelines, though with some variations as
outlined in Table 9. In all jurisdictions, all donors are required
to have serological testing for anti-HIV-1/2 (or the anti HIV
Ag/Ab combination test), HBsAg, anti-HBs, anti-HBc, and
anti-HCV. As of July 2017, Queensland, South Australia, Tas-
mania, and Victoria routinely order NAT for HIV, HCV, and
HBV for all solid organ donors, requiring prospective re-
sults in the case of increased-risk donors (retrospective re-
sults are acceptable for nonincreased risk-donors). In New
Zealand, New South Wales, and Western Australia, urgent
(prospective) NAT is required for donors with: (i) evidence
of BBV (positive serology or known history), (ii) recent expo-
sure to risk factors for BBV (past ~6 months), or (iii) where
medical history is not available.
All jurisdictions stipulate mandatory prospective anti-
CMV testing. NSW, Queensland, SA, and WA also require
prospective anti-EBVand anti–T. pallidum testing; Tasmania
and New Zealand require retrospective testing for anti-EBV.
Jurisdictions are variable with regard to guidelines for
HTLV-1/2 testing: NSW recommends HTLV-1/2 testing at
the clinician's discretion; New Zealand, Queensland, SA,
and Victoria include HTLV-1/2 among mandatory prospec-
tive tests; WA lists anti–HTLV-1/2 among additional routine
tests (not strictly mandatory); Tasmania recommends retro-
spective testing for HTLV-1/2. Only Queensland, SA, and
WA routinely test for toxoplasmosis; New Zealand includes
toxoplasmosis screening among retrospective tests.
The list of possible pathogens for which potential donors
might be screened is very long. Which of these pathogens to
screen for depends on whether:• The pathogen is sufficiently prevalent in the population so
that screening would be useful;
• There is evidence that the pathogen in question can be trans-
mitted by organ transplantation;
• Transmission of the pathogen would result in significant mor-
bidity and mortality;
• A sufficiently accurate, rapid and affordable screening test exists;
• The agent has a high level of potential harm (eg, transmissible
spongiform encephalopathies [TSE], WNV).
For many of the notable cases of unexpected disease trans-
mission that have occurred in the past decade - including
lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCMV), arenavirus
and rabies—screening would not be warranted based on
the criteria above.34 Furthermore, even when screening is
performed as per guidelines, unexpected transmission events
can occur. Donor screening may occur during the eclipse or
window period of the disease, or screening tests can yield
false-negative results (a negative assay result when the
true result should be positive, due to unforeseen technical
error).53,54 In some urgent cases the risk of waiting for
test results may outweigh the risk to the patient of disease
transmission. Alternatively, prophylaxis or vaccination
may fail, as has happened in several reported cases of
posttransplant fulminant HBV associated with mutated
strains of the virus that evaded recipient vaccination,55,56
or lamivudine-resistant strains of HBV.57 Human error
may also be the reason for unexpected transmission,
such as in a 2007 case of HIV transmission in Italy where
the donor's HIV-positive status was incorrectly transcribed
as negative on their donation record.58
Donor screening can never be strictly fail-safe, which is
why (i) screening must be supported by vigilance and surveil-
lance systems that are capable of responding to adverse
events if andwhen they happen, and (ii) the informed consent
of recipients is essential (not only in cases where the donor is
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TABLE 10.
Additional tests which might be considered for donors who have lived in areas with endemic disease5
Tests Central and South America North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Indian subcontinent Southeast Asia
HTLV-1/2 serology Always Always Always Always Always
NAT for Plasmodium spp. Central America and Amazon No Always Always Always
Stool examinationa Always Always Always Always Always
Urine examinationb No Egypt Always No No
Strongyloides stercoralis serology Always Always Always Always Always
Schistosoma spp. serology Caribbean, Venezuela and Brazil Always Always No Always
T. cruzi serology for screening; NAT or Strout
test for exclusion of parasitemia
Always (not Caribbean) No No No No
Leishmania serology Always Always Always Always Always
Paracoccidioides brasilliensis serology Brazil No No No No
Histoplasma capsulatum and Coccidioides
immitis serology
Always No Western Africa (Histoplasmosis) No No
a Entamoeba histolytica, Clonorchis spp., Opisthorcis spp., Schistosoma spp., Strongyloides spp.
b S. haematobium.
HTLV, human T-lymphotropic virus; NAT, nucleic acid testing.
16 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comconsidered to be at increased risk).Where donor information
about behavioral risk factors is incomplete, the donor should
be treated in the same way as an increased-risk donor.45
Another issue for donor screening is hemodilution: where
the donor requires multiple blood transfusions or significant
infusions of intravenous (IV) fluids before donation, hemodilu-
tion may occur such that serum antibodies and targets for PCR
are at too low a concentration to be detected. OPTN guidelines
state that OPOs must use nonhemodiluted blood samples for
the purpose of serological screening of deceased donors wher-
ever possible.59 If only a hemodiluted sample is available, that
donor is treated as though they are an increased-risk donor
according to the US PHS Guideline (ie, HIV RNA by donor
screening, diagnostic NAT, or the HIV antigen/antibody
(Ag/Ab) combination test is also required in addition to the
standard mandated tests). Other factors may also affect the
accuracy of serological test results, such as the suppression
of the donor immune response to infection as a consequence
of disease or of high steroid dosage. Such factors need to be
taken into account when interpreting test results.
Additional Tests for Consideration Based
on Donor History
Potential donors with a history of significant travel to or
residence in Africa, the Middle East, Asia or Central/South
American may warrant additional screening for pathogens
endemic to that area or occurring as epidemic disease. Addi-
tional tests that should be considered for donors who have
lived in these geographic areas, according to European guide-
lines, are shown in Table 10.
In the United States, targeted T. cruzi screening is recom-
mended for potential donors born in Mexico, Central
America and South America.60 Since screening assays for
T. cruzi have a high false-positive rate and positive results re-
quire laboratory confirmation, which may not be possible
within the donation timeframe but can informposttransplant
interventions.7 United States recommendations are that kid-
neys and livers from potential donors testing positive for
T. cruzi be used with the informed consent of the recipient.
Given a high rate of transmission in the context of heart
transplantation, however, hearts from donors infected with
or screen-positive for T. cruzi should not be used.60Donor Suitability and Recommendations
for Organ Allocation
Table 11 compares published guidelines from the UK,
Europe and Scandinaviawith TSANZguidelines with respect
to recommendations for the utilization of organs from donors
testing positive for any of the routinely screened pathogens de-
scribed in Screening for Infectious Disease inDeceasedDonors:
Overview. It should be noted that the recommendations de-
scribed in the table correspond to the most recently published
versions of jurisdictional guidelines as of November 2017, but
do not reflect more recent changes in policy and practice. Prac-
tices with respect to HCV-positive donors in particular are rap-
idly evolving as a result of the introduction of DAAs able to
effectively treat infection in the event of disease transmission
(see Recipient Management). With an increasing number of in-
dividuals being successfully treated forHCVinfection, therewill
also be a need for revised guidelines to consider donors with a
history of treated HCV.VIRAL INFECTIONS IN THE DECEASED DONOR
HIV, Hepatitis C and Hepatitis B
Epidemiology
The estimated prevalence of HIV in the Australian popula-
tion 15 years or older in 2016 was 0.13%37; in NewZealand
estimated HIV prevalence in 2016 was 0.08%.62 Rates of
HIV infection in Australia and New Zealand are relatively
low by international standards: estimated HIV prevalence
in the overall UK population in 2015 was 0.16%, and in the
United States population 13 years or older it was 0.4%.63,64
Comparing HIV prevalence among high-risk groups, estimated
rates of HIV among IVDU in Australia and New Zealand are
very low compared to other high-income countries (1.7% and
0.2% respectively see Figure 5). In contrast, the estimated prev-
alence of HIV among men who have sex with men (MSM) in
Australia is relatively high (18.3%); in New Zealand the esti-
mated prevalence of HIVamong MSM is lower at 6.5%.26
HCV prevalence is similar in Australia and New Zealand,
with an estimated viremic prevalence of approximately 1.0%
in the adult populations of both countries in 2015.37 Figure 6
compares viremic prevalence of HCV in 2015 across
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FIGURE 5. Estimated prevalence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) among increased-risk groups in selected high-income countries in
2016 (data source: www.aidsinfo.unaids.org, accessed February 2018). MSM, men who have sex with men; IVDU, intravenous drug users.
18 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comhigh-income countries for which estimates were available
(estimates published by The Polaris Observatory HCV
Collaborators).65 Estimated HCV prevalence in Australia
and New Zealand is relatively high compared to other high-
income countries; the only high-income country with higher es-
timated viremic prevalence in 2015was Italy (1.1%). Estimated
HCVprevalence in theUnited States and theUKwas 0.9%and
0.3% respectively. Globally, the countries with the highest esti-
mated viremic prevalence of HCV in 2015 were Gabon
(7%), Mongolia (6.4%), Egypt (6.3%), Uzbekistan (4.3%),
Georgia (4.2%), Pakistan (3.8%), and Russia (3.3%).65
The estimated prevalence of HBVin Australia in 2016was
0.9%.37 Prevalence of HBV is much higher in New Zealand
(~4%), related to immigration from highly endemic countries
in the Pacific region.66 Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu in particular
have some of the highest rates of chronic HBV prevalence
in the world, affecting between 12% and 23% of the total
populations of these countries.66
The risk of BBV transmission from a solid organ donor to
a recipient is dependent on the incidence, prevalence, and dis-
tribution of the virus in the donor population, the viral load
in the donor, the specific organ transplanted, and the efficiency
of virus transmission through contact with blood and tissues.FIGURE 6. Viremic prevalence of hepatitis C virus (HCV) in selected higHistorically, organ transplant systems in several countries
have attempted to mitigate this risk by categorizing potential
donors as either increased-risk or standard-risk with respect
to their potential to transmit BBV, then screening increased-
risk donors usingNAT tominimize the possibility of awindow
period transmission. Stratification of potential donors accord-
ing to their risk of BBValso has the advantage of simplifying
the patient consent process. Risk of BBV is generally defined
according to the presence of the following risk factors:
• MSM
• IVDU
• Incarceration in the previous 12 months
• Sexual partners of those in the categories above
• Unexplained fever/weight loss/cough etc.
• Partner with HIV/HBV/HCV
• Sex workers
• sexually transmitted infection (STI) in the past 12 months
• Cosmetic body piercing/tattooing
• Cocaine snorting
• Physician concern (based on medical history or physical
examination).
The United States PHS published Guidelines for Preventing
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus throughh-income countries, estimated for the year 2015.65
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 19Transplantation of Human Tissue and Organs in 1994, with
an update subsequently published in 2013, and implemented
in 2014.45 These evidence-based guidelines outline behavioral
and medical characteristics of the donor that put them at in-
creased risk of transmitting a BBV, and have been widely cited
as a basis for donor screening policies, including in Australia
(see Table 12).
There are, however, problems with a binary risk-
stratification approach. First, the extent to which next of
kin are aware of illicit drug use and sexual history will of-
ten be limited, and misreported social histories are likely to
translate into the systematic misclassification of many poten-
tial donors as standard-risk. Secondly, criteria defining
“increased-risk” are broadly inclusive and define a large pro-
portion of the potential donor population. For example the
PHS criterion of “people who have been newly diagnosed
with, or have been treated for, syphilis, gonorrhea, chla-
mydia or genital ulcers in the preceding 12months” alone ac-
counts for nearly 10% of the US adult population. Under the
PHS Guidelines outlined in Table 12, 19.5% of potential do-
nors were labeled as increased-risk in 2014.13 Third, labeling
organs as “increased-risk” has an impact on organ utilization
as patients and physicians tend to be risk averse when it
comes to acceptance decisions, despite the very low absolute
risks of infectious disease transmission.67 This risk aversion
may be particularly pronounced when referring to stigma-
tized social behaviors (IVDU) and stigmatized diseases
(HIV and HCV).13 The criteria above, therefore, describe a
large proportion of the population, yet the risk factors stipu-
lated will be routinely underreported by next of kin; further,TABLE 12.
Social risk factors for BBV identified by a systematic review
of the literature regarding risks of HIV, HCV, and HBV
transmission conducted by Seem et al45
Pathogens Behavioral characteristics Nonbehavioral characteristics
HIV • MSM
• IVDU
• Noninjection illicit drug use
• Multiple sex partners
• Sex with partner known to be
HIV-infected
• Age ≤ 18 at first sexual
intercourse
• STI
• Marital status
HCV • IVDU
• Noninjection illicit drug use
• Multiple sex partners
• Sex worker
• Inmates
• Age ≤ 18 at first sexual
intercourse
• Sex with partner known to be
HCV-infected
• Sex with an injection drug user
• Tattooing performed by a
nonprofessional
• Hemodialysis
• Receipt of blood transfusion
• Signs and symptoms (eg,
jaundice, elevated ALT)
• STI
• Marital status
HBV • MSM
• IVDU
• Multiple sex partners
• Hemodialysis
• STI
• Marital status
HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; HCV, hepatitis C virus; HBV, hepatitis B virus; MSM, men who have sex
with men; IVDU, intravenous drug users; STI, sexually transmitted infection; ALT, alanine aminotransferase.despite systematic misclassification, patients and physicians
will place undue emphasis on an “increased-risk” label when
making acceptance decisions.
The challenge of mitigating the risk of BBV transmission
is, therefore, a complex one, and one that is constantly evolv-
ing as social norms change and as the capacity to effectively
treat disease in the event of disease transmission improves.
For now, however, there remains a strong focus on population
groups at increased risk of BBV, and therefore, it is important
to have an accurate understanding of the current epidemiology
of HIV, HCVand HBV in Australia and New Zealand.
BBV in Australia
After a spike in 2012, the number of newly diagnosedHIV
infections in Australia has remained steady, with 1013 new
cases diagnosed in 2016, 1027 in 2015, 1084 in 2014, and
1030 in 2013.37 Of the estimated 26444 people estimated
to be living with HIV in Australia in 2016, an estimated
75% of these infections are attributable to male-to-male sex
exposure. Heterosexual sex accounts for approximately
22% of cases, IVDU for 2%, and other exposures (eg, sex
work) for <1%.37 Of all diagnoses of HIV notified since
1984, 91% were in males. Notification rates in 2016 were
highest among males in the 20- to 29-year age group (17.1
per 100000), followed by the 30- to 39-year age group
(16.1 per 100000). Of the total number of new HIV diagno-
ses in 2016, 5%were in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
(ATSI) people. HIV prevalence among ATSI people was esti-
mated to be 0.11% in 2016.
It is estimated that nearly 90% of all HIV cases are diag-
nosed, and that of diagnosed cases 86% were receiving anti-
retroviral therapy as of 31December 2016.37 The proportion
of HIV-infected persons taking effective treatments and
achieving a suppressed viral load has increased significantly
over the past 10 years. Of those on antiviral therapy, 93%
had a suppressed viral load, corresponding to 72%of all peo-
ple living with HIV in Australia having a suppressed viral
load.37 In addition, large, state-funded preexposure prophy-
laxis (PrEP) implementation programs were rolled out in
2016 in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. By the
end of 2016, 23% of all estimated gay men at high risk of
HIVaccording to PrEP eligibility criteria were taking PrEP.37
It is likely that this will effect a reduction in HIV incidence in
Australia in coming years. Already in NSW, an overall 11%
decline in new HIV diagnoses was observed in 2017 com-
pared to the previous 6-year average, whereas among
Australian-born MSM, the number of new diagnoses was
19% less in 2017 compared with the previous 6-year aver-
age.68 A decline in new HIV diagnoses was not observed in
overseas-born MSM, however, nor among heterosexual people.
The number of heterosexually acquired infections in NSW with
an early diagnosis was has remained stable since 2011, but the
number of new diagnoses with non–early-stage infection in-
creased 31% in2017 compared to the previous 6-year average.68
HCV infections in Australia are concentrated among
IVDU, prisoners with a history of IVDU, people from high-
prevalence countries, and HIV-positive MSM. In contrast to
HIV trends, HCV notifications in Australia fell consistently
between 2005 and 2012,69 a trend which is thought to have
been largely driven by a decrease in the number of people
newly initiating injecting drug use. Some of this decrease
may also be due to an increased use of needle and syringe
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mained steady; however, a spike in notifications was ob-
served in 2016 that is likely to be attributable to an increase
in the number of people being newly tested for HCV in re-
sponse to the availability of newDAA treatments. Themajor-
ity (67%) of HCV notifications in 2016 occurred in males,
with the highest notification rate in the 25- to 29-year age
group (84.6 per 100000), followed by the 40+ years age
group (56.4 per 100000).37 Nine percent of HCV notifica-
tions occurred among ATSI people.
Interferon-free DAA regimens became available on the
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme in Australia from March
2016. Of an estimated 227306 people living with HCV in
Australia at the start of 2016, 32550 received treatment
and 30434 (93%) were cured, reducing the number living
with chronic HCV at the end of 2016 to 199412 (a decline
in prevalence of 13%).37 The uptake of HCV treatment in
2016 compared with previous years is illustrated in Figure 7.
Importantly, according to the Australian Needle and Syringe
Program Survey in 2016, there was an 11-fold increase in the
rate ofHCV-treatment among respondents with self-reported
chronic HCV, from 2% in 2015 to 22% in 2016. The ex-
panded availability of DAAs has an immediate impact on
mortality associated with HCV: among people living with
chronic HCV and those who have been cured of chronic
HCV, the estimated number of HCV-related deaths approxi-
mately doubled between 2007 and 2015, but between 2015
and 2016 this number fell by 26%.
HBV notifications have been declining over the past de-
cade in younger age groups due to the impact of vaccination
programs. The greatest decline in newly acquiredHBV cases
has been in the 20- to 24-year age group (females in partic-
ular). Chronic HBV cases in Australia are concentrated
among 4 key populations: migrants from high prevalence
countries (especially Northeast and Southeast Asia), people
who inject drugs, ATSI peoples, andMSM.Of the estimated
233034 people living in Australia with chronic HBV infection
at the end of 2016, 38% were born in the Asia-Pacific, 9.3%
were ATSI peoples, 6% were IVDUs and 4% were MSM.37
Australia-wide age- and sex-specific notification rates for
HIV, HCVand HBVare shown in Figure 8. Age groups with
the highest notification rates will have the highest residual
risk of BBV transmission after donor screening. For example,
the highest residual risk of HIV transmission would be
amongmale donors aged 25 to 30 years. The highest residualFIGURE 7. The estimated number of people living with hepatitis C whorisk of HCV transmission would be for male donors aged 35
to 40 years.
Rates of BBV Infection in Increased-risk Groups
MSM
Sexual contact between men is the main route of HIV
transmission in Australia, accounting for 70% of all new
cases in 2016.37 Overall incidence of HIV among MSM in
Australia was 0.85 per 100 person years in 2016, a rate
which had not changed significantly for the prior 6 years.69
The roll-out of expanded access to PrEP in 2016, however,
has started to effect a decline in the number of newHIV diag-
noses among Australian-born MSM—in NSW in 2017, the
number of MSM newly diagnosed with HIV declined by
19% compared with the 2011 to 2016 average.68 However,
this decline did not extend to overseas-born MSM, among
whom the number of new diagnoses increased 12% in
2017 compared to the 2011 to 2016 average.68 In NSW in
2017, the number of newly diagnosed MSM who were born
overseas exceeded the number of new diagnoses in
Australian-born MSM (135 vs 97).68 Regions of birth for
MSM newly diagnosed with HIV in 2017 in NSW were
Australia (41%), southeast Asia (17%), northeast Asia
(14%), southern and central America (8%), southern and
eastern Europe (6%), northern and western Europe (5%),
and less than 5% from all other regions.68
Men who have sex with men are also significantly more
likely to have HBV compared to the population overall, with
an estimated chronic HBV prevalence of 3.0% versus 0.9%
in the general population.68 Based on a community-based co-
hort of MSM with serum samples stored between 2001 and
2007, the overall prevalence of HCV among MSM in
Sydney was approximately 1% (or 2% when restricted to
men 35 years and older); however, the rate among those
who were HIV-positive was nearly 10 times that of those
who are HIV-negative (HCV prevalence of 9.4% vs 1.1%).70
In this study, IVDU was strongly associated with HCV sero-
positivity in MSM regardless of HIV-status.70
IVDU
Strategies to reduce HIV transmission among the IVDU
population in Australia have been very successful. In 2016,
IVDUs (without a history of male-to-male sex) accounted
for only 14 new HIV diagnoses (1% of the total); IVDUsreceived treatment, 1997–2016.37
FIGURE 8. Graphs of (A) human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), (B) hepatitis C virus (HCV), and (C) hepatitis B virus (HBV) notification rates by
age and sex (data sources: The Kirby Institute. HIV, viral hepatitis and sexually transmissible infections in Australia—Annual Surveillance Re-
port 2016, and The Kirby Institute, UNSW Australia, Sydney; 2015 Australian HIV Public Access Data set: http://kirby.unsw.edu.au/
surveillance/Australian-HIV-Public-Access-Data Set—NB this data set excludes Queensland diagnoses).
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 21who also reported male-to-male sex accounted for an addi-
tional 51 new diagnoses (5% of the total).37 The prevalence
of HIV in the IVDU population was 1.4% in 2016, or
0.7% if gay and bisexual men are excluded.37 This is far
lower than the HIV prevalence among IVDUs in the United
States (9%), or Europe (11%).22
In contrast, the prevalence of HCVamong IVDUs attend-
ing needle and syringe programs remained steady between
2009 and 2016 at 50% to 57%.37,69 An overall decline in
the absolute number of HCV notifications attributable to
injecting drug users is thought to be due to a reduction in
the number of people initiating injecting drug use and a si-
multaneous increase in the number of people receiving opioidsubstitution therapy, rather than an actual decline in the
HCV infection rate in the IVDU population. Prevalence of
HBVamong IVDU in 2016 was 4.0%.37Prison Population
There were no cases of HIV detected among 793 of 1235
prison entrants screened as part of the most recent Australian
National Prison Entrants' Bloodborne Virus Survey.71 The
overall prevalence of HCV in the prison population was
31% in 2013, up from 22% in 2010, andwas highest among
those with a history of IVDU (58% in IVDUs vs 4% in non-
IVDUs). HCV rates were also higher among female inmates
22 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comwith a history of IVDU versus males with a history of IVDU
(67%vs 56%). HBVprevalence is also relatively high among
prisoners. Nationally, 18% of those tested under the Na-
tional Prison Entrants' Bloodborne Virus Survey in 2013
were positive for HBV core antibody, and 3% (all male) were
positive for HBV surface-antigen.71
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders
The rate of HIV notifications was higher in the ATSI pop-
ulation in 2016 than in the Australian-born, non-Indigenous
population (6.4 vs 2.9 per 100000).37WhereasHIV notifica-
tion rates in the Australian-born, non-Indigenous population
have declined since 2014, in the ATSI population there has
been a steady increase in the annual HIV notification rate
over the past 5 years.37 A higher proportion of HIV notifica-
tions in this population are attributable to heterosexual sex
(20%) and IVDU (14%) than in the Australian-born non-
Indigenous population (15% and 3% respectively). HIV preva-
lence, however, was the same in the ATSI population in 2016 as
in the Australian-born, non-Indigenous population (0.11%).37
Whereas the HCV notification rate for the Australian pop-
ulation overall has been has been declining for the past
10 years, the rate of HCV notifications among ATSI people
has been increasing, and in 2016 was nearly 4-times greater
than for the non-Indigenous population (172.7 vs 45.2 noti-
fications per 100000).37
The estimated prevalence of HBV in ATSI people in 2016
was 3.7%, versus 0.2% in theAustralian-born, non-Indigenous
population.37 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people
accounted for 10.6% of people living with chronic HBV in-
fections in Australia in 2016.37
BBV in New Zealand
In 2016 there were 244 HIV notifications in New Zealand
(217 men, 27 women; 30 previously diagnosed overseas).62
Of new diagnoses, 159 (65%) were infected through male
to male sex, 42 (17%) were infected through heterosexual
contact, 1 person was infected through IVDU, and 5 men
were infected either through sex with another man or
IVDU.62 The number of MSM newly infected with HIVeach
year in New Zealand has substantially increased since 2013,
and in 2016 was the highest ever. Of all 159MSM first diag-
nosed with HIV in 2016, 60% were European, 20% Asian,FIGURE 9. Distribution of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) notification
MSM, men who have sex with men; IVDU, intravenous drug users.9% Māori, 4% Pacific Islander, and 7% other ethnicities.
The majority (59%) were living in Auckland; 13% were liv-
ing in Wellington. A study of gay and bisexual men in Auck-
land found an HIV prevalence in this population of 6.5%,
with 21% be unaware that they were infected.72 The overall
distribution of HIV notifications in New Zealand in 2016 by
risk exposure type and ethnicity are shown in Figure 9.
There were 2278 adults (1898 men and 380 women) and
16 children receiving subsidized antiretroviral therapy at
the end of June 2016. On the basis that ~80% of people with
HIV in New Zealand have been diagnosed and are under spe-
cialist care, and ~85% of people with HIV who are under spe-
cialist care are receiving antiretroviral therapy, it is estimated
that there were about 3500 people with HIV in New Zealand
at the end of 2016, or a population prevalence of 0.077%.62
HCV prevalence in New Zealand is approximately 1.0%.
After falling steeply from 1998 to 2004, HCV notification
rates in New Zealand have remained steady at 0.4 to 0.8
cases per 100000 population for the past decade (vs 2.4 cases
per 100000 in 1998).38 HCVis highly prevalent among IVDUs
inNewZealand.A 2015 study ofHCV serology among IVDUs
attending drug clinics in the lower north island found that, of
579 patients tested, 439 (76%) were positive for HCV anti-
body.73 Of those with a PCR/viral load test on file, 50% had
a positive result on theirmost recent test, and 32%had cleared
their HCV infection without treatment. Of those who were
referred and treated, 75% had achieved viral clearance.73
HBV notifications in New Zealand have gradually de-
clined over the past 2 decades, from 2.3 per 100000 popula-
tion in 1998, to 0.7 per 100000 population in 2015.38 The
relatively high prevalence of chronic HBV infection in New
Zealand (~4%) is attributable to the high rates of HBV
among immigrant populations from the highly endemic
countries of the Pacific region, such as Kiribati, Nauru,
Solomon Islands and Tonga, where up to a quarter of the
population are chronically infected with HBV.66
BBV Prevalence and Risk Factors among
Donor Referrals
A recent retrospective analysis of the NSWOrgan and Tis-
sue Donation Service logs found that 10% (309/2995) of all
organ donor referrals from2010 to 2015 had a reported history
of BBV and/or social risk factors for BBV.74 The proportions in New Zealand in 2016 by (A) exposure category and (B) ethnicity.62
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 23of all donor referrals with a documented history of increased-
risk behavior was 7.5% (224/2995), whereas the proportion
with a known history of BBV was 6.4% (192/2995). The
most common reported infection among referrals with a
known history of BBV was HCV (84% of BBV diagnoses),
with 19% of referrals having HBVand 3% having HIV. Of
referrals with reported BBV, 10% reported more than 1 in-
fection. The most commonly reported social risk factor for
BBV was IVDU (84% of increased-risk donors, n = 191),
followed by incarceration (11%), sexual partner in an at-
risk category (6%), and MSM (3%).
Of the increased-risk referrals with a documented history
of BBVand/or social risk factors for BBV, 16% (48/309) be-
came actual donors. Of referrals with social risk factors but
no history of BBV, 26% (n = 30) became actual donors. Over-
all, 3.3% (100/2995) of all referrals did not proceed primar-
ily due to concern over BBV transmission risk. However, of
the 100 increased-risk referrals that did not proceed primar-
ily due to concerns about BBV transmission risk, only 15%
had serology and/or NAT performed. Limiting the analysis
to referrals with social risk factors only (no history of BBV),
of the 33 referrals that did not proceed due to perceived
BBV risk, 9% had serology and/or NAT performed. This
means that from 2010 to 2015 in NSW there were 30 donor
referrals where the donor had social risk factors for BBV but
no documented history of BBV, whowere ruled out frompro-
ceeding down the donation pathway on the basis of perceived
BBV risk, but were not tested for presence of BBV.
By comparison, a similar study conducted in the United
Kingdom found 3.8% of potential deceased donors had a
documented history of increased-risk behavior, and 1.7%
were seropositive for BBV markers.75 The most common so-
cial risk factor was IVDU (47%of increased-risk potential do-
nors), followed by incarceration (33%), andMSM (10%). Of
potential donors who were seronegative for BBV, those with a
history of IVDUwere significantly less likely to become actual
donors, after taking into account age and comorbidity.75
Table 13 shows the proportions of potential organ donors
tested at South Eastern Area Laboratory Services (SEALS)
that were positive for BBV in 2010. The finding of only
3.2% testing positive for HCV RNA suggests that increased-
risk donors, especially those with a history of IVDU, form a
small minority of those referred forNAT inNSW. This could ei-
ther be the result of underreferral of potential donors at in-
creased risk of BBV, or routine referral of potential donors at
low risk of BBV for NAT, despite current guidelines.TABLE 13.
Proportion of potential organ donors screened at the SEALS NAT
testing positive for HIV, HCV and HBV using testing methods for
evidence of infection (anti-HIV, anti-HCV, anti-HBc)
Virus HIV H
BBV marker Anti-HIVa HIV RNAb Anti-HCVc
% testing positive 0.00 0.00 6.95
a Architect HIV Ag/Ab combined assay.
b Cobas Amplicor and Cobas 6800-MPX assay.
c Architect Anti-HCV.
d Architect HBsAg Qualitative II.
e Architect Anti-HBc II.
S Ray and W Rawlinson, personal communication.
HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; HCV, hepatitis C virus; HBV, hepatitis B virus; HBsAg, hepatitis B surDonor Screening and Utilization
Until recently, a key question for BBV screening in poten-
tial solid organ donors was whether NAT should be per-
formed routinely for all potential donors, or whether it
should be reserved for potential donors known to be at in-
creased risk. Risk-benefit modeling by Humar et al published
in 2010 predicted that NAT in average-risk donors would re-
sult in a net loss of quality-adjusted life years, as the number
of false-positives would outweigh the number of transmis-
sion events averted.44 By comparison, among increased-risk
donors, higher incidence of BBV means a much higher
chance of window period infection, thus NAT significantly
reduces residual transmission risk and increases organ utili-
zation by providing reassurance to physicians and patients
who would otherwise be reluctant to accept these organs.
The recent introduction of newer-generation NAT systems
—including the Cobas 6800 system from Roche Molecular
Systems (currently used by SEALS) and the Panther system
from Hologic—have reduced turnaround time to 3.5 hours,
which is short enough to permit confirmatory testing within
a timeframe suitable for organ donation.76 Additional features
of theCobas 6800 system include a range of features thatwill re-
duce contamination risk and allow continuous sample loading
(rather that batch runs). Using this new machine in conjunction
with repeat/parallel testing protocols should effectively re-
duce the false-positive rate to negligible levels, and should
permit prospective NAT for all organ donors.77,78
The Cobas 6800 system is now in use inNSW,Queensland
andWestern Australia, and NAT is already routinely ordered
for all potential solid organ donors in Queensland. With the
introduction of newer-generation NAT, the rationale for
selective NAT testing is largely redundant, as donor losses
due to false-positive tests are predicted to be rare using
the new systems. Furthermore, most of the unexpected
donor-derived BBV transmission events reported over
the past 20 years (excluding those due to human error)
occurred due to window period infections in donors with
incomplete social histories or without known risk factors
for BBV (see Transmission Risk). Selective NAT would not
have averted such adverse events.HIV
Serological screening for HIV should be performed using a
fourth-generation antigen/antibody combination immunoas-
say which identifies antibodies against bothHIV-1 andHIV-2,laboratory between January 1 and December 3, 2016,
current viremia (HIV-RNA, HCV-RNA, HBV-DNA) and
CV HBV
HCV RNAb HBsAgd Anti-HBce HBV DNAb
3.20 0.64 2.67 1.06
face antigen; RNA, ribonucleic acid; BBV, bloodborne viruses.
TABLE 14.
Residual risk per 10000 of an HIV infection occurring during the window period, by ELISA and NAT, calculated
for the Australian population (Karen Waller, personal communication; N.B. data are preliminary and may be subject to
change pending formal publication)
Risk category
No.
patients
No. HIV
seroconverted
Person
years
Pooled incidence per
100 PYS (95% CI)
Residual risk
(95% CI), ELISA
Residual risk
(95% CI), ELISA + NAT
MSM 10 414 175 15 280.5 1.05 (0.59–1.63) 6.3 (3.6–9.8) 2.0 (1.1–3.1)
IVDU 76 596 717 — 0.33 (0.30–0.35) 2.0 (1.8–2.1) 0.6 (0.6–0.7)
Incarcerated 196 784 348 — 0.04 (0.03–0.04) 0.2 (0.2–0.2) 0.1 (0.1–0.1)
Commercial sex worker 4555 12 — 0.07 (0.04–0.13) 0.4 (0.2–0.8) 0.1 (0.1–0.2)
High-risk partner 522 1 — 0.07 (0.00–0.40) 0.4 (0.0–2.4) 0.1 (0.0–0.8)
HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; MSM, men who have sex with men; IVDU, intravenous drug users; ELISA, enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; NAT, nucleic acid testing.
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in the bloodstream shortly after infection. The serological
window fromHIVexposure to the development of HIVanti-
bodies ranges from approximately 3weeks to up to 6months
(average window period of 17–22 days); however, p24 anti-
gen can be detected ~7 to 16 days after infection.44 NAT per-
mits detection of acute HIV infection within 5.6 to 10.2 days
of exposure.79 If an initial test is positive, this result should be
confirmed with subsequent testing.
Neither negative serology nor negative NAT can entirely
exclude the possibility of donor transmission of HIV, as there
is always the risk that the donor recently acquired an infec-
tion that is still in the eclipse phase. This risk is a function
of the underlying incidence of HIV in the population; that
is, the lower the incidence of HIV, the lower the risk of win-
dow period infection. This risk has been estimated for the
United States and Canadian populations80,81 and more re-
cently for the Australian population (personal communica-
tion Karen Waller). The estimates calculated by Waller et al
are based on a systematic review and meta-analysis of HIV
incidence and prevalence in Australia, which was used to es-
timate the pooled incidence of HIVamong various increased
risk groups in the population, and the estimate was then ap-
plied in the following formula:
Risk of window period infection
¼ 1−e− incidence rate xwindow durationð Þ
The risks of window period infection calculated by Waller
et al are reported in Table 14. These estimates are provided
in this report ahead of final publication, and therefore, are
preliminary estimates that may be subject to minor revisions.
It should also be noted that, given the rapid scale-up of PrEP
in NSW and Victoria in recent years, HIV incidence is likely
to decline and the residual risk of HIV transmission inTABLE 15.
Interpretation of results of HCV screening in organ donors and im
HCV test Conclusion Implica
Anti-HCV + HCV-NAT not available HCV viremia cannot be ruled out HCV tra
Anti HCV + HCV-NAT+ HCV viremia
Anti HCV-HCV NAT+
Anti HCV + HCV-NAT- HCV viremia unlikely HCV tra
may
HCV, hepatitis C virus; NAT, nucleic acid testing.Australia is expected to fall in the future and thus these figures
may somewhat overestimate true contemporary residual risk.
HCV
The serological window for HCV antibody detection is
long: at least 40 to 70 days. NAT reduces the HCV detection
window to ~4 to 6 days and is highly sensitive, allowing for
HCV RNA detection at levels as low as 2.0 to 9.4 IU/
mL.44,82,83 The ~10-fold reduction in the HCV detection
window using NAT versus serological tests corresponds to
a 10-fold reduction in the residual risk of HCV transmission.82
Current TSANZ Guidelines recommend screening for anti-
HCV in standard-risk donors, with HCV-NAT recommended
for increased-risk donors. The highest-risk group for HCV
transmission in Australia and New Zealand is IVDUs.
A positive HCV-NATwith or without a positive anti-HCV
is an indication of activeHCVinfection.However, viral loads
can fluctuate in HCV-infected people, sometimes falling
below the NAT detection limit. Therefore, a negative HCV-
NAT cannot alone be used to rule out HCV infection—
anti-HCV results are also required. A positive anti-HCV with
a negative HCV-NATcan indicate a resolved infection, a false-
positive anti-HCV result, or an active infection with a viral
load below the detection threshold for NAT (see Table 15).
The false-positive rate for HCV-NAT in the Australian and
New Zealand population is not known; in the United States
it has been estimated at <0.2%.46 AnHCV infection is consid-
ered resolved when a person has been free of the virus for
>12 weeks (demonstrated by 2 blood tests 12 weeks apart),
with no new risk exposure over this interval.
Currently published international guidelines state that
organs from HCV-positive donors may be used for HCV-
positive recipients, given evidence of minimal impact on
transplant outcomes in this context.84-86 TSANZ guidelines
also allow for transplantation of organs from HCV-NAT-
negative, HCV antibody-positive donors to HCV-negativeplications for utilization5
tions for liver utilization Implication for utilization of nonliver organs
nsmission may occur
nsmission is unlikely to occur but cannot be ruled out completely: transplantation
occur with the informed consent of the recipient
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 25recipients in exceptional circumstances. Of actual organ do-
nors in Australia and New Zealand in 2016, 3% (n = 18)
were HCV-antibody–positive.87 Currently, organs from
HCV-NAT–positive donors are not formally acceptable for
use in HCV-negative recipients except in exceptional circum-
stances, given the 100% infectivity rate and historical evi-
dence of poor posttransplant outcomes.88-90 However, the
availability of DAAs able to successfully eradicate HCV in-
fection in transplant recipientsmeans that policies are rapidly
changing, and the utilization of HCV-NAT-positive donors
for both HCV-positive and HCV-negative recipients is likely
to increase in future (see Recipient Management). Successful
treatment of HCV in the community will also have the effect
of diminishing the residual risk of donor-derivedHCVinfection
over the next fewyears.Nonetheless, it will remain important to
accurately identify active HCV infection in donors, ideally pro-
spectively, to inform recipient management posttransplant.HBV
HBV is an enveloped DNAvirus consisting of surface and
core. The surface incorporates the envelope protein, or hepa-
titis B surface antigen (HBsAg). The core contains a DNA po-
lymerase, double-stranded DNA, a core antigen (HBcAg)
and another antigen called “e” (HBeAg). When screening
for HBV in potential organ donors, testing for HBsAg,
HBsAb, and antibody to HBcAb (anti-HBc) are all required
to identify and distinguish between current infection and
prior cleared infection.91 Serology that is positive for HBsAg
indicates a current HBV infection, and in the absence of pre-
ventative measures, HBV may be transmitted by any organ
or tissue in this scenario (see Table 16). Anti-HBc of IgM
class indicates a current or recent infection with HBV,
whereas anti-HBc of IgG class indicates a past infection.
The presence of hepatitis B surface antibody (HBsAb) in the
blood is indicative of an immunologic response to HBsAg,
and the higher the HBsAb titer, the lower the infectious risk
associated with anti–HBc-positive donors.
Individuals who have cleared a natural HBV infection typ-
ically become HBsAg-negative, anti–HBc-positive, and have
an HBsAb titer greater than 10 IU/L. However, a donor sero-
logical profile with an isolated presence of anti-HBcmay also
indicate a current HBV infection at a point where HBsAg is
no longer detectable in peripheral blood but HBsAb titers
have not yet reached levels sufficient to clear the virus (or to
be detected).91 Presence of anti-HBc, therefore, carries the
possibility of HBV transmission, although the extent of thisTABLE 16.
Interpretation of results of HBV screening in organ donors and im
HBV test Conclusion Implications for live
HBsAg+Anti-HBc− HBV infection HBV transmission occurs. Tran
to HBV-infected recipients, o
circumstances after speciali
HBsAg+Anti-HBc+ HBV infection
HBsAg-Anti-HBc+ Hepatocyte infected, usually no
viremia but low-level viremia
should be considered
HBV transmission occurs with
allow transplantation of orga
recipients or recipients with
to vaccination and HBV prop
a HBV prophylaxis, antiviral treatment (and HBIG) as well as lifelong monitoring (serology and NAT) required
uation of antiviral treatment can be considered on a case-by-case basis.
HBV, hepatitis B virus; HBsAg, hepatitis B surface antigen.risk depends on the organ being transplanted. The liver is a
reservoir for HBV, with the HBV genome forming a stable
microchromosome—the covalently closed circular DNA—
in the hepatocyte nucleus, meaning that the immune system
is unable to completely eradicate the infection. Thus in
anti–HBc-positive donors the hepatocytes are latently in-
fected with HBV, and reactivation may occur at any time in
immunosuppressed patients.92,93 Guidelines, therefore, rec-
ommend livers from anti–HBc-positive donors be used for re-
cipients with previous HBV infection or for recipients who
have been successfully vaccinated.5
Nonliver grafts from anti–HBc-positive donors with a
cleared infection rarely transmit HBV; however, current
international guidelines recommend that organs from such
donors preferentially be used in recipients with current or
previous HBV infection or successful vaccination (see
Table 11). Nonliver organsmay be used for HBV-naïve recip-
ients after informed consent andwith specialmonitoring of the
recipient for the appearance of HBV, with or without hepatitis
B hyper Immune-immunoglobulin (HBIG) and antiviral pro-
phylaxis. Current TSANZ policy is that anti–HBc-positive do-
nors may be accepted with caution after specialist advice, taking
into account the recipient HBsAb titer.52 HBsAg-positive donors
can be considered for HBsAg-positive recipients, or for HBsAg-
negative recipients in exceptional circumstances after specialist
advice. This position is similar to that of theUK and Europe.5,29
As a first-line screening tool, HBV-NAThas a relativelymi-
nor benefit in countries with low endemic rates of HBV.
HBsAg assays have a detection window of 35 to 44 days;
NAT reduces this window to 20 to 22 days.44 Nucleic acid
testing is still useful, however, because it will detect viral rep-
lication in potential donors who are anti–HBc-positive but
HbsAg-negative, that is, where the immune response has
not entirely cleared the infection.94 Occult HBV infection oc-
curs where there is persistence of HBV DNA in the liver, and
is characterized by undetectableHBsAg and low-level plasma
HBV DNA.95 Approximately 50% of occult HBV infections
are positive for anti-HBc, but about 20% are negative for all
serological markers of HBVexcept for HBVDNA.96 If HBV-
NAT is positive, donors should be treated as if they were
HBsAg-positive. If HBV-NAT is negative, transplantation
can proceed with considered given to antiviral therapy and/
or HBIG treatment for the recipient, unless the recipient is al-
ready immune.5
What constitutes a protective HBsAb level for preventing
HBV transmission has not been precisely determined: a thresh-
old of greater than 10 IU/L has been demonstrated to beplications for utilization5
r utilization Implication for utilization of nonliver organs
splantation of organs
r in exceptional
st advice.
liver transplantation:
ns in HBV-infected
an immune response
hylaxisa
Transmission is unlikely: allow transplantation of organs in
vaccinated or infected recipients. Organs may also be
used in other recipients with/without prophylaxisa and with
monitoring for at least 12 months.
In recipients with appropriate own immunological protection against HBV after vaccination, discontin-
TABLE 17.
Reports of unexpected donor to recipient transmission of HIV and clinical outcomes (deceased donors only)
Organ Ref
Year of
transplant Donor risk factors
Time from transplantation
to diagnosis, months
Follow-up
interval, months
Recipient died at
end of follow-up
Graft failure during
follow-up period
Kidney Poli, 198999 1984 Presumed illicit drug use 27 27 No No
Poli, 198999 1984 Presumed illicit drug use 40 40 No No
Poli, 198999 1984 Illicit drug use 13 19 No No
Poli, 198999 1983 Illicit drug use 11 21 No No
Poli, 198999 1983 Illicit drug use 16 33 Yes No
Poli, 198999 1982 Illicit drug use 2 59 Yes No
Briner, 1989100 1984 IVDU <1 59 Yes No
Erice, 1990101 1984 Transfusiona 33 67 No No
Simonds, 1992102 1985 None known 17 32 Yes No
Simonds, 1992102 1985 None known 7 14 Yes Yes
Schwarz, 1987103 1986 IVDU, alcoholism 2 15 No Yes
Schwarz, 1987103 1986 Homelessness, alcoholism 1.5 33 No No
CDC, 1987104 1986 None known 2 7 No No
Bowen, 1988105 1988 MSM <1b 15 No No
Borchi, 2010106 2007 None known <1 35 No No
Bellandi, 201058 2007 None known <1 35 No Not reported
Ison et al, 201154 2007 MSM 10c 14 No Yes
Ison et al, 201154 2007 MSM 10c 24 No Yes
Mukhopadhya, 2012107 . . 9 9 No Not reported
Liver CDC, 1987104 1986 None known 3 7 No No
Samuel, 1988108 1986 Not reported <1 1.5 Yes No
Simonds, 1992102 1985 None known <1d <1 Yes No
Bellandi, 201058 2007 None known <1 35 No Not reported
Ison et al, 201154 2007 MSM 11c 12 Yes No
Heart Erice, 1990101 1984 Transfusiona 25 72 No No
Simonds, 1992102 1985 None known 8 9 Yes No
Ison et al, 201154 2007 MSM 11c 35 Yese No
Pancreas Erice, 1990101 1984 Transfusiona 1 6 Yes No
Lung No reports
a The donor received a transfusion shortly before death with blood from a seropositive donor.
b HIV detected on donor serology performed at the time of organ retrieval.
c Both HIV and HCV were simultaneously transmitted from the donor.
d HIV detected post mortem.
e Recipient died due to withdrawal from care.
Excludes reports with no evidence of donor origin of infection.
IVDU, intravenous drug users; MSM, men who have sex with men; CDC, Centers for Disease Control.
26 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comprotective for recipients of anti–HBc-positive kidneys; how-
ever, in liver recipients, a threshold of HBsAb greater than
100 IU/L is often applied.97 In 1 study, the risk of anti-HBc se-
roconversion postliver transplant was 4% when pretransplant
HBsAb titers in the recipient were >100 IU/L, and 10% when
pretransplant titers were less than 100 IU/L.98
Transmission Risk
HIV
Table 17 summarizes published reports of unexpected HIV
transmission fromdeceased donors to recipients. Reportswere
identified as per the search strategy described inMaterials and
Methods 1, SDC (http://links.lww.com/TXD/A152). Given
that transmission events are not systematically reported in
peer-reviewed journals, it is unlikely that Table 17 captures
all cases of unexpected HIV transmission. Furthermore, given
the limited number of case reports it is also difficult to draw
conclusions about rates of mortality and graft failure resulting
from donor-derivedHIV transmission. For this reason, as de-
scriptive summary of these case reports is provided only.The relatively large number of reports of donor-derived
HIV transmission around the mid-1980s coincides with the
introduction of serological tests for HIV. Routine donor
screening was introduced in 1985, and recipient screening
also conducted around this time retrospectively identified
several cases of donor-derived transmission. There was then
gap of approximately 20 years before the next cases of
donor-derived HIV transmission were reported. The absence
of reported cases over this interval probably reflects a cau-
tious approach to donor selection during this era. With the
growing demand for organs of the past decade and the corre-
sponding expanded utilization of increased-risk donors,
cases of donor-derived HIV transmission have reappeared.
However, the implications for donor-derived HIV transmission
have altered profoundly since the introduction of effective anti-
retroviral therapy in 1996. Reviews ofHIVinfection in solid or-
gan transplantation from the early 1990s reported 5-year
mortality rates among recipients who seroconverted posttrans-
plantation of 30% to 50%.101,109 From 3 cases of HIV trans-
mission reported in the past decade affecting 8 recipients,
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 27there was only 1 death (a liver transplant recipient who was
co-infected with HCV) over a median follow-up interval of
29.5 months.
In the case reported jointly by Borchi et al and Bellandi
et al, HIV transmission from an Italian donor to 3 recipients
(2 kidney recipients and 1 liver recipient) occurred due to a
“chain of errors during the donation process”.58,106 The do-
nor in this case was a woman in her forties who died of a
brain hemorrhage at home, but had no clinical history of
any diseases. Her family consented to her donating her or-
gans with no idea that she was HIV-positive.110 Routine
blood tests showed that the donor was infected with HIV;
however, the laboratory report of the anti-HIV test was mis-
takenly hand-transcribed from HIV-positive to -negative.
The protocols of the donor hospital at the time were to man-
ually transcribe results from the laboratory machine into the
laboratory information system, because this was not auto-
mated. The incorrect result was sent to the Regional Trans-
plant Centre without the supporting machine report and
included in the donor record. On this basis, the Regional
Transplant Centre authorized the donation. Tissueswere also
procured from the donor and tested again in a second labora-
tory in a different city, where HIV was detected again but, in-
stead of communicating this information by phone, the
laboratory operators sent the results by fax to the laboratory
of the hospital where the donor organs had been taken for
transplantation. The results were sent on a Saturday, and were
not seen by the laboratory direction untilMonday, 5 days after
the transplants had taken place. Only then was the Regional
Transplant Center alerted and the patients contacted.58
This case demonstrates, first, that biovigilance systems
with clear lines of communication are essential for rapid no-
tification of recipients potentially affected. Second, there is al-
ways the potential for human error, and systems, therefore,
need to be computerized as far as possible, and designed with
the potential of human error inmind.A similar casewas also re-
ported in Taiwan in 2011, where the transplant team did not
check the donor's HIV status in their computer record but in-
stead the laboratory technician read the HIV result over the
phone, and the result of “reactive” was misheard as “nonreac-
tive” by the transplant coordinator.111 Precautionary measures
proposed by the regional health authorities subsequent to the
Italian HIV transmission event were included110:
• cross-checking of laboratory reports and transcription of test
results confirmed by double signature,
• computerized delivery of test results,
• introduction of clearly visible graphic symbols to indicate
donor suitability,
• Including the number of antibodies and positivity threshold
next to the positive/negative test result,
• Introduction of specific accreditation pathways for
laboratory personnel.
In the case reported by Ison et al,54 a 39-year-old male do-
nor transmitted HIV and HCV to 4 recipients (2 kidney re-
cipients, 1 heart recipient, and 1 liver recipient). The donor
tested negative on serological screening for HIV (HIV-1/
HIV-2 recombinant DNA enzyme assay) and HCV (Ortho
HCV version 3.0 enzyme-linked immunoassay); his family
members were unable to provide a social history, but a social
contact subsequently disclosed a history of sex with anotherman. NAT was not performed before donation, which was
consistent with the screening guidelines of the time. Three
months after transplantation, investigation of elevated liver
enzymes in the recipient of the left kidney resulted in HCV
being detected; 10 months after transplant the onset of acute
rejection and proliferative glomerulonephritis in the same re-
cipient lead to a concurrent diagnosis of HIV. The OPO no-
tified the other recipients at this time. Kidney function in the
recipient of the left kidney deteriorated steadily, resulting in
nephrectomy 14 months posttransplant. The recipient of
the right kidney experienced graft rejection that resulted in
transplant nephrectomy 19 months posttransplant. The recip-
ient of the liver, despite aggressive treatment, died 12 months
after transplantation (less than 2 months after the detection
of HIVandHCV). The recipient of the heart stopped adhering
to treatment 9 months after being diagnosed with HIV and
HCV, and died 3 months later.
This case highlights a number of important points for do-
nor screening and recipient management. First, obtaining an
accurate social history is a difficult undertaking, and next of
kin may be the least likely to be aware of high-risk behaviors.
Where there is doubt (which there arguably is in most cases),
potential donors might be prudently regarded as increased
risk. Second, mechanisms need to be in place to detect an un-
expected transmission event as early as possible posttransplant
so that prophylactic treatment can be commenced. The long
interval between transplantation and detection of HIV and
HCV in the recipients in this case is likely to have contributed
to the poor outcomes (compared with the cases reported by
Borchi et al andBellandi et al). Data fromDTACclearly demon-
strate improved outcomes with early recognition and expedited
communication.112 If NAT is not performed before donation, it
should be performed retrospectively for increased-risk donors,
and recipients should be routinely screened with HIV-NAT
7 days after transplantation. More importantly, there were
key flags that should have led to recognition and reporting by
the teams but were missed opportunities for detection. Third,
the outcome of the heart recipient in this case is a reminder of
the potential psychological impact of the transmission of BBV.
It is alsoworth noting the impact of this transmission event
on physician practice in the United States. A survey of atti-
tudes and practices of transplant surgeons with respect to
increased-risk donors in the 12 months after this event oc-
curred found that 42% of surgeons had decreased their use
of increased-risk donors, 35% had increased their emphasis
on informed consent, 17% had increased their used of
NAT, and 6% had implemented a formal policy at their
transplant center.113
Notably, there have been no reported cases of unexpected
HIV transmission where NATwas performed and returned a
negative result. Where HIV transmission from donor to re-
cipient(s) has occurred, either NAT was not performed or a
positive result was misread or miscommunicated.HCV
Before HCV screening became available in the early
1990s, HCV transmission during organ transplantation—
either from the donor organ or blood transfusion—was not
uncommon, resulting in chronic hepatitis, cirrhosis, and
hepatocellular carcinoma in approximately 80% of those
recipients who were infected.114,115 When an organ from
28 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.coman HCV-positive donor is transplanted, whether HCV
transmission occurs depends on whether there was active
viral replication at the time of transplantation, the specific
organ that was transplanted, and the HCV status of the re-
cipient.114 A positive HCV-NAT indicates current active
infection, whereas a positive test forHCVantibodies in the ab-
sence of a positiveNAT result likely indicates a cleared infection
or false-positive serologic test. HCV-NAT–positive donors
will transmit infection in virtually all cases.116 Currently,
HCV-NAT–positive allografts are used for HCV-negative re-
cipients in lifesaving circumstances. The risk of transmission
from NAT-negative HCV antibody-positive donors to HCV-
negative recipients, however, has not been quantified.49
A review of outcomes of anti–HCV-positive heart donor
transplants in the United States between July 1994 and
December 1999 reported a 3-year actual survival rate of
40% for recipients who were at risk of imminent death be-
fore transplantation, and 70% for recipients who would
not have otherwise been offered heart transplantation due
to age or other medical risk factors.117 Of this cohort, 4 of
17 recipients who survivedmore than 60 days posttransplant
seroconverted to HCV-positive; of these 4, only 1 began to
show elevated liver function tests at 1 year posttransplant.
The donors in the analysis were restricted to those testing
positive for HCV on enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
(ELISA) but without recent or ongoing clinical history of liver
dysfunction and markers of liver function within normal
limits. By contrast, an analysis of the outcomes of heart trans-
plants involving anti–HCV/HCV-RNA-positive donors and
anti–HCV-negative recipients found 100% of recipients be-
came HCV RNA–positive posttransplant and 6 of 9 patients
surviving beyond 3months posttransplant developed evidence
of hepatitis, including severe liver injury in 2 patients.118
Table 18 summarizes case reports of unexpected HCV
transmission events and their clinical outcomes, going back
as far as it was possible to screen for HCVand theoretically
avoid transmission. The cases reported by Krajden et al119
and Nampoory et al120 both involve infection occurring dur-
ing the serological window forHCVdetection. The donors in
each case would not be considered at increased risk of HCV
based on usual criteria: the donors were a 25-year-old
woman with no known risk factors and an 11-year-old
boy; both were seronegative for HCV. In the case reported
by Nampoory et al, HCV was detected in both kidney re-
cipients 4 and 8 months after transplantation when their
liver function began to deteriorate. One of the recipients
experienced progressive deterioration of liver function
and died while awaiting liver transplantation abroad.120
In the case reported byKrajden et al,119 none of the recipients
had died or lost their graft within the 14-month follow-up
time frame.
The 2011 case reported by the CDCwas primarily a case
of human error. The donor (a middle-aged man who died
of traumatic head injury) was known to have a history of
schizophrenia, substance abuse and incarceration, and
was, therefore, at increased risk of BBV infection. Serolog-
ical tests were negative but NAT was positive for HCV;
however, the reaction wells were misread and misreported
as negative.121 Recipients of the 2 kidneys both had posi-
tive results on HCV-NATwhen tested 6 months after trans-
plantation; the liver recipient was HCV-positive before
transplantation.In most cases of unexpected HCV transmission, only sero-
logical test results were available at the time of transplanta-
tion, thus the residual risk of a window-period infection
was higher than if NAT had been performed. However,
HCV transmission during the eclipse window is still a possi-
bility. Suryaprasad et al122 reported 3 clusters of solid organ-
transmitted HCVoccurring in the United States despite NAT
screening.122 Each of the donors in these clusters had a
known history of IVDU preceding death and, therefore,
underwent NAT in accordance with guidelines. In the first
of these cases, the donorwas a 25-year-oldwoman found un-
responsive with a hypodermic needle in her arm. Four days
before donation, NAT for HCV, HBV, and HIV were all neg-
ative, and the heart, liver, and both kidneys transplanted into
4 recipients after consent was obtained to receive organs
from an increased-risk donor. The liver and right kidney
recipients had known HCV infection before transplanta-
tion: 9 days posttransplant, the left kidney recipient was
found to be newly HCV NAT-positive on routine screen-
ing. The heart transplant recipient had detectable HCV
RNA31 days posttransplant, and treatmentwith pegylated in-
terferon (27 weeks postdiagnosis) and ribavirin (16.5 weeks
postdiagnosis) was commenced. The heart recipient had a
sustained virological response and remained free of clinical
liver disease and without graft rejection. The left kidney recip-
ient was unable to receive interferon therapy due to comorbid-
ities and had a peak HCV RNA level greater than 69 million
IU/mL approximately 8 months posttransplant. After the pa-
tient developed cirrhosis due to nonalcoholic steatohepatitis
approximately 2 years posttransplant, sofosbuvir and ribavi-
rin were commenced, and at the time of last follow-up, HCV
RNAwas undetectable in the patient.
The donor in the second case reported by Suryaprasad et al
had a history of incarceration and evidence of recent IVDU,
however, NATscreeningwas negative for BBV. The 2 kidneys
were transplanted into 2 HCV-negative recipients after
providing informed consent. Hepatitis C virus RNA was
detected in the recipient of the right kidney 1 month
posttransplant; however, the left kidney recipient had unde-
tectable HCV RNA at 1, 2, and 3 months posttransplant.
The right kidney recipient developed a low level of elevated
liver enzymes at 4months posttransplant and died 19months
posttransplant due to transplant pyelonephritis, sepsis, and
refusal of dialysis. In the third case, the donor also had a his-
tory of IVDU but negative NAT results for HCV, HBV, and
HIV. The lungs, left kidney/pancreas, right kidney, liver, and
heart were transplanted into 6 recipients. HCV RNAwas de-
tected in the recipient of the left lung on routine screening
66 days posttransplant, and in the kidney/pancreas recipient
73 days posttransplant. The right lung recipient developed pri-
mary graft dysfunction and died shortly after transplantation:
retrospective testing detected HCV RNA in a sample
taken 20 days posttransplant. HCVRNAwas not detected
in the right kidney and heart recipients at 7 and 6 months
posttransplant, respectively.
These cases highlight the importance of routine
posttransplant screening for BBV for the early detection
and treatment of BBV transmission and the need for a high
degree of clinical suspicion in the case of donors with clear
evidence of active IVDU. What is also noteworthy about
these cases is that they coincide with the introduction of
DAAs for HCV, which have transformed the ability to
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30 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comsuccessfully treat donor-derived HCV transmission.114 In
particular, the recipient of the left kidney in the first cluster
reported by Suryaprasad et al122 was unable to receive inter-
feron therapy at the time of HCV diagnosis in 2011, but
2 years later was treated with sofosbuvir and ribavirin and
achieved a sustained virologic response.
Two recent cases of unexpected donor-derivedHCV trans-
mission in the United States highlight the profound shift in
the clinical implications of HCV transmission in the current
era.123 In the first case, the donor suffered a cardiac arrest
after an opiate overdose. Hepatitis C virus serology was
negative; however, routine recipient follow-up at day 40
posttransplant identified proteinuria and recurrent focal
segmental glomerulosclerosis. Evaluation for apheresis de-
tected HCV RNA, at which point, a 16-week course of
sofosbuvir/declatavir was initiated. HCV viral load was un-
detectable within 2 weeks of treatment and remained unde-
tectable. In the second case, the donor was a 36-year-old
with a history or polysubstance abuse and negative HCV se-
rology. One month posttransplant, HCV seroconversion
was reported in the liver recipient, and testing of the kidney
recipient was positive for HCV RNA. The recipient com-
pleted 12 weeks of elbasvir/grazoprevir and HCV viral load
remained undetectable upon completion of treatment.123
In addition to the cases above, 2 additional cases of unex-
pected HCV transmission in organ transplantation are worth
mentioning. The first is a case of HCV transmission through
the use of stored blood vessels used as conduits in organ trans-
plantation.125 Second is a case of an unexpected severe HCV
infection in a recipient of a deceased donor kidney due to a ge-
notype mismatch between the HCV-positive recipient (geno-
type 2) and the HCV-positive donor (genotype 1) combined
with a change to tacrolimus-based immunosuppression.126
HBV
Donors testing positive for HBsAg have a very high risk of
transmitting HBV to an HBV-negative recipient, although
this risk is attenuated for vaccinated recipients and with
the use of antiviral prophylaxis. Donors who are anti–
HBc-positive, but HBsAg-negative, have a lower risk of
disease transmission, although transmission is still possible,
especially in the context of liver transplantation.127-130 Ret-
rospective analysis of liver transplant outcomes in Spain
from 1995 to 1998 found that, in the absence of prophylaxis,
HBsAg-/anti–HBc-negative recipients of livers from anti–
HBc-positive donors developed de novo HBV (defined as
detection of HBsAg in serum on 2 consecutive samples post-
transplantation) in 50% of cases.131 Similar rates of trans-
mission from anti–HBc-positive donors to HBV-negative liver
recipients have been reported from Italy (43%) and the United
States (50%-78%).92,93,130
By contrast, reported rates of de novo HBVin recipients of
kidneys from anti–HBc-positive donors range from 0% to
2.4%.93,130 In a retrospective study of 45 kidney recipients
with a history of prior HBV infection or reported vaccination
who received organs from HBcAb-positive donors, none be-
cameHBsAg-positive within 12months of transplantation, al-
though 18% acquired HBsAb and 13% acquired HBcAb.132
None of the recipients developed signs of clinical HBV infec-
tion. A large retrospective analysis of the US United Net-
work for Organ Sharing database found that—after taking
into account donor and recipient characteristics—althoughanti–HBc-positive donor kidneys resulted in a higher incidence
of anti-HBc seroconversion in HBV-negative recipients, this
was not associatedwith a higher incidence ofHBsAg detection
posttransplant, nor with worse graft or patient survival com-
pared to D−/R− pairs.133
From 122 heart/heart-lung transplants reported in the
published literature involving anti–HBc-positive donors, there
has been a single report of HBV transmission to an HBsAg-
negative heart recipient who did not receive prophylaxis
posttransplant.93,130,134-136 There have been at least 2 reports
of heart transplantation involvingHBsAg-positive donors that
did not result in HBV infection in HBV-negative, vaccinated
donors receiving HBV prophylaxis.137,138 Similarly, in the
context of lung transplantation, the risk of HBV transmission
from anti–HBV-positive donors appears to be extremely
low.139-141 A large retrospective registry study of lung and
heart-lung transplants found no significant difference in
5-year survival based on donor anti-HBc status and concluded
anti–HBc-positive donors may be safely used in lung/heart-
lung transplantation.139
The risk of HBV transmission from anti–HBc-positive do-
nors to organ recipient is determined by 3 factors142:
1. The size of the inoculum: the risk of HBV transmission is
greater for liver transplantation than for other organs because
of the large viral DNA load within the liver graft.
2. Recipient pretransplant HBV status: HBsAb levels in the re-
cipient greater than 10 IU/L confer protection against de novo
HBV infection, irrespective of whether anti-HBs was pro-
duced by previous HBV infection or by vaccination.
3. Use of antiviral prophylaxis: treatment with HBV immune
globulin and/or entecavir or tenofovir is highly effective in
preventing de novo HBV infection posttransplantation.
Table 19 summarizes reports of donor-derived HBV trans-
mission according to donor serological status.Only 3 reports of
HBV transmission by kidney transplantation were identified
that also provided information on patient outcomes. Wolf
et al143 reported 3 cases of HBV transmission from HBsAg-
positive kidney donors to recipients occurring at the University
of California San Francisco between 1975 and 1977. Although
none of the recipients developed abnormal liver function over
the relatively short follow-up period (range, 6–23 months),
one of the recipients died 23 months posttransplant.143 In the
case reported from Iowa in 1980, the donor's HBV serostatus
was unknown at the time of transplantation, but there was no
evidence in the medical or social history of increased risk. The
recipient experienced early severe rejection, and the kidney
was removedonday12posttransplant; however, complications
continued to develop over the following weeks, including
wound infection with dehiscence, rupture of the right external
iliac artery and massive recurrent lower gastrointestinal hemor-
rhage. The patient was found to be HBsAg-positive 10 weeks
posttransplant, and retrospective testing of posttransplant
blood samples showed serum was first HBsAg-positive on day
6 posttransplant.144 In the case reported byMagiorkinis et al,55
a kidney from an HBsAg-positive donor was transplanted into
a vaccinated recipient under the cover of prophylaxis (IV hyper-
immune gammaglobulin). The recipient developed acute HBV
hepatitis 4 months posttransplant and died 1 month later from
encephalopathy, Child-Pugh class C, and renal hepatic syn-
drome type 1 despite treatment with entecavir. Genotype
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32 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comanalysis of the transmitted HBV strain found multiple muta-
tions in the S, pre-S, core, and X regions, and in particular a
G145R escape mutation.
The majority of case reports of donor-derived HBV trans-
mission occurred via liver transplantation. Several of the cases
summarized in Table 19 involve HBsAg-negative donors who
were found to be anti–HBc-positive on retrospective testing
posttransplantation. Gow and Mutimer146 retrospectively
searched the database of the liver transplant unit at the Queen
Elizabeth Hospital, Birmingham, for cases of de novo HBV
posttransplantation from 1982 to 2000, when screening for
HbsAg was standard but routine screening for anti-HBc had
not yet been implemented in the United Kingdom. They found
4 cases of transmission from HBsAg-negative donors from a
total of 1354 adult liver transplants—an infection rate of
0.3% in the absence of routine anti-HBc screening. In one
of the reported cases, the donor was known to be anti–
HBc-positive but the liver was transplanted into the recipient
without prophylaxis regardless, because at that time the in-
fectious risk was not appreciated (see Table 19).
Although the risk of infection derived from organs from
HBV-positive donors to unvaccinated liver recipients is now
appreciated and vaccination and prophylaxis are now stan-
dard, a number of cases of transmission have been reported
in vaccinated recipients as a result of mutations in the HBV
genome—in particular, mutations resulting in structural
variations in the surface antigen recognized by anti-HBV,
resulting in a loss of immunoreactivity.150 “Vaccine escape
mutants” may evade detection via standard serological test-
ing, and cause infection in immunized recipients and recipients
receiving immunoprophylaxis with polyclonal anti-HBs
(HBIG).150 Moraleda et al149 report a case of a female recip-
ient of a liver transplant from a HBcAb- and HBsAb-positive
donor, who despite responding to recombinant HBV vaccine
in the preliver transplant period (anti-HBs titer, >10 IU), was
found to have active HBV infection 7 months posttransplant.
Retrospective analysis of the stored donor serum showed
mutations in the “a” determinant of the HBV S gene at posi-
tions 127 and 145. Similarly, Molina Rueda et al56 reported
a case of HBV transmission in the recipient of a liver from a
HBsAg-negative, HBcAb-negative, HBsAb-negative donor.56
HBV NATwas performed on stored donor serum and found
mutations at 118V + 128V + 142T.
No detailed case reports of donor-derivedHBV transmission
in heart, lung, or pancreas transplantation were identified.
In none of the cases of HBV transmission described above
were the results of HBV-NAT available at the time of trans-
plantation. With the introduction of routine HBV-NAT, it
will be easier to distinguish which potential donors with pos-
itive serological test results do in fact pose a threat of infec-
tion. HBV-NAT would also detect vaccine escape mutants
that are able to evade detection by standard serology.
Recipient Management
The case reports described in Transmission Risk highlight
the importance of close monitoring of recipients for de novo
infection with BBV in the weeks and months after transplan-
tation. Recipients who are on immunosuppression may not
seroconvert despite being viremic, and therefore, screening
recipients for viral infection requires both serology and NAT
testing to be performed.1,119 For recipients of an organ from
an increased-risk donor in particular, posttransplantmonitoringfor donor-derived BBV infection should ideally include NAT
screening for HIV, HBV, HCVat 2 and 4 weeks, and screening
by both NAT and serology at 12 and 48 weeks.1,7,44,45
Unlike HCVandHBV, HIV infection in the potential donor
currently remains an absolute contraindication to donation.
Donation would only be considered in the circumstances that
a suitable HIV-positive recipient exists, in which case donation
may be considered after specialist advice. Transplantation of
organs from HIV-positive donors to HIV-positive patients re-
ceiving highly active antiretroviral therapy before and after
transplantation has shown excellent results in the context of
careful selection and monitoring by experts.151-153 For HIV-
negative patients receiving organs from increased-risk donors
who test negative for HIVon serology and NAT, prophylaxis
with antiretroviral therapy to prevent HIV transmission is
not deemed necessary in the Australian context due to the very
low estimated residual risk of disease transmission and uncer-
tainties about efficacy (personal communication, P Boan).
The proportion of actual donors in Australia and New
Zealand in 2016 who were anti–HBc-positive was 4.6%
(n = 26), and a total of 3 HBsAg-positive donors were used.87
Current TSANZ guidelines do not recommend use of donors
who are HBsAg-positive except in exceptional circumstances
and/or where the recipient is also HBsAg-positive, given the
high likelihood of transmission even in vaccinated patients
and regardless of which organ is transplanted.52,127 Excep-
tional circumstances typically indicate a patient who is highly
likely to die on the transplant waiting list before further organ
offers. If, after appropriate expert consultation and patient
consent is obtained, organ transplantation from an HBsAg-
positive donor does go ahead, an example of appropriate pro-
phylaxis and recipient management posttransplant in this case
would involve (P Boan, personal communication):
a) HBIG if recipient HBsAb less than 100 IU/L or unknown.
One regimen described is 800 IU/L intramuscularly daily
for 7 days, then monthly for 12 months154;
b) potent antiviral therapy (eg, entecavir and/or tenofovir) for
12 months for recipients of nonliver transplants and indef-
inite antiviral therapy for recipients of liver transplants.
Donors who are HBcAb-positive but HBsAg-negative
should be tested for plasma HBVDNA. If HBV DNA is pos-
itive, the donor should be treated as if they were HBsAg-
positive. If HBV DNA is negative and the decision is made
to proceed with transplantation, the after prophylaxis might
be observed (P Boan, personal communication):
a) If recipient has HBsAb greater than 100 IU/L recorded in
the last 3 months, no prophylaxis is required. If recipient
has HBsAb less than 100 IU/L or if HBsAb titer is un-
known, intramuscular HBIG 800 IU should be adminis-
tered daily for 1 week for nonliver transplant recipients.
For recipients of liver transplants, treatment should extend
to 12 months of HBIG 800 IU monthly.
b) Nonliver transplant recipients should receive entecavir
0.5 mg daily (adjusted if creatinine clearance <50 mL/min)
for 1 month. For liver recipients, entecavir therapy should
be extended for 12 months.
Prophylaxis strategies according to donor/recipient HBV
serology profiles, as proposed by the American Society of
Transplantation Infectious Diseases Community of Practice,
are summarized in Table 20.
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 33For all recipients of organs from donors testing positive for
HBsAg and/or HBsAb, ongoing posttransplant surveillance
for the appearance of HBV infection is essential. Patients re-
ceiving prophylaxis should be screened for HBVDNA at least
every 3 months posttransplant to 12 months postantiviral ces-
sation. Patients not receiving prophylaxis should be tested
monthly for 12 months posttransplantation. European guide-
lines recommend lifelong monitoring for any recipients of
HBsAg-positive donor organs, and for recipients of livers from
anti–HBc-positive donors, due to the possibility of HBV reac-
tivation or breakthrough mutation of the virus.5
Before transplantation, all potential recipients who are not
infected with HBVand do not have current immunity should
be vaccinated. Unfortunately, the proportion of who sero-
converts is only in the range of 16% to 62%, and up to
73% of liver transplant recipients lose HBsAb within
12 months of transplantation as HBsAb titers tend to wane
in immunocompromised individuals.127 For this reason, the
higher-dose (40 μg antigen) vaccine is recommended in the
pretransplant setting, with repeat or booster HBV vaccination
recommended at approximately 12months posttransplant.97,127
Vaccination before transplantation is more successful than
vaccination posttransplant, when achieving seroconversion
is even more problematic.
The introduction of DAAs for HCV has entirely changed
the landscape of recipient management in relation to the risk
of HCV infection. Before 2011, the standard of care in the
treatment of HCV in transplant recipients was 48 weeks of
peginterferonwith ribavirin, achieving a relatively poor response
rate of between 13%and43%, in part due to treatment-limiting
side effects leading to discontinuation and serious adverse events,
including graft loss and death.155-161 The first DAAs for HCV,
boceprevir and telaprevir,were approved for use by theUS Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2011. These first-generation
protease inhibitors, also administered in combination with
peginterferon and ribavirin, improved the patient response
rate to 60% to 75% but were still associated with a high rate
of adverse events, including skin rashes, cytopenias, allograft
rejection, decreased kidney function, and death.162,163 In late
2013, second-generationNS3/4protease inhibitor simeprevir andTABLE 20.
Suggested HBV prophylaxis for liver and nonliver transplantation
Donor Recipient HBIG
HBcAb HBsAg HBcAb HBsAg HBsAb
Liver transplantation
− − + − −/+ No
−/+ −/+ + + − Yesa
+ − −/+ − + No
+ − −/+ − − No
+ + −/+ − −/+ c
Nonliver transplantation
− − + − −/+ No
−/+ −/+ + + − No
+ − −/+ − + No
+ − −/+ − − No
+ + −/+ − −/+ c
a If HBV DNA-negative at transplant, consider short-term HBIG therapy; if HBV DNA positive at transplant,
b If donor HBV DNA is performed and negative, no prophylaxis is required, although close monitoring for H
c Transplant typically contraindicated but may consider in select exceptional cases, in the setting of indefi
HBIG, hyper Immune-immunoglobulin; HBsAg, hepatitis B surface antigen.nucleotide analogNS5B polymerase inhibitor sofosbuvir were
approved to be used alongside peginterferon and ribavirin for
the treatment of HCV. Based on the results of the COSMOS
study showing a sustained virological response rate greater
than 90% using simeprevir and sofosbuvir with or without
peginterferon and ribavirin, this interferon-free DAA regimen
was approved by the FDA in 2014.164
Additional DAAs have subsequently been approved since
2014, and numerous studies have demonstrated interferon-
free DAA regimens to be safe and highly effective in patients
with advanced liver disease and liver transplant recipients.162
Clinical trials of interferon-free DAA regimens in liver trans-
plant recipientswithHCVgenotype 1 recurrence have achieved
sustained virological response rates atweek 12 of 90% to 98%,
based on patients without severe hepatic impairment/advanced
fibrosis at baseline.163,165,166 Response rates of between 96%
and 100% have been demonstrated in liver transplant recipi-
ents with fibrosing cholestatic hepatitis, and between 60%
and 75% in recipients with severe hepatic impairment.166,167
Only minor side effects—for example, fatigue, headache and
cough—were reported, and any required adjustments to immu-
nosuppression dosage were minimal.163 There have also been a
number of case reports of successful treatment of HCV infec-
tionwith interferon-free DAA regimens in kidney transplant re-
cipients.168 As a consequence, HCV-NAT–positive donors are
now being used with greater frequency for HCV-positive re-
cipients and a reduction in HCV-positive organ discard has
been reported in the United States.162
Given the highHCV cure rate for DAAs and their manage-
able side-effect profile, organs from HCV-infected donors
might now be made available to all potential recipients, not
only those who are already HCV-positive/in extremis. The
results of the first pilot trial of transplantation of HCV-NAT–
positive kidneys into HCV-negative recipients—transplanting
hepatitis C kidneys into negative kidney recipients—conducted
at theUniversity of Pennsylvania,were reported in June 2017.47
This trial included adults on dialysis who were expecting long
transplant waiting times (and did not have elevated risks of
liver disease, allograft failure, or all-cause mortality). Donors
were restricted to those with an HCV genotype-1 infection.127
Prophylaxis Vaccination
No Consider if HBsAb-ve or lost
Yes No
Yes, unless HBsAb persists Consider if HBsAb lost
Yes, unless HBsAb persists after vaccinationb Yes
c Consider if HBsAb-ve or lost
No Consider if HBsAb-ve or lost
Yes No
Yes, unless HBsAb persists Consider if HBsAb-ve or lost
Yes, unless HBsAb persists after vaccinationb Yes
c Consider if HBsAb-ve or lost
consider long-term or indefinite HBIG.
BV recurrence is recommended.
nite antiviral prophylaxis and close monitoring.
34 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comRecipients were given IV glucocorticoids and rabbit antithy-
mocyte globulin, followed by oral tacrolimus, mycophenolate
mofetil, and prednisone. HCV viral load was measured 3 days
posttransplant, and elbasvir-grazoprevir was to be initiated as
soon as recipients had detectable HCV RNA. Ten recipients
were transplanted with HCV-infected kidneys as per protocol.
All were HCV-RNA–positive by day 3 posttransplant, and
elbasvir-grazoprevir was initiated, with a total treatment course
of 12 weeks. All 10 recipients were cured of HCV (defined
as a sustained virologic response 12 weeks after the end of
DAA treatment). At 6 months, none of the recipients had
died or experienced graft failure, acute rejection, or other
major morbidity.
A second trial of transplantation of HCV-NAT–positive
kidneys into HCV-negative recipients—EXPANDER-1—is
currently underway. In this trial, recipients are preemptively
treated with elbasvir-grazoprevir, with a single dose given
pretransplant, and then daily doses for 12 weeks posttrans-
plant.169 If HCV genotype 2 or 3 was detected, then sofos-
buvir was added to the treatment regimen. HCV RNA was
quantified on postoperative day 1 and then weekly for the
first month, then every 4weeks until 12 weeks posttransplan-
tation. Preliminary results for 8 HCV-negative recipient/
HCV-positive donor pairs were presented at the 2017
American Society of Transplantation meeting: HCV RNA
was detected in 4 recipients on posttransplant day 1 but no
later timepoints, no graft failure was observed, and no ad-
verse events related to elbasvir-grazoprevir were observed.
Three recipients had delayed graft function.169
The first report of the deliberate transplantation of a liver
from an HCV-viremic donor to a nonviremic recipient was
published in August 2017.170 The recipient was a 57-year
old woman with a history of Child-Turcotte-Pugh class A
HCV cirrhosis, who had been on the liver transplant waiting
list for 3 years. She had HCV genotype 1A, which had previ-
ously been treated with 12 weeks of sofosbuvir/simeprevir
combination therapy as part of an industry-sponsored clin-
ical trial, and a sustained virological response had been
achieved. However, 6 months later the patient developed
hepatopulmonary syndrome and was granted 22 MELD ex-
ception points. The patient agreed to accept anHCV-positive
liver, understanding that she would have to be retreated with
DAAs. The donor was an 18-year-old man who had died
from an IV heroin overdose: the donors' HCV genotype
was not known at the time of transplantation, but 3 days
after transplantation, the recipient's HCV genotype was re-
ported as 1A. Treatment with ledipasvir/sofosbuvir was
commenced on posttransplant day 25, and HCV RNAwas
undetectable by week 8 posttransplant. Two years postliver
transplant, the patient remained HCV-RNA–negative, with
excellent graft function.170
One of the areas, where more evidence is currently re-
quired, is with regard to the safe use of DAAs for HCV in pa-
tients with impaired kidney function. In most of the trials of
DAA-based therapies, patients with severe renal impairment
were excluded; in addition, the nucleotide polymerase inhibitor
sofosbuvir is eliminated through the kidney and is, therefore,
not appropriate for patients with estimated glomerular filtra-
tion rate less than 30 mL/min per 1.73 m2.171 The HCV prote-
ase inhibitor asunaprevir and the Ns5A inhibitor daclatasvir
are mainly eliminated through the liver, and combination ther-
apy with daclatasivir and asunaprevir has been demonstratedto be highly effective and safe in genotype 1 HCV-infected pa-
tients with estimated glomerular filtration rate less than 45mL/
min per 1.73 m2.172 Other drug protocols, including
ombitasvir/paritaprevir/ritonavir without ribavirin, or elbasvir
and grazoprevir combination therapy, have also been shown
to be safe and effective in genotype 1 HCV-infected patients
with chronic kidney disease stages 4 and 5, including hemo-
dialysis patients.173-175 Effective DAA therapies for genotype
2 HCV-infected patients with impaired kidney function are
lacking, however. A Japanese study of the outcomes of
sofosbuvir and ribavirin combination therapy in genotype 2
HCV-infected patients with chronic kidney disease stages 1
to 3 found that patients with stage 3 chronic kidney disease
were significantly more likely to not experience a sustained
virological response, but that otherwise the regimen was safe
for patients with kidney impairment.171 Other studies have
reported serious adverse events of sofosbuvir therapy in pa-
tients with kidney impairment.176
Current TSANZ guidelines allow for transplantation of
organs from HCV-positive donors to HCV-negative recipi-
ents in exceptional circumstances only; however, this is likely
to evolve in the light of successful trials of DAAs in D+/R−
pairs. At the present time, if there is a patient who is highly
likely to die on the transplant waiting list before receiving an-
other organ offer, transplantation with an HCV-NAT-positive
organmay go ahead after discussionwith an infectious disease
or hepatology specialist. The recipient would be then moni-
tored frequently (eg, twice weekly) by plasma HCV RNA,
with initiation of DAA therapy as soon as RNA became posi-
tive (personal communication P Boan). Factors affecting the
choice of DAA regimen would include HCV genotype, renal
function, interaction with immunosuppressant medications
(eg, protease inhibitors with calcineurin inhibitors), and any
organ-specific protocols.46 HCV infection itself affects dosing
requirements of calcineurin inhibitors, and thus the eradica-
tion of HCV requires a corresponding close monitoring of
immunosuppression trough levels.166 Treatment protocols
are still being refined at the time of writing—when to intro-
duce DAAs, the optimal duration of treatment, and the full
extent of drug interactions are questions that are rapidly be-
ing addressed.163,165-167,177,178
More data and longer term follow up of clinical trial partic-
ipants are now required to establishwhetherHCV-negative re-
cipients transplanted with organs from HCV-positive donors
experience any survival detriment. In the case of liver trans-
plantation, chronic HCV infection in the donor may have
caused fibrosis of the donated liver, which could still affect
graft and patient survival even if HCV is successfully cleared
in the recipient posttransplant. Also, little is currently known
about the risk of treatment failure, which has implications
for the informed consent of D+/R− transplants.179 In addition,
there is a need for data on the cost effectiveness of HCV-
positive transplantation that inform the appropriate usage of
DAAs in organ transplantation—from expanding the donor
pool, to reducing the liver transplant waiting list, to preventing
and treating donor-derived HCV transmission.
HTLV-1
Epidemiology
The Human T-cell lymphocytic virus-1 (HTLV-1) is an on-
cogenic retrovirus that preferentially infects CD4+ T-cells.
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use, sexual intercourse or blood transfusion. Although infec-
tion is usually asymptomatic in most individuals, approxi-
mately 2% to 5% of infected individuals will subsequently
develop acute T-cell leukemia/lymphoma (ATL) around 20
to 30 years after infection.5 A smaller proportion (0.25–
4%) will develop HTLV-1–associated myelopathy/tropical
spastic paraparesis (HAM/TSP) soon after the initial infec-
tion.180 The majority of HTLV-1–infected individuals will
not develop clinical manifestations of ATL or HAM/TSP in
their lifetime. However, infection with HTLV-1 suppresses
immune surveillance and increases susceptibility to other in-
fections including parasitic infection with Strongyloides
stercoralis and scabies, bacterial infections including Myco-
bacterium tuberculosis, Mycobacterium leprae, and infec-
tious dermatitis, and viral infections including HIV, HCV,
and HBV.181 Breaches in the skin or intestinal mucosa as a
consequence of HTLV-1–associated infections (especially
scabies and S. stercoralis) may lead to bloodstream infections
with S. aureus, Escherichia coli, Streptococcus pyogenes, or
other organisms.181 In addition, HTLV-1 infection is associ-
ated with pulmonary disease, including bronchiectasis.181
Therefore, in affected individuals, HTLV-1 infection is likely
to be associated with an increased risk of morbidity and indi-
rectly with increased mortality risk.
HTLV-1 is not a ubiquitous virus, rather, it is present
throughout the world in clusters of high endemicity.182 The
main foci of HTLV-1 are southwestern Japan (Kyushu Island
and the Okinawa archipelago), sub-Saharan Africa (Guinea-
Bissau, Ghana, Nigeria, Zaire), the Caribbean (Martinique,
Jamaica, Haiti), parts of South America (French Guyana,
Peru), and parts of the Middle East and Australo-Melanesia.182
It is hypothesized that this highly specific geographical distri-
bution originates from a founder effect in certain population
groups with the persistence of a high viral transmission rate.182
On the other hand, large global regions have not been investi-
gated for HTLV-1 infection and population-based studies to
estimate HTLV-1 prevalence at the country level are rare,
thus the prevalence remains unknown in many areas of the
world. What is clear from the areas that have been studied is
that HTLV-1 distribution is not homogenous. In Australia,
HTLV-1 is endemic among ATSI populations in Central
Australia, where infection with the Australo-Melanesian
HTLV-1 subtype C predominates183; by contrast, studies
conducted among mostly non-Indigenous blood donors liv-
ing in Australian cities found a very low prevalence of
HTLV-1, ranging from0.001% to 0.032%.182 A retrospective
assessment of serology requests made to the Northern Terri-
tory Government Pathology Service between 2008 and 2011
found a gradient of HTLV-1 prevalence from Central Australia
(highest) to Northern Australia (lowest), ranging from a re-
gional high of 51.7% in the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands in
northern South Australia, 50% in Ngaanyatjarraku Shire in
Western Australia, and 25.3% in the MacDonnell Shire of
the Northern Territory, to less than 1% in the greater Darwin
region, East and West Arnhem Shire, Roper Gulf Shire, and
Tiwi Islands.184 In terms of the wider Australo-Melanesian
region, estimates of the population prevalence of HTLV-1
in the Solomon Islands range from 1.2% to 3%, and a
population-based study in the Vanuatu archipelago reported
HTLV-1 prevalence of 0.62%.182 Studies in Fiji and New
Caledonia did not detect HTLV-1 in these populations.182Risk factors for HTLV-1 among Indigenous Australians
living in Central Australia include older age, male sex, pre-
vious STI, and residence in the south or west of Central
Australia.183 Each of the major recognized complications
of HTLV-1—ATL, HAM/TSP, infective dermatitis, strongy-
loidiasis, HTLV-1–associated pulmonary disease, crusted
scabies—has been described in the Indigenous residents of
this region.183,185
Although immunosuppressionmight theoretically affect the
rate of onset of HTLV-1–associated disease, reports regarding
outcomes amongHTLV-1–infected solid organ recipients have
been mixed. Retrospective studies of HTLV-1–infected kidney
transplant recipients in Japan found no HTLV-1–associated
disease in 2 case series of 10 and 16 recipients followed up
for an average of 13 and 8 years, respectively.186,187 In con-
trast, a third case series Japan observed 3 cases of ATL at 6,
9, and 25 months after living donor liver transplantation
from 8 HTLV-1–infected recipients.188 There has also been
1 report of an HTLV-positive recipient developing HAM/
TSP after a living donor kidney transplant, and 1 report in
which 3 recipients from a single deceased donor rapidly de-
veloped HAM/TSP posttransplant.189,190
Donor Screening and Risk Minimization
Standard testing for HTLV-1 is performed using a com-
bined serological test for HTLV-1 and HTLV-2. An important
issue with serological tests for HTLV-1/2 is the extremely high
rate of false-positive results in low HTLV prevalence set-
tings.191,192 False-positive rates of up to 100% have been re-
ported for potential organ donors in nonendemic settings.193
A second issue with serological tests is that, at the current time,
available assays are unable to distinguish between HTLV-1
and HTLV-2, which is a relevant limitation as HTLV-2 has
not been found to be associated with any human disease and
should not preclude transplantation.191 HTLV-1 and HTLV-2
can be distinguished by confirmatory NAT testing, or by
virus-specific Western blot or line immunoassay.194
Given the high false-positive rate, testing is generally not
performed in countries where seroprevalence of HTLV-1 is
low, or alternatively it is restricted to donors coming from
high-risk subpopulations or endemic areas.191,195 OPTN has
removed the requirement for pretransplant screening for
HLTV-1, and it is left to individual organ procurement agen-
cies to decidewhether to perform targeted screening on donors
thought to be at increased risk of HTLV-1 infection.194 OPTN
recommends that positive HTLV-1/2 screening test results be
confirmed using Genelabs HTLV 2.4 (Western blot) or inn ge-
netics HTLV-1/2 Line Immunoassay.194
European guidelines recommend screening in endemic
areas and for donors coming from endemic populations only,
and also stipulate that any initial reactive test must be con-
firmed as a true-positive for HTLV-1 before decisions are
made about organ utilization.5 France and Portugal currently
screen for HTLV-1/2, and Spain recommends HTLV-1/2
screening for donors at higher risk of HTLV-1 including im-
migrants or sexual partners of immigrants from endemic
areas and children at risk of vertical transmission.5,195
In the Australian context, HTLV serology should be con-
sidered for donors from endemic regions (the Caribbean,
South America, Africa, Asia, Iran, Romania) and for ATSI peo-
ple living in the Northern Territory, Queensland, Kimberley,
and northern South Australia.
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Between 1994 and 2001, the UNOS reported 12 HTLV-
positive deceased donors, from whom 5 organs were trans-
planted. As of 2003, 4 of 5 recipients were alive and without
malignancy, and a heart transplant recipient of an HTLV-
positive organ had died 1 month posttransplant from multi-
organ failure although there was no indication that this was
related to HTLV-1 infection.192 A retrospective analysis of
outcomes among liver transplant recipients in the United
States who received their transplants before August 2007
found no statistically significant difference in graft or patient
survival according to the HTLV status of the donor.196 How-
ever, the authors note that their analysis was limited by the
short recipient follow-up period (mean, 1.2 years) and the
high false-positive rate for HTLV testing.
The first European cases of donor-derived HTLV-1 trans-
mission were reported in Spain in 2001.190 Three recipients
of organs from the same donor (a liver and 2 kidney recipients)
presented 2 years posttransplant with clinical manifestations
of subacute myelopathy. The donor was retrospectively found
to be seropositive forHTLV-1 and, despite having no apparent
risk factors for HTLV-1, it was found on further investigation
that his mother was originally fromVenezuela, whereHTLV-1
is endemic. Genetic analysis of the transmitted strain of
HTLV-1 in this case showed multiple substitutions in the
tax gene characteristic of the taxA subgroup, which is asso-
ciated with greater risk ofHAM/TSP development. The inves-
tigators hypothesize that the presence of taxA may at least in
part account for the rapid onset of neurological disease in
these organ recipients.
This cluster of HTLV-1 cases in Spain prompted a survey
of HTLV-1 seroprevalence among potential organ donors
to inform an appropriate national approach to donor screen-
ing. This survey, conducted from January 2002 to December
2003 screened for HTLV-1 antibodies in 1298 organ donors.
Not a single seropositive donor was identified. Simultaneously,
HTLV screening was conducted in a sample of 1079 immi-
grants, finding a prevalence of asymptomatic carriers of 0.5%
(with carriers predominantly originating from South America
or Africa).195 These findings supported the existing policy
in Spain of testing for anti-HTLVantibodies only among or-
gan donors from HTLV-1 endemic areas or among native
Spaniards with a high suspicion of HTLV-1 infection.195
Recipient Management and Outcomes
There are currently no treatments for HTLV-1 infection.
OPTN guidelines state that if the donor is confirmed to be
HTLV-1–positive, the recipient(s) should be screened by
HTLV-1–specific NAT and serology at 1, 3, and 12 months
posttransplant, and should receive ongoing clinical monitor-
ing for the appearance of unexplained neurological disease
and/or T-cell leukemia/lymphoma.194 Counseling to avoid
secondary transmission to sexual partners or breast-fed infants
of recipients may also be required.
The effect of immunosuppression on the outcomes of
HTLV-1 infection is not well characterized. Immunosuppres-
sion may promote a rapid increased in HTLV-1 proviral load
due to a lack of cytotoxic T lymphocyte response to infection,
thus leading to a more rapid onset of neurological disease.190
However, the immunosuppressed status of the organ recipi-
ent is only one of several factors that will potentially affect
the outcomes of HLTV-1 infection. CertainHTLV-1 subtypesare more likely to result in HTLV-1–related disease than
others (eg, Cosmopolitan A viruses carrying the taxA gene
are linked to greater risk of TSP/HAM development), and
the proviral load is typically higher in patients with TSP/
HAM versus asymptomatic carriers.197,198 Host factors, in-
cluding HLA haplotype, may influence the outcome of infec-
tion, with the class I allele HLA-A*02 appearing to confer
protection against TSP/HAM.199 Lastly, the route of transmis-
sion is also likely to have a role in patient outcomes: HTLV-1
transmission by organ transplantation or blood transfusion
exposes the patient to a much larger viral inoculum than by
other transmission routes, and it is hypothesized that this re-
sults in a shorter latency period and greater risk of TSP/
HAM.200 These factors are likely to account for the variation
in outcomes of HTLV-1 infection in solid organ transplant
recipients reported in the published literature: although there
have been several cases of ATL and TSP/HAM in HTLV-1–
positive organ recipients after transplantation,190,201,202 there
have also been multiple studies demonstrating an absence of
HTLV-1–related diseases in HTLV-1–infected recipients and
recipients of HTLV-positive donor organs over long-term
follow-up.186,191,203HERPES VIRUSES (EXCLUDING EBV AND CMV)
Epidemiology
Herpes Simplex Virus
Data on the epidemiology of HSV types 1 and 2 (HSV-1
and HSV-2) in Australia come from the baseline AusDiab
survey, a population-representative survey of adults 25 years
and older conducted between 1999 and 2000.204 Serum
analysis of a stratified random sample of 4000 individuals
from the original cohort of 11000 found a seroprevalence
of HSV-1 in the Australian population of 76% and a sero-
prevalence of HSV-2 of 12%. Seroprevalence of HSV-1
peaked in the 65- to 74-year age groups at 85% compared
with a seroprevalence of 67% in the 25- to 34-year age groups.
Seroprevalence of HSV-2 peaked in the 35- to 44-year age
groups at 16% compared with the lowest seroprevalence of
8% in the 65- to 74-year age groups. Seroprevalence of both
HSV-1 and HSV-2 were higher in women than in men
(80% vs 71% and 16% vs 8%, respectively). Seroprevalence
of HSV-2was higher in capital cities (14%) andmetropolitan
areas (13%) comparedwith rural and remote areas (9%). Es-
timated seroprevalence of bothHSV-1 andHSV-2was higher
in Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander people than non-
Indigenous Australians (100% vs 75% and 18%vs 12%, re-
spectively). Although not analyzed as part of the AusDiab
survey, international studies have reported HSV-2 seropreva-
lence among MSM of 24% to 87%.205,206
Kaposi Sarcoma Herpes Virus or Human Herpes Virus-8
Since its identification in 1994, Kaposi sarcoma herpes vi-
rus (KSHV) has been demonstrated to be associated with all
forms of Kaposi sarcoma, primary effusion lymphoma, and
multicentric Castleman's disease, and is the most common
malignancy of HIV-1–infected persons.207 KSHV is homolo-
gous with, but distinct from, the gamma herpes viridae, EBV,
and herpes virus saimiri, and—unlike most herpes viruses—
human infection with KSHV is not ubiquitous but has a wide
geographic variation. Seroprevalence is estimated to be less
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between 20% and 80% in the Mediterranean and parts of
Africa.207 Modes of KSHV transmission vary in different
parts of theworld: in nonendemic regions, sexual transmission
is likely the main route of transmission; in endemic regions,
primary KSHV infection also commonly occurs in childhood
(probably via salivary transmission), and cases of vertical
transmission have also been reported.208
Multiple cases of KSHV transmission from organ donors
to recipients have been reported in the literature.209-214 Pri-
mary infection with KSHV in immunocompromised persons
is characterized by fever, splenomegaly, lymphoid hyperpla-
sia, pancytopenia, and in some cases, rapid onset Kaposi sar-
coma. In immunosuppressed transplant recipients, KSHV is
more commonly associated with neoplastic disease.5
Donor Screening and Risk Minimization
Herpes Simplex Virus
International guidelines do not require any specific donor
screening for HSV-1 or HSV-2, and no contraindication ex-
ists to organ donation from donors with latent herpes family
viral infections due to high rates of donor and recipient expo-
sure and routine effective antiviral prophylaxis (acyclovir,
valaciclovir, ganciclovir, valganciclovir.5 Nonetheless, it is
important to note the potential for fatal de novo infections
in naïve recipients from organs recovered from latently in-
fected donors (see Transmission), as well as the potential
for reactivation in latently infected recipients. Active infec-
tion in the potential donor should also not be disregarded.
Some transplant centers perform retrospective additional do-
nor tests for latent HSV in cases of seronegative recipients
(usually in the case of pediatric recipients) to decide on specific
antiviral prophylaxis or treatments and follow-up, although
there is minimal evidence to support this approach. European
guidelines state that organs canbe accepted fromdonorswith la-
tent herpes family viral infections, except in the case of acute her-
pes viremia in the donor without effective antiviral treatment.5
KSHVor Human Herpes Virus-8
Kaposi sarcoma herpes virus DNA is not detectable in all
infected individuals; therefore, KSHVmust be detected by sero-
logical assay.Given that donor-derivedprimaryKSHVinfection
can be associated with severe disease, European guidelines
recommend screening donors for KSHV antilytic antilatent
antibodies in areas of high KSHV prevalence (eg, Mediterra-
nean region).5 As KSHV serology is generally unavailable
before deceased donor organ transplantation, screening for
KSHV antibodies may be performed retrospectively in the
days immediately after transplantation. In the case of a trans-
plant from a positive donor to negative recipient, European
guidelines recommend close monitoring of KSHV DNA in
the blood to detect infection early.5
Transmission
Herpes Simplex Virus
A case of donor-derived HSV-2 infection affecting 6 solid
organ recipients occurred in Victoria in 2014.18,215 Lungs,
kidneys, pancreas, and liver were retrieved from the original
donor and transplanted into 4 recipients. The recipient of the
kidney-pancreas had an acute myocardial infarction and
cardiac arrest 2 days posttransplant and subsequentlydeteriorated, with brain death declared on day 9. Serolog-
ical testing on day 9 was negative for HSV-2 IgG, but subse-
quent HSV-2 NAT later performed on stored samples was
positive. This recipient then became a donor, with his lungs
and the recently transplanted kidney from the original donor
going to new recipients. The original donor had died of hyp-
oxic brain injury; no clinical evidence of HSV-2 infectionwas
seen and no history of recurrent HSV-2 infection was re-
ported. On retrospective laboratory testing, HSV DNAwas
not detected; however, the donor's serology was positive
for HSV-2 IgG (but not for HSV IgM). Biopsy of the kidney
originally transplanted into the kidney-pancreas recipient
(biopsy performed before retransplantation) showed his-
tiocytes with enlarged nuclei containing possible viral in-
clusions, and HSV-2–specific staining confirmed the
diagnosis of disseminated HSV-2 infection.
Of the other recipients of organs from the original donor,
only the recipient of the liver developed HSV viremia and
clinical symptoms. Evidence of hepatitis was observed on
day 13 posttransplant, and HSV-2 viremia was detected.
Valaciclovir treatment was increased to 1 g 8 hourly, but on
day 19 a disseminated rash developed suspected to be cutane-
ous HSV. The patient was admitted and IVacyclovir 600 mg
was administered 8 hourly, and eventually, the hepatitis and
rash resolved and the patient remained symptom free at
12 months posttransplant.
None of the other recipients in this case became symptom-
atic. The recipient of the lungs from the original donor had
received CMVprophylaxis with IV ganciclovir andCMVhy-
perimmune globulin due to CMV-status mismatch, and there
was no evidence of viremia or HSV disease up to 12 months
posttransplant. The recipient of the second kidney from the
original donoralso receivedanti-CMVprophylaxis (valganciclovir
450mg 12 hourly) and did not develop viremia or any symp-
toms of HSV disease.
The recipient of the retransplanted kidneywas seropositive
for HSV-1 IgG and HSV-2 IgG at the time of transplantation
but negative for HSV IgM and was commenced on vala-
ciclovir 1 g daily on day 1 posttransplant. HSV-2 viremia was
noted on day 5 and treatment switched to IVacyclovir 400 mg;
viremia resolved and the patientwas asymptomatic at 12months
posttransplant.
Finally, the recipient of the bilateral lung transplant from
the kidney-pancreas recipient was similarly HSV-1 IgG and
HSV-2 IgG-positive at the time of transplantation but negative
for HSV IgM and was treated with IV ganciclovir 5 mg/kg on
day 1 posttransplant. HSV-2 viremia was detected on day 2
posttransplant, and the patient switched to valaciclovir 1 g ev-
ery 8 hours. Viremia resolved, and the patient was asymptom-
atic at 12 months posttransplant.
These 2 clusters of cases demonstrate that HSV-2 may be
transmitted by HSV DNA-negative donors; however, the
impact on the recipient depends on whether they have
preexisting immunity and on the prophylaxis regimen
used. Symptomatic HSV disease only occurred in the recip-
ients who were serologically negative and did not receive
prophylactic antiviral therapy.KSHVor Human Herpes Virus-8
Studies of the seroprevalence of human herpes virus-8
(HHV-8) in organ donors and recipients pretransplantation
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in D+/R− pairs of between 12 and 29%.211,212,216 The risk of
KSHV seroconversion appears to be higher for liver transplant
recipients than for kidney transplant recipients.217 Although
relatively rare, the development of KS or other lethal nonma-
lignant illnesses after donor-derived transmission of HHV-8
has been reported on multiple occasions.212,214,216,218 It has
also been demonstrated that Kaposi sarcoma progenitor cells
may be transmitted through solid organ transplantation, with
individual HHV-8–infected neoplastic cells able to seed tu-
mors in the recipient.210 Table 21 summarizes published cases
of donor-derived KSHV transmission and their outcomes.
CMV and EBV
The majority of adult populations worldwide are latently
infected with CMVand/or EBV, which affect somewhere be-
tween 20% to 100% and 50% to 90% of populations older
than 18 years, respectively.5,222-224 The most recent available
data on EBV prevalence in the Australian population come
from a 1975 study of a Caucasian population in Western
Australia, which found antibodies to EBV in 41% of 9- to
10-year-olds, 80% of 16- to 19-year-olds, and in 92% of
young adults.223More recent data are available onCMVprev-
alence: in 2002, 3593 nationally representative serum samples
were tested forCMVunder theNational Centre for Immuniza-
tionResearch and Surveillance of Vaccine Preventable Diseases
(NCIRS) serosurveillance program. This survey found CMV
seroprevalence of 38% in the 1- to 2-year age group, increasing
to 50% in the 15- to 19-year age group, and reaching 79% in
the 55- to 59-year age group, with little difference in seroprev-
alence between males and females.225
CMV and EBV cause lifelong infection, and organs from
seropositive donors may transmit infection, potentially caus-
ing severe disease in a seronegative recipient. Latent CMV
and EBV may also reactivate in immunosuppressed seropos-
itive patients posttransplantation. No contraindications exist
for organ donation in the case of donors with latent CMVin-
fection, although recipient morbidity increases in the case of
D+/R− combinations. De novo infection in the recipient can
be avoided bymatching the donor and recipient for CMV se-
rological status, and/or by prophylaxis or virological moni-
toring with preemptive treatment.
EBV transmission to naïve recipients increases the risk of
posttransplant lymphoproliferative disorders. In immuno-
competent individuals, EBVis latent in the cells of the reticuloen-
dothelial system. However, in immunosuppressed transplant
recipients, EBV may activate, proliferate, and induce the malig-
nant transformation of B lymphocytes, increasing the risk of
PLTD. In the case of donor-derived primary EBVinfection post-
transplantation, viral loads are higher and the risk of PLTD
greater than in the case of EBV reactivation. In a large, retro-
spective study of the incidence of PLTD in kidney transplant re-
cipients in the United States, the risk of PLTD was more than 6
times higher for D+/R− deceased-donor transplants compared
with R+ transplants.226 For chemoprophylactic protocols it
should be considered that there is no prophylactic treatment
that can prevent primary EBV infection; therefore, EBV-DNA
monitoring and early treatment should be considered for all D
+/R− recipients.
UK guidelines recommend that patients who are seroneg-
ative for CMV should receive a donation from a CMV sero-
negative donor if possible. If the donor and/or recipient isseropositive, routine CMV prophylaxis should be adminis-
tered posttransplant and/or routine CMV viral load surveil-
lance instituted. In the case of EBV, ideally, the donor and
recipient should be matched for EBV serostatus if possible—
especially children. Given the risks of PLTD in an immuno-
compromised, naive recipient, UK guidelines advise close
monitoring of EBVDNA levels posttransplantation in patients
at risk.29
European guidelines recommend specific antiviral prophy-
laxis for CMV-naïve recipients and virological monitoring
and preemptive therapywhere there is a risk of de novo infec-
tion or reactivation of a latent infection in the recipient. Or-
gans can be accepted independently of the anti-EBV IgG
status of the donor. However, given the risk of PLTD and po-
tential for fatal complications associated with de novo EBV
infection, regular follow-up/surveillance regarding posttransplant
lymphoproliferative disorder is essential, particularly in children
and D+/R− cases.5
The risks of D+ R− CMVand EBV transplants are well re-
ported and ideally would be avoided, but in many circum-
stances this relative risk is accepted and managed to use a
life-sustaining organ. For D+ R− CMV transplants, antiviral
prophylaxis according to international guidelines will be
used, with CMV hyperimmune globulin also considered in
some thoracic transplant units. For EBV D+ R− transplants,
EBV viral load in blood is recommended (eg, monthly for
6 months then 3 monthly to 12 months posttransplant; most
EBV-related PTL presents within 1 year posttransplantation)
with investigation (eg, PET scan) and consideration of inter-
vention (eg, reduction in immunosuppression, rituximab) with
a significant rise in viral load (eg, >103 IU/mL).
Yearly Epidemic Influenza
Epidemiology
Influenza affects 5% to 10% of the Australian population
each year and is estimated to cause over 3000 deaths, and
more than 13500 hospitalizations among Australians older
than 50 years alone.227,228 The National Influenza Surveil-
lance Scheme, guided by the CDNA's Enhanced Influenza
Surveillance Framework for Australia, exists to monitor the
onset and severity of annual epidemics and to trigger an ap-
propriate public health response. This Scheme encompasses
a range of influenza surveillance systems coordinated by the
Australian Government Department of Health that capture
information about influenza activity in the community, gen-
eral practice, emergency departments and hospitals. Commu-
nity information relies on self-report systems: Flutracking
and the National Health Call Centre Network. Surveillance
in general practices and hospitals operates by a national net-
work of sentinel practices and hospitals (the Australian Senti-
nel Practices ResearchNetwork [ASPREN] and the Influenza
Complications Alert Network [FluCAN]).
The highest months for reporting influenza-like symptoms
are June, July and August, with the peak influenza-like illness
week usually falling in August.229 During the influenza sea-
son, a potential lung donor has about a 1% to 2% chance
of excreting and potentially transmitting influenza, based
on up to 10% of the population being infected over a season
lasting ~8 weeks, given that influenza virus can be recovered
from respiratory secretions of infected persons for approxi-
mately 1 week.230
T
A
B
L
E
2
1
.
C
as
e
re
p
o
rt
s
o
fd
o
no
r-
d
er
iv
ed
K
S
H
V
in
so
lid
o
rg
an
tr
an
sp
la
nt
re
ci
p
ie
nt
s
(d
ec
ea
se
d
d
o
no
rs
)
Tr
an
sp
la
nt
ed
or
ga
n
Re
fe
re
nc
e
Ye
ar
of
tra
ns
pl
an
t
Ti
m
e
fro
m
tra
ns
pl
an
ta
tio
n
to
di
ag
no
si
s,
m
on
th
s
To
ta
lf
ol
lo
w
-u
p
tim
e,
m
on
th
s
Cl
in
ic
al
co
ur
se
HH
V-
8
as
so
ci
at
ed
di
se
as
es
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
Re
ci
pi
en
t
di
ed
at
en
d
of
fo
llo
w
-u
p
Ki
dn
ey
Lu
pp
ie
ta
l,
20
00
21
8
19
98
5
12
Fe
ve
r,
en
la
rg
ed
sp
le
en
,a
ne
m
ia
,
th
ro
m
bo
cy
to
pe
ni
a,
ac
ut
e
kid
ne
y
fa
ilu
re
No
Ac
yc
lo
vir
,g
an
cic
lo
vir
Ye
s
Lu
pp
ie
ta
l,
20
02
21
9
19
98
4
24
.
KS
,h
em
op
ha
go
cy
to
sis
Re
du
ct
io
n
of
im
m
un
os
up
pr
es
sio
n,
fo
sc
am
et
,m
icr
os
om
al
da
un
or
ub
ici
n
No
Ch
ie
re
gh
in
et
al
,2
01
72
16
.
1.
5
2
Se
ve
re
lu
ng
in
fe
ct
io
n
No
.
Ye
s
Ch
ie
re
gh
in
et
al
,2
01
72
16
.
6
.
No
ne
(H
HV
−
8
de
te
ct
ed
on
ro
ut
in
e
sc
re
en
in
g)
No
.
No
Pa
rk
et
al
,2
01
72
20
.
5
6
m
ac
ul
op
ap
ul
ar
sk
in
ra
sh
,f
ev
er
,
pa
nc
yt
op
en
ia
KS
Ch
an
ge
in
im
m
un
os
up
pr
es
sio
n
th
en
re
du
ct
io
n
im
m
un
os
up
pr
es
sio
n,
th
en
di
sc
on
tin
ua
tio
n,
ac
yc
lo
vir
,
fo
sc
ar
ne
t,
cy
to
to
xic
th
er
ap
y
(e
to
po
sid
e
an
d
de
xa
m
et
ha
so
ne
)
Ye
sa
Li
ve
r
M
ar
ce
lin
et
al
,2
00
42
21
20
00
5
5
Ra
sh
,p
ol
ya
de
no
pa
th
y,
fe
ve
r,
an
em
ia
,t
hr
om
bo
pe
ni
a
KS
,s
ol
id
fo
rm
of
pr
im
ar
y
ef
fu
sio
n
lym
ph
om
a
(lu
ng
,s
pl
ee
n,
st
om
ac
h)
.
Ye
s
Pi
et
ro
si
et
al
,2
01
12
14
20
07
2
3
Fe
ve
r,
co
ug
h,
bi
la
te
ra
lp
le
ur
al
ef
fu
sio
n,
m
ul
tio
rg
an
fa
ilu
re
No
Ci
do
fo
vir
,p
ro
be
ne
ci
d
Ye
s
Pi
et
ro
si
et
al
,2
01
12
14
20
07
6
2
As
ci
te
s,
in
cr
ea
se
in
liv
er
fu
nc
tio
n
te
st
s,
kid
ne
y
fa
ilu
re
,l
ive
rf
ai
lu
re
No
Ci
do
fo
vir
Ye
s
Pi
et
ro
si
et
al
,2
01
12
14
20
08
6
15
Fe
ve
r,
w
ea
kn
es
s,
se
ve
re
sin
us
ta
ch
yc
ar
di
a
an
d
m
ac
ul
op
ap
ul
ar
sk
in
ra
sh
KS
Ci
do
fo
vir
,l
ip
os
om
al
-d
ox
or
ub
ic
in
No
Pi
et
ro
si
et
al
,2
01
12
14
20
10
<
1
4
No
ne
(H
HV
-8
de
te
ct
ed
on
ro
ut
in
e
sc
re
en
in
g)
No
Ci
do
fo
vir
No
Ch
ie
re
gh
in
et
al
,2
01
72
16
.
1.
5
10
Dy
sp
ne
a,
m
al
ai
se
,p
an
cy
to
pe
ni
a,
pl
eu
ra
le
ffu
sio
n,
kid
ne
y
fa
ilu
re
,l
ive
r
fa
ilu
re
,m
ul
tio
rg
an
fa
ilu
re
.
No
Re
du
ct
io
n
of
im
m
un
os
up
pr
es
sio
n,
ci
do
fo
vir
Ye
s
a
De
at
h
w
as
du
e
to
se
pt
ic
sh
oc
k
du
e
to
a
m
ul
tid
ru
g-
re
sis
ta
nt
ba
ct
er
ia
li
nf
ec
tio
n
w
ith
lo
ba
rp
ne
um
on
ia
.
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 39
40 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comIn general, nonlung organs from donors with influenza in-
fection can be safely used. As patients infected with influenza
viruses (other than H1N1 virus) generally do not have virus
in nonlung tissues, the risk of transmitting infection to recip-
ients of solid organs other than lungs is low.231 Evaluation of
potential lung donors for influenza-like symptoms or respira-
tory tract infection is essential to avoid life-threatening infec-
tion in the recipient in the early posttransplant period.232 In
the event of donor-derived influenza transmission, however,
successful antiviral treatment is possible: in a case of influ-
enza transmission through bilateral lung transplantation,
the presence of influenza A in the recipient was confirmed
on day 6 posttransplant and after a 5-day course of oral
oseltamivir 2  75 mg daily, the patient was cleared from
the virus and was doing well 3 years later with no criteria
for bronchiolitis obliterans.230
The Australian Organ & Tissue Authority issued a Guide-
line for Assessing and Managing the Possible Risk of Trans-
mission of Influenza in 2009.231 This guideline states that
the donor coordinator must establish whether the potential
donor has a fever, flu-like symptoms, or respiratory tract in-
fection. The following diagnostic tests are recommended, in
order of utility:
1. Influenza-specific NAT,
2. Influenza A subtyping (for example to identify A/H1N1 09,
A/H3N2, A/H1N1) performed on any patientwith confirmed
influenza A (generally using NAT),
3. Influenza virus culture (turnaround time 3–5 days),
4. Influenza rapid antigen detection (point of care test or
immunofluorescence),
5. Serology.
If influenza-like illness is suspected, the donor coordinator
should inform the medical consultant on call, who may con-
sult an infectious disease specialist. If indicated, an influenza-
specific NAT to determine the influenza A subtypemay be or-
dered, although it is not essential to wait for the result before
proceeding with organ donation. All nonlung solid organs
are considered suitable for transplantation; the purpose of
confirming or excluding influenza is to determine (a) whether
the lungs are acceptable for retrieval and transplantation and
(b) whether the recipient units should consider prescribing an
antiviral agent to the recipient as secondary prophylaxis. The
utilization of lungs should be considered on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account the following factors:
• the potential infection risk of the donor respiratory tract,
• at what stage in the potential donor's influenza-like-illness has
the patient become a potential donor,
• if the potential donor is considered to still be infective,
• if the potential donor received an antiviral agent and, if yes, if
the duration has been greater or less than 48 hours.
By comparison, UK guidelines state that lungs and bowel
should not be used from donors with confirmed influenza in-
fection. Other organs may be offered, and the final decision
lies with the transplanting surgeon, weighing the balance of
risks for the recipient and noting that pathogenicity of some
strains of virus may be enhanced by immunosuppression.29
The American Society of Transplantation recommends that
potential organ donors who have been diagnosed as recentlyhaving influenza (eg, within the previous 2 weeks) should
likely be deferred for lung and small-bowel transplantation;
however, this may be considered if the donor has received ap-
propriate antiviral therapywith input from theOPO'smedical
director and an infectious diseases expert. They state there is
currently no data on the duration of influenza therapy before
donor organs can be safely used, and recommend a 5- to
10-day course of influenza therapy for the recipient if the do-
nor did not complete a course of treatment.233
In line with these international recommendations, donors
with suspected influenza should be tested rapidly byNAT, be-
ing the most sensitive test. Organs apart from lung and small
bowel from donors with confirmed influenza may be used
with 10 days influenza treatment to the recipient. Lung and
small bowel transplantation from donors with confirmed in-
fluenzamay be considered on a case-by-case basis taking into
account the donor response to influenza treatment and likeli-
hood of another donor for the recipient.
Other Viral Pathogens
Other Viral Hepatitis
Hepatitis A virus infection in the donor does not pose a
risk to the recipient except in cases of acute infection. Reac-
tivity to antihepatitis A IgG indicates a cleared infection or
immunity acquired through vaccination.
Hepatitis D virus (HDV) is a satellite virus/virusoid of
HBV that requires the HBV envelope proteins (HBsAg) for
replication. Hepatitis D virus can, therefore, only be trans-
mitted where there is concomitant HBV infection—either as
a simultaneousHBV/HDV coinfection or as anHDVinfection
in someone with an existing HBV infection (superinfection).
Hepatitis D virus coinfection/superinfection complicates the
management of HBV and results in a poorer prognosis—
compared with monoinfection with HBV, persons with
HDVare 3 times more likely to develop cirrhosis, typically
at a younger age, and a high proportion will subsequently
require liver transplantation.234 Coinfection may result in
more severe hepatitis compared with superinfection; of those
with superinfection, approximately 90%will develop chronic
HDV, which will then lead to cirrhosis within 5 to 10 years in
70% of patients.235 Coinfection usually appears first as IgM
anti-HDV and then converts to IgG anti-HDV while HDV
RNA levels remain low.234 Markers of acute HBV infection
such as HBV IgM and anti-HBc are a feature of coinfection.
In the case of superinfection, HDV IgM antibodies appear
first, followed by HDV IgG, whereas anti-HBc IgG only
would be observed.234
Internationally, the burden of HDV is highly variable and
does not follow patterns of HBV prevalence.236 In the high
prevalence countries of the Mediterranean, parts of eastern
Europe, the Middle East, Pakistan, central and northern Asia,
Japan, Taiwan, Greenland, western and central Africa, the
Amazonian basin, the Pacific Islands, and Vietnam, HDVaf-
fects between 15% and 40% of chronic HBV patients.234,237
Elsewhere, the average proportion of chronic HBV patients
who are also infected with HDV is 5%, although wide local/
regional variation exists.234 For a detailed map of global
HDVprevalence amongHBV carriers, see reference.238 Trans-
mission can be bloodborne, sexual, percutaneous, permucosal,
or perinatal. Prevalence of HDV is generally highest in the
20- to 40-year age group, and the majority of transmission
is thought to be sexual or related to IVDU.234
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 41In the 2 decades since its discovery in 1977, HDV preva-
lence declined in most high-income countries as a result of
HBV vaccination programs and the introduction of public
health policies to reduce the spread of BBV (such as needle
exchange programs and safe sex campaigns).239 As a result,
awareness of HDV and rates of testing fell, contributing to
the perception that HDV was being eradicated.239 However,
more recent epidemiological data show HDV prevalence re-
mains high in many countries, and prevalence is in fact in-
creasing among chronic HBV patients in Europe—a finding
which is largely attributable to increased immigration from
high-prevalence countries.234 A German study, for example,
showed that 75% of HDV-positive patients were originally
from Turkey or Eastern Europe.240
A study of HDV diagnoses in Victoria, based on data from
the VictorianDepartment of Health surveillance notifications
and Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory, re-
ported 87HDV notifications from 2000 to 2009.241 The me-
dian age at diagnosis was 34 years, and the majority of cases
were male (77%) and/or born overseas (71.4%). The pre-
dominant countries of birth of HDV cases were Vietnam,
Sudan, Liberia, and Romania (see Table 22). There was 1 no-
tification of an ATSI individual; however, Indigenous status
was not reported for one third of the cohort so it is not pos-
sible to comment on HDV prevalence in Indigenous Austra-
lians. Of the total number of people tested for HDV over
the study period (n = 2314), 4.75% returned a positive result.
The annual number of notifications remained steady at be-
tween 14 and 16 notifications per year. Forty-one percent
of HDV notifications occurred within 1 year of HBV notifi-
cation (median lag time between HBVand HDV notification
of 2 years).
In the context of organ donation and transplantation, or-
gans donors who are HBsAg-positive and come from coun-
tries with a high prevalence of HDV pose a high risk to the
recipient, regardless of recipient HBsAg status. Serological
tests for HDV-Ab have low sensitivity, whereas HDV-Ag is
only briefly detectable in serum. In the Victorian study, for
example, only 6 people tested positive for HDV-Ag. NAT is,
therefore, the most reliable method for detection of HDV.234
Nevertheless, measures to prevent transmission of HBV to
the recipient will also prevent HDV.
Oral antivirals are largely ineffective against HDV, and
current treatment options are limited to interferon-alpha
(IFNα) and its derivative pegylated IFNα. Treatment mayTABLE 22.
Notifications for HDV in Victoria 2000–2009241
Country of birth No. notifications Proportion of total Proportio
Australia 16 18.4%
Vietnam 9 10.3%
Sudan 9 10.3%
Liberia 4 4.60%
Romania 3 3.45%
Lebanon 2 2.30%
Other (overseas)a 13 —
Not stated 31 35.6%
Total 87 —
a Countries of birth with 1 notification each: Afghanistan, Croatia, Kenya, Kiribati, Laos, Nauru, New Zealan
defined.”be combined with nucleoside analogs (eg, tenofovir or
entecavir) to control HBV replication. Nucleoside analogs,
however, target HBV reverse transcriptase but do not di-
rectly affect envelope protein expression of HBV, and there-
fore, do not suppress HDV replication or assembly in HBV-
infected cells.242 IFNα works by directly suppressing HDV
replication to some extent (mechanism unknown) and, in
rare cases, by inducing negativation of HBsAg, possibly by
eliminating HBsAg producing hepatocytes. Trials of peg
IFNα alone or in combination with nucleoside analogs
showed generally low response rates after for 48 to 96weeks
of treatment, and relapse was common even in patients who
experienced RNA negativation.242,243 Three novel drugs
are currently in phase 2 trials in HDV-infected patients:
(1) lonafarnib, an oral prenylation inhibitor preventing
enveloped HDV particles leaving the hepatocyte; (2) nucleic
acid polymers, such as REP2139-Ca that interfere with the
molecules involved in cell entry; and (3) myrcludex B, a
myristoylated L-HBsAg-derived 47-mer lipopetide, which
blocks the formation of new HDV RNA.242 Given the urgent
need for effective treatment forHDV, lonafarnib andmyrcludex
B have received orphan drug status by the EuropeanMedicines
Agency and Fast-Track status from the US FDA. For a thor-
ough review of these new therapeutic agents, see Lempp and
Urban.242
Hepatitis E virus (HEV) is overall the world's most com-
mon cause of acute viral hepatitis. First identified in Kashmir
in 1978, HEV has 2 distinct epidemiological patterns: in
low- andmiddle-income countries, HEVpresents as endemic
and epidemic disease, with an annual estimated burden of
3.4 million cases and 7000 deaths.244 Modes of transmission
in low- and middle-income countries are primarily waterborne,
person-to-person contact, or vertical (mother to fetus/infant).
Risk factors include cirrhosis and being pregnant, and the ma-
jority of those affected are aged 15 to 40 years. Hyperendemic
countries (where disease incidence and prevalence are consis-
tently high) and endemic countries are shown in Table 23. In
high-income countries, HEV occurs as autochthonous or
sporadic cases, or as case clusters, with transmission most
commonly attributable to contaminated food (pork, game
meats and shellfish). Avian HEV has also been isolated in
Australia, the United States and Europe.244 Those affected
in high-income countries are generally older (>50 years),
with risk factors including cirrhosis, liver transplantation,
and HIV.244 Although in the viremic phase, HEV can alson with injecting drug use as a risk factor Median time lag (IQR), years
68.8% 3.58 (0.07–7.54)
77.8% 6.35 (1.94–8.52)
0% 0.32 (0.22–1.61)
0% 1.59 (0.08–3.29)
0% 1.51 (0.02–8.84)
50% 10.5 (8.99–12.0)
— —
29.0% 1.69 (0.27–3.43)
34.5% 2.02 (0.21–4.83)
d, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Ukraine, “Sub-Saharan Africa,” “South East Asia,” and “Overseas not further
TABLE 23.
Global distribution of HEV244
Hyperendemic zonea Endemic zone Distinctive patternb Sporadic zone
Southern Asia
India
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Burma
Cambodia
Indonesia
Thailand
Vietnam
Laos
Central Asia
Kazakhstan
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
North Africa
Algeria
Morocco
Sudan
Tunisia
East Africa
Kenya
Uganda
Burundi
West Africa
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Nigeria
Mali
North America
Mexico
Middle East
Turkey
Saudi Arabia
Yemen
Libya
Oman
Bahrain
Iran
Kuwait
United Arab Emirates
Southeast Asia
Singapore
South America
Brazil
Argentina
Ecuador
Uruguay
Egypt High-income countries including Australia and New Zealand.
a In hyperendemic countries, HEV infections present as epidemic and endemic disease, with HEV-1 being the most common genotype (with the exception of Mexico and west Africa, where HEV-2 is more prevalent).
b HEV infection in Egypt usually occurs at a young age and is caused by subtypes of genotype HEV-1 that are not seen in the Asian population.
42 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.combe transmitted by blood transfusion, and several cases of
transfusion-transmitted HEV have been reported.245-247
There are 4 major HEV genotypes that infect humans (G1
toG4). G1 andG2, which infect human hosts only, occur pri-
marily in Asia and Africa, where they are responsible for wa-
terborne, horizontal and vertical transmission of HEV.248 G3
is foundworldwide and infects humans, pigs and other mam-
malian species, and is responsible for transmission via con-
taminated meat products. G4 infects humans and pigs only,
and is found primarily in Southeast Asia.248
The clinical presentation of HEV is similar to HAV, al-
though asymptomatic cases are not uncommon, especially in
children. HEV infects the intestinal tract first, then the blood
and the liver. HEV RNA can be detected in serumwithin days
of infection, but may be difficult to detect by the time the per-
son experiences symptoms.249 Anti-HEV IgM titers peak at 6
to 8 weeks postinfection but then rapidly wane; anti-HEV IgG
antibody titers rise slowly and persist for months to years.
Challenges for serological testing for HEV infection include is-
sues related to genotype applicability, poor test performance in
immunocompromised persons, cross-reactivity with other vi-
ral infections, and variable sensitivity and specificity by test
type. Acute HEV infection will be detected in approximatelyTABLE 24.
Effects of antiviral and immunosuppressant therapy on HEV rep
transplant patients244
Class Drug Ef
Calcineurin inhibitors Cyclosporine, tacrolimus Stimulates HEV replication wit
mTOR inhibitors Rapamycin, everolimus Stimulates HE
Antimetabolite immunosuppressant Mycophenolate mofetil Inhibits HEV
Guanosine analog Ribavirin Inhibits HEV r
Cytokines Pegylated interferon α Inhibits HEV r
Nucleotide analog Sofosbuvir Inh
HEV, hepatitis E virus.90% of immunocompetent persons at 2 weeks postinfection,
but HEV RNA testing is recommended for persons who are
immunosuppressed.244
Infection is usually cleared from the bodywithin 120 days,
though chronic HEV infection may occur in profoundly im-
munosuppressed patients, and HEV infections have been
observed in liver, lung, kidney, hematopoietic stem cell,
heart, and kidney-pancreas recipients.5 Those with existing
liver damage are more likely to experience serious morbidity,
including acute liver failure, after HEV infection. HEV is
amenable to treatment with ribavirin monotherapy—for a
summary of the effect of different antivirals and immunosup-
pressant’s on HEV-3 replication, see Table 24.
Two cases of suspected donor-derived HEV transmission
have been reported in the literature: the first occurred in
Germany in 2008, and the second involved a Singaporean re-
cipient of an organ from a commercial deceased donor in
2009.250,251 In the German case, the donor, who had died
from a myocardial infarction, was negative for HBV and
HCV but had alanine aminotransferase (ALT) values 4 times
the upper limit of normal. Although histological assessment
of the donor liver showedmild fatty liver changes, there were
no signs of chronic hepatitis or fibrotic alterations. Nolication in the context of chronic HEV infection in solid organ
fect on HEV replication Clinical use
h increase in HEV load and promotes HEV persistence Reduce dose
V replication with increase in HEV load Reduce dose
replication and helps HEV clearance Continue the drug
eplication and causes HEV clearance Primary drug for therapy
eplication and causes HEV clearance Indicated if Ribavirin therapy fails
ibits HEV replication in vitro Unclear, clinical trials indicated
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 43further information was provided about the donors (travel
history was not given). At 37 days posttransplant, the liver
recipient experienced elevations in ALT, aspartate amino-
transferase (AST) and alkaline phosphatase. Liver biopsy
showed fatty liver degeneration but no evidence of acute
or chronic hepatitis. Another biopsy was performed at
150 posttransplant due to increasing ALT levels, and at this
stage chronic inflammation with portal and interface hepa-
titis was observed, possibly indicative of acute rejection,
and the patient was treated with steroid therapy. At day
333 posttransplant, the patient presented with edema of
the lower limb, and liver cirrhosis with advanced fibrosis
was diagnosed. Three months later, the recipient died from
septic shock. Retrospective analysis of blood samples taken
before death detected anti-HEV IgM and IgG antibodies.
Stored donor samples were then screened and, although an-
tibody screening and RT-PCR of donor serumwere negative
for HEV, HEV RNAwas detected in high concentrations in
the liver tissue of the donor. Phylogenetic analysis showed the
donor and recipient were infected with the same strain of
HEV-3. This case demonstrates that HEV can persist in liver
tissue without serological evidence of HEV infection.250
In the case from Singapore, the recipient was a 48-year-old
man with chronic HBV and multifocal hepatocellular carci-
noma that was outside of the eligibility criteria for liver trans-
plantation in Singapore.251 The donor procured a commercial
deceased donor liver graft in 2009 (country not reported), and
was deeply jaundiced on returning to Singapore 3 weeks later
for follow-up. Serology and NAT were positive for EBV and
HEV-3, and acyclovir was commenced. Magnetic resonance
imaging suggested an anastomotic biliary stricture and a bili-
ary stent were successfully inserted; however, despite regularTABLE 25.
Statements of recommendations regarding HEV and solid organ tr
Testing of solid organ donors for HEV
• All solid organ donors are screened for HEV in line with the SaBTO recommendations.
• The detection of HEV viremia in a donor is not an absolute contraindication to the use o
Management of HEV infection in solid organ transplant recipients
• The initial management of newly diagnosed or acute HEV infection in solid organ transpla
spontaneous clearance of infection.
• A strategic reduction in immunosuppression is considered in patients with acute or pers
• Early treatment with ribavirin may be considered in specific cases, such as patients wh
• Persistent HEV infection is diagnosed when HEV RNA is detectable in blood or stool for m
• Individuals with persistent HEV infection should receive treatment with ribavirin, with the
• A baseline quantitative HEV RNA assessment should be undertaken on both plasma an
• Treatment with ribavirin should continue for at least 3 months for transplant recipients
• Monthly HEV RNA testing in plasma and stool should be undertaken until a decision is
• Ribavirin should be continued until stool tests are negative for HEV RNA on 2 occasions
• A test of sustained virological response should be conducted by testing plasma and sto
• Regular hemoglobin monitoring should be conducted during ribavirin treatment, as anem
• Assessment of the change in plasma HEV RNA after 7 days of ribavirin treatment is su
treatment, and to predict the likely length of ribavirin treatment required.
• The dosage of ribavirin is suggested to be adapted according to kidney function, to min
• Patients with persistent HEV who relapse after a first course of ribavirin are suggested
range, where tolerated.
• Routine baseline sequencing of HEV for mutations is not indicated.
• PEG-interferon treatment may be considered in cases of ribavirin-refractory persistent H
PEG-interferon is not recommended as a first line treatment in transplant recipients.
HEV, hepatitis E virus; SaBTO, Advisory Committee on the Safety of Blood, Tissues & Organs; RNA, ribonustent changes and good bile outflow, the patient's liver tests
did not improve and he remained jaundiced. A liver biopsy
1 month after transplantation showed moderate acute cellular
rejection, which responded well to pulse methylprednisolone,
yet his liver function continued to deteriorate and 6 months
posttransplant hewas admitted to hospital with jaundice, asci-
tes, peripheral edema, and constitutional symptoms, and he
died shortly after fromgraft failurewith disseminated bacterial
and fungal infection. HEVRNAwas still detectable at the time
of death.251 In this case, it is not certain whether HEV was
donor-derived, or whether the patient acquired it from eating
contaminated meat shortly after transplantation.
In June 2017, the British Transplantation Society published
guidelines for HEV detection and management in transplan-
tation recipients, prompted by surveillance data fromEngland
indicating a recent rise in indigenousG3HEVinfection.252 Se-
roprevalence of HEV in the general English population is esti-
mated to be as high as 13%, and data from the NHS Blood
and Transplant selective screening program indicated that 1
in 2500 blood donations were HEV RNA-positive as of
February 2017.253 A study of recipients of HEV-containing
blood products found that 42% developed HEV infection,
thus the approximate risk of transfusion-related HEV infec-
tion in England is 1 in 5000.254 On this basis, universal
screening of blood components for HEV is now recom-
mended by the UK Advisory Committee for the Safety of
Blood, Tissues and Organs.255 The recommendations of
the British Transplantation Society with regard to donor
screening andmanagement of HEVin solid organ transplant
recipients are summarized in Table 25.
In summary, HAVand HEV pose a threat to transplanta-
tion in their acute phase, although outbreaks occur rarely inansplantation, British Transplantation Society. Adapted from255
f an organ from that donor, but will inform clinical management decisions posttransplant.
nt recipients includes observation and monitoring of HEV RNA levels and liver enzymes for
istent HEV.
o develop severe liver dysfunction.
ore than 3 months after disease onset, raised liver enzymes or first positive HEV RNA test.
aim of achieving a sustained virological response.
d stool at the start of treatment.
with persistent infection.
made to stop treatment.
1 month apart.
ol samples for HEV RNA at 3 and 6 months after stopping antiviral treatment.
ia is a common side effect.
ggested to assess the likelihood of sustained virological response after 3 months of
imize side effects.
to be retreated for at least 6 months with ribavirin at dosages toward the higher dose
EV infection, although patients will require very close monitoring for rejection.
cleic acid.
44 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comAustralia. HDV is of greater concern, as coinfection/
superinfection with HBV may seriously affect the outcome
of transplantation and effective treatment is currently un-
available; however, measures to prevent HBV transmission
to the recipient will prevent HDV transmission. Accord-
ingly, the European Guide to the Quality and Safety of Or-
gans for Transplantation states that organs from donors
with HDVare usually not accepted, whereas organs are ac-
cepted regardless of the anti-HAV IgG/anti-HEV IgG status
of the donor, except in cases of acute HAV/HEV infection.5
Other international guidelines do not include specific rec-
ommendations with respect to HAV, HDV, or HEV. An al-
gorithm for the treatment of HEV-3 infection in transplant
recipients has been developed in the event of donor-derivedTABLE 26.
Notifications of nonendemic arboviral diseases in Australia in
2017, by country of acquisition256
Country Chikungunya Dengue Zika
Bangladesh 35 10 —
Cambodia 1 7 —
China — 1 —
Colombia 2 2 —
Congo, Republic of — 1 —
Cuba — — 2
Ethiopia — 1 —
Fiji — 42 —
India 26 129 1
Indonesia 8 195 —
Italy 1 —
Malaysia — 35 —
Maldives — 3 —
Mexico — 2 1
Myanmar — 8 —
Nauru — 10 —
Nepal — 2 —
New Caledonia 1 9 —
Nigeria — 2 —
Niue — 1 —
Pakistan 2 — —
Papua New Guinea 2 24 —
Peru 1 — —
Philippines 5 33 1
Samoa — 40 —
Sierra Leone — 1 —
Singapore — 5 —
Solomon Islands — 31 —
Somalia 4 2 —
South Africa 1 — —
Sri Lanka — 85 —
Thailand 4 119 2
Timor-Leste — 25 —
Uganda — 1 —
Vanuatu — 89 —
Vietnam 4 39 —
South-East Asia, NFD 1 8 —
Southern and East Africa, NFD 1 — —
Americas, NFD — — 1
Other/unknown — 106 1
NFD, not further defined.disease transmission or infection posttransplant (see Table 26).
Australia and New Zealand are not endemic areas for HEV;
therefore, there is no requirement for routine donor screening.
HEV transmission is a risk only in the acute phase, so testing
for this virus using NAT needs to occur only in donors with
clinical suspicion (eg, acute hepatitis) and epidemiological risk
for HEV infection.Arboviruses
Arboviruses refer to any viruses transmitted by arthropod
vectors (eg, mosquitoes, ticks, sandflies). Arboviruses en-
demic to Australia include the flaviviruses Murray Valley en-
cephalitis virus, the Kunjin lineage of WNV, and Japanese
encephalitis virus, and the alphaviruses Ross River virus
and Barmah Forest virus. Rates of infection are seasonal,
peaking between approximately January and May when
mosquitoes are most active, although seasonal trends vary
between andwithin States and Territories according to differ-
ences in local mosquito vectors, hosts and climate.257 Ross
River fever is the most common mosquito-borne disease of
humans in Australia (6920 notifications in 2017), followed
by Barmah Forest virus (449 notifications in 2017). Symp-
toms of Ross River virus most commonly include arthralgia,
and less commonly rash and fever; however, up to 75% of
Ross River virus infections are asymptomatic.258 Symptoms
of Barmah Forest virus similarly include arthralgia, rash, fa-
tigue, and flu-like symptoms, although againmany people in-
fectedwill be asymptomatic.257 Ross River virus and Barmah
Forest virus infections have been reported in all Australian
states (including Tasmania), with the highest notification
rates occurring in Queensland, tropical Western Australia
and the Northern Territory. The number of Ross River virus
notifications in each State and Territory from2007 to 2017 is
shown in Figure 10. It should be noted, however, that there
are known issues with unreliability of serological tests for
Ross River virus and Barmah Forest virus, leading to overdi-
agnosis particularly in the off-season.257
There have been no cases of transmission of Ross River vi-
rus or Barmah Forest virus infection by organ transplantation
reported to date, although the potential for donor-derived
transmission presumably exists given the ubiquity of these
alphaviruses in Australia and 1 report in the literature of a
case of Ross River virus transmission via blood transfusion
occurring in Western Australia in 2014.259 The blood donor
developed fatigue and arthralgia 2 days after giving blood
and was subsequently diagnosed with Ross River virus infec-
tion; however, some of the components had already been
transferred to a patient before the recall of the affected dona-
tion. The recipient was receiving regular blood transfusions
due tomyelodysplastic syndrome associatedwith chronic fatigue
and joint pains, and had reported a worsening of symptoms in
themonths after the transfusionof the infected blood.259 Serolog-
ical testswere positive forRossRiver virus; however, the recipient
experienced no further symptoms or sequelae. The potential
outcomes in the event of transmission to an immunosuppressed
organ transplant recipient are unknown.
In contrast to endemic alphaviruses, notifications of the
Kunjin lineage ofWNVandMurray Valley encephalitis virus
are infrequent and mostly sporadic, with approximately 10
cases in recognized outbreak years, generally affecting resi-
dents of and visitors to the Kimberley region of Western
FIGURE 10. Ross River virus notifications (number) received from State and Territory health authorities, 2007 to 2017.36 NSW, New South
Wales; NT, Northern Territory; QLD, Queensland; SA, Southern Australia; TAS, Tasmania; VIC, Victoria; WA, Western Australia.
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the low notification rate, it is recognized that for every clinical
case of there may be hundreds of asymptomatic infections, be-
cause the vast majority of Kunjin virus andMurray Valley en-
cephalitis virus infections are asymptomatic.259 Anecdotal
evidence suggests Kunjin virus causes symptomatic disease
more often than Murray Valley encephalitis virus, with symp-
toms of Kunjin including arthralgia, myalgia, fever, headache,
and occasionally, a rash.260 When Murray Valley encephalitis
virus does cause clinical disease, symptoms are generally more
than severe than forKunjin virus: an estimated 1 in 1000 infec-
tions with Murray Valley encephalitis virus results in clinical
encephalitis.261 Encephalitis is less common in cases of Kunjin
virus infection.260 To date, there have been no cases of Kunjin
virus or Murray Valley encephalitis virus transmission via
blood transfusion or organ donation; however, precautions
may be warranted particularly in regions where there are ac-
tive outbreaks of disease.
Other nonendemic arboviruses of public health importance
to Australia include dengue virus, chikungunya virus, and
Zika virus. Nonendemic arboviruses are of concern primarily
in the case of donorswhose recent travel history includes south
and southeast Asia, tropical Africa, or the Pacific Islands.
Imported cases of dengue fever are relatively common among
travellers returning from endemic areas, in particular India, Sri
Lanka, southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands (see Table 26).
InNewZealand, virtually all notified cases of arboviral in-
fections to date have occurred in overseas travellers, although
a local case of sexual transmission of Zika virus was reported
in 2016.39 Only 1 arbovirus is endemic to New Zealand–the
Sindbis-like alphavirus Whataroa virus which is established
in bird populations on the West Coast of the South Island;
however, human infection has only ever been documented se-
rologically (absent of disease).40 There are 3mosquito species
established in New Zealand that have the potential to be
vectors for humandiseases:Culex quinquefasciatus (a potential
vector for encephalitis viruses),Aedes notoscriptus (a vector for
dengue virus), and Aedes australis (a vector for dengue and
Whataroa viruses). All 3 are potential vectors for Ross River
virus, by none are particularly effective arboviral vectors are
would be unlikely to support endemic transmission of arbo-
viruses in New Zealand.
In 2016, there were 191 cases of dengue virus infection
(4.1 per 100000) in New Zealand, 28 cases of chikungunya
virus infection (0.6 per 100000 population), 100 cases ofZika virus infection (2.1 per 100000 population), and 4 cases
of Ross River virus infection.39 Countries of acquisition in-
cluded Indonesia (dengue), Fiji (dengue, chikungunya, Ross
River, Zika), Tonga (Zika virus), Samoa (dengue, Zika),
Thailand (dengue), India (chikungunya), Brazil (chikungunya),
and Australia (Ross River virus).39
The flaviviruses Zika virus and WNVare discussed sepa-
rately as pathogens of special interest in sections Zika Virus
and West Nile Virus, respectively. The WHO declaration of
global public health emergency in relation to the 2015/2016
Zika outbreak in Brazil andCentral America prompted inter-
national authorities to develop targeted recommendations
for the prevention of Zika transmission via organ and tissue
transplantation, and these are discussed in detail in section
Zika Virus. West Nile virus is also of special interest given
its widespread global distribution and the relatively large
number of reported cases of transmission via solid organ
transplantation, with frequently fatal outcomes. The risks
of donor-derived transmission of other arboviruses appear
to be relatively low, and there are limited case reports of
transmission events in the published literature. One case of
possible donor-derived dengue transmission was reported
from Singapore in 2005. The recipient was a 23-year-old
male with end-stage kidney disease due to lupus nephritis,
who received a living donor kidney transplant from his
mother, who was known to have had a history of dengue fe-
ver 6 months before donation.262 Five days posttransplant,
the recipient developed a high fever and, given the donor his-
tory, NAT was performed and returned a positive result for
dengue virus serotype 1. Twelve days posttransplant, the re-
cipient developed upper gastrointestinal bleeding, gross he-
maturia and tachycardia. Three days later, he complained
of left flank pain and abdominal distension, and a large retro-
peritoneal hematoma at the bed of the transplanted kidney
was revealed on computed tomography (CT). Emergency
surgery to evacuate the hematomawas successful, and repeat
NATwas negative for dengue. The recipient then went on to
have an uneventful recovery, with resolution of hematemesis
and hematuria and excellent graft function. In this case, the
clinical presentation of dengue in the transplant recipient was
similar to that in immunocompetent persons but with longer
duration—19 days versus mean duration of 2 to 7 days.262
European guidelines recommend ruling out acute infection
with arboviral diseases including dengue, chikungunya and
WNV for donors living in or coming from endemic regions
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Zealand, a similar approach would be warranted: where
the donor is a resident of or has a history of travel to an en-
demic region or area with an ongoing outbreak of arboviral
disease, acute infection should ideally be ruled out before
proceeding with transplantation.
Pulmonary Viral Infections
The lung virome consists of transient infections (influenza,
human respiratory virus, etc.) as well as resident viruses that are
present in both healthy and disease states.263 Next-generation
sequencing techniques have permitted a new appreciation of
the diversity of resident viral species within individuals, a large
proportion of which remain uncharacterized.263 Metagenomic
studies of samples from cystic fibrosis patients and lung trans-
plant recipients have found that up to 88%of lung virome se-
quences were unknown.264,265 These studies identified a
wide range of bacteriophages, as well as herpes virus, adeno-
virus, human papillomavirus, and torque teno virus. The
complexity of the respiratory virome complicates the diagno-
sis of the causative agent of disease, because pathogenic vi-
ruses may be present among the resident viruses of healthy
individuals. In an example of this, a metagenomic study of
nasopharyngeal aspirates from febrile versus afebrile chil-
dren detected rhinovirus in both groups.266
To date, there has been a single study characterizing the lung
virome of lung transplant recipients.265 Young et al found that
the majority (>68%) of reads that could be mapped to refer-
ence viruses mapped to various anelloviruses, including torque
teno viruses, torque teno midi viruses, torque teno mini viruses
and small anelloviruses (each with multiple subtypes). These
anellovirus sequenceswere 56-foldmore abundant in broncho-
alveolar lavage (BAL) from transplant recipients compared to
healthy controls. Anelloviruses are ubiquitous in humans and
have not yet been causally linked to human diseases267; how-
ever, Young et al265 also observed that high anellovirus loads
correlatedwith dysbiotic bacterial communities in the allograft,
that is, the higher the anellovirus titer, the greater the divergence
between the corresponding bacterial community and healthy
controls. The cause and clinical implications of this observation
are not yet clear. Other viruses detected within the lung virome
by this study included EBV, human herpesvirus, human papil-
lomavirus, and various bacteriophage genomes (eg, phages of
Enterobacteria, Salmonella, Pseudomonas, Streptococcus, and
Yersinia). Notably, an average of 81% of reads could not be
mapped to reference viruses in the NCBI viral database. The
authors speculate that many of these correspond to DNA
phage sequences.
Currently, there are minimal data available on the impact
of transplanting the lung virome; however, longitudinal studies
are underway and the potential importance of the respiratory
virome to outcomes of lung transplantation should be noted.
Although next-generation sequencing may be of use for lung
donor screening in the future, currently, for practical purposes,
viral testing of the donor before implantation and BAL postim-
plantation will capture most viruses provided that samples are
properly handled (personal communication A Glanville).
Meningoencephalitis of Viral Origin
Donors with undiagnosed meningoencephalitis are an un-
common but potentially lethal source of donor-derived infec-
tion.268 Transmission of rabies, LCMV,WNV,Mycobacteriumtuberculosis,Cryptococcus,Coccidiodes immitis,Aspergillums,
andBalamuthia have occurred when donors withmeningitis or
encephalitis of unknown cause have been used as organ do-
nors.269 For this reason, any meningitis or encephalitis without
a proven cause should be an absolute contraindication to trans-
plantation, according to the international guidelines.5,7,29,269
Recognition of transmissible infections in potential de-
ceased donors with meningoencephalitis is often complicated
by the circumstances of brain death, which might not raise
the suspicion of the presence of a central nervous system
infection, for example, stroke in the case of a patient with
amoebic encephalitis, or cocaine use in a patient with intrace-
rebral hemorrhage who had rabies.268,270 Distinguishing be-
tween such ubiquitous causes of death in potential donors as
anoxia, head trauma, or cerebrovascular accident and a po-
tentially transmissible central nervous system infection is
extremely difficult. In addition, many of these pathogens
are not part of routine donor screening in Australia and
New Zealand (or elsewhere) and, therefore, would not be de-
tected as part of a standard donor evaluation. Based on
reporting to the United States OPTN Ad Hoc Disease Trans-
mission Advisory Committee, the most common diagnoses
for central nervous system infections in deceased donors were
tuberculosis, endemic fungi, cryptococcosis, coccidiomycosis,
and WNV, followed by syphilis, histoplasmosis, toxoplasmo-
sis, and Chagas disease.268
In some cases, donors diagnosed with treatable forms of me-
ningoencephalitis might be safely used for organ transplantation
after a suitable period of antimicrobial treatment for the do-
nor and the recipient.5,269 Donors with meningoencephalitis
of viral origin other than HSVor VZV, however, present an
extremely high risk for disease transmission. If the pathogen
in unknown or if the suspected pathogen is one for which no
treatment options are available, transplantation should be
avoided or pursuedwith extreme caution only after weighing
the risks of adverse recipient outcomes with the risks of
waiting for another organ.269 Where the cause of the menin-
goencephalitis is confirmed as a virus that is amenable to
treatment, for example, HSV encephalitis, the organs might
be used if the donor is not viremic and provided that the recip-
ient is seropositive pretransplant and/or is given appropriate
prophylaxis.5,29 Meningitis of bacterial origin is discussed in
the Bacteremia and Meningitis section, andWNV is discussed
as a special case in theWest Nile Virus section.
Published reports of transmission events from donors with
unrecognized central nervous system infections highlight the
extreme risks associated with such donors, as well as the
challenges of recognizing central nervous system infection.
In 2004, 4 recipients of organs from a single donor died of en-
cephalitis of unknown cause shortly after transplantation.
The donor in this case had presented to the emergency de-
partment with nausea, vomiting and difficulty swallowing.
He was subsequently admitted to a second hospital with al-
tered mental status requiring intubation, with a fever and
fluctuating blood pressures. His toxicology screen was posi-
tive for cocaine and marijuana, and a CT of the brain re-
vealed a subarachnoid hemorrhage, which progressed to
brain death 4 days after admission. Standard donor screening
did not reveal any infection precluding organ donation, and
the donor's kidneys, liver and lungs were retrieved for trans-
plantation. Encephalitis developed in all 4 patients within
30 days of transplantation and was accompanied by rapid
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ter the onset of symptoms—rabies was subsequently con-
firmed in all of the organ recipients. Contact investigations
revealed that the donor had been bitten by a bat shortly be-
fore becoming ill.270
A second report of unrecognized central nervous system
infection involved 2 clusters of LCMV, in which 7 of 8 recip-
ients died.271 Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus is a rodent-
borne, OldWorld arenavirus that normally causes only mild,
self-limited disease in humans, though, in very rare cases, can
cause fatal meningitis.272 Transmission can occur vertically
from mother to fetus, but other forms of human-to-human
transmission do not normally occur. The 2 transplant-related
clusters of LCMV occurred in the United States in 2003 and
2005, respectively. The donor in the 2003 cluster was a
51-year-oldman found unresponsive with subdural hematoma,
but without fever or other specific signs of infection. The donor
in the 2005 cluster was a 45-year-old woman with a history of
hypertension presentingwith headache and left-sidedweakness,
and diagnosedwith cerebral infarction. After LCMVwas deter-
mined to be the etiological agent causing the deaths of the recip-
ients, LCMV could not be detected in either of the 2 organ
donors, even after testing multiple donor tissues by immunohis-
tochemical analysis, cell culture, and PCR. Subsequent contact
tracing interviews with the donors' families revealed that the fe-
male donor had contact at home with a pet hamster that was
tested and found to be infected with an LCMV strain identical
to that detected in the organ recipients; the male donor, how-
ever, had no known rodent exposure. Symptoms in the
transplant recipients included abdominal pain, altered
mental status, thrombocytopenia, elevated aminotransfer-
ase levels, coagulopathy, graft dysfunction, and either fever
or leukocytosis, with onset within 3 weeks of transplanta-
tion. The 1 patient who survived was a recipient of a kidney
from the female donor. LCMV was identified as theTABLE 27.
Questions for consideration when completing screening procedu
Question
What is the potential donor's age and cause of brain death? Were there any comorbidities t
meningoencephalitis noted? Pediatric and young adult donors are less likely to have a str
younger potential donors given this diagnosis. Although older adults being evaluated are m
comorbidities should prompt consideration for meningoencephalitis.
Did the potential donor have a fever at presentation of illness/admission (eg, fever defined as
meningoencephalitis should be considered.
Were altered metal status and/or seizures part of the presentation that led to the donor's hospitaliz
Was a CT of the head, or MRI of the head or lumbar puncture consistent with an infectious
elevated CSF protein without a clearly defined bacterial pathogen? Is there unexplained hy
clearly defined case of bacterial meningitis currently under treatment would be an excepti
necessarily exclude a diagnosis of meningoencephalitis.
Was the donor an immunosuppressed host? This includes donors with a prior history of tran
immunosuppressive medications for other reasons, or with a history of an underlying cond
and other immune disorders).
Did the donor have any potential environmental exposures associated with organisms causin
country and the time of year. For example, a donor with a recent bat exposure and menta
with heavy WNV activity would be at greater risk for WNV meningoencephalitis.
It should be noted that homeless donors or any donors in whom obtaining an adequate med
medical-social history and living conditions that may put them at increased risk for transm
for vector borne illness—like WNV, Lyme Disease, rabies, etc).
CSF, cerebrospinal fluid; WNV, West Nile virus.etiological agent on day 25 posttransplant, and IV ribavirin
was initiated for the kidney recipient on day 26 (loading
dose of 30 mg/kg every 6 hours for 4 days then 8 mg/kg ev-
ery 8 hours); unfortunately, by this time, all of the other re-
cipients of organs from the female donor had already died
without confirmation of the etiological agent and without
receiving targeted treatment. After the patient's clinical
condition had stabilized, they were switched to oral ribavirin
(400 mg each morning and 600 mg each evening), and by day
63, a renal biopsy specimen was negative for LCMV DNA
and serum IgM was detectable. By day 311 posttransplant,
the patient had stable graft function and was able to resume
full immunosuppressive therapy.271
A cluster of fatal donor-derived arenavirus cases was re-
ported in Australia in 2008, in which the infectious agent
was a previously unidentified LCMV-related arenavirus.17
The donor in this cluster was a 57-year-old man who died
of cerebral hemorrhage 10 days after returning to Australia
from a 3-month visit to the former Yugoslavia, where he
had travelled in rural areas. No viral nucleic acids were de-
tected in the donor, and no history of acute infectious disease
was reported; however, IgG and IgM antibodies were pres-
ent. He donated his liver and both kidneys to 3 recipients,
all of whom developed febrile illness with varying degrees
of encephalopathy and proceeding to death within 4 to
6 weeks of transplantation. Bacterial and viral cultures, NAT,
and viral and panmicrobial oligonucleotide microarray assays
revealed no candidate pathogens, and therefore, RNAwas ex-
tracted from the brain, cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), serum, liver,
and kidney of one of the kidney recipients, and from the CSF
and serum of the liver recipient. High-throughput sequencing
of amplified RNA samples and examination of Vero E6 cells
inoculated with homogenized fresh-frozen kidney tissue re-
vealed the presence of an arenavirus with an identical but previ-
ously uncharacterized genetic sequence in the recipients.res for potential organ donors269
hat may support stroke/CVA diagnosis (ie, diabetes, hypertension, prior CVA) vs possible
oke or CVA compared to older adults. Accordingly, caution should be used in evaluating
ore likely to have stroke/CVA diagnosis, atypical presentations and/or the absence of
>37.5–38.3°C)? If yes, was there a clear explanation for this fever? If not,
ation? If these were new and/or unexplained events, meningoencephalitis may be considered.
process? For example, was there an unexplained CSF pleocytosis, low CSF glucose, or
drocephalus—another potential indicator of CNS infection? Abnormal CSF due to
on. MRI may show a focal finding like infarct or hemorrhage; however, this may not
splant on immunosuppressive medication (including steroids), a donor on
ition associated with immunosuppression (ie, cirrhosis, end-stage renal disease,
g meningoencephalitis? These exposures will vary depending on the region of the
l status changes could have rabies. A donor who spent a lot of time outdoors in an area
ical social history is problematic may pose a unique risk due to difficulty in collecting
itting infection (eg, tuberculosis or extended outdoor exposure that may increase risk
FIGURE 12. Percentage of tuberculosis cases with drug resistance
testing indicating multidrug resistance.273,274
48 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comThe case above highlights the challenges of identifying cen-
tral nervous system infections particularly in donors dying
from CVA and the potential for rare and uncharacterized in-
fectious agents to be transmitted by organ transplantation.
To aid decision making in this context, the United States
OPTN has formulated a guidance document for recognizing
central nervous system infections in potential deceased organ
donors. Issues for consideration highlighted by this docu-
ment are listed in Table 27.
BACTERIAL INFECTIONS IN THE
DECEASED DONOR
Mycobacterium tuberculosis
Epidemiology
The number of tuberculosis notifications inAustralia in 2016
was 1217 (5.1 per 100000 population, National Notifiable
Disease Surveillance System 2016 data set). The vast majority
(approximately 90%) of these cases occurred in Australia's
overseas-born population, among which the incidence of tu-
berculosis is approximately 20 times that of the Australian-
born, non-Indigenous population (18.4 vs 0.7 notifications
per 100000 in 2013 respectively).273 NSW and Victoria
account for more than 50% of all tuberculosis cases in
Australia, whereas the Northern Territory has the highest
jurisdiction-specific notification rate (17.1 per 100000 in
2013). Tuberculosis incidence in ATSI peoples was 4.6
cases per 100000 in 2013.273
The most frequently reported countries of birth for tuber-
culosis cases in Australia in 2013 were India, Vietnam, the
Philippines, andChina. Relative to population size, the highest
rates of tuberculosis in 2013 were reported for Australian res-
idents born in Somalia, Nepal, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Papua
NewGuinea, and Sudan.273Of those diagnosedwithin 4 years
of arrival in Australia, international students accounted for
21% of tuberculosis cases in 2013. The contribution of in-
ternational students and the demographics of the Australian
resident migrant population (median age, 37 years; ABS
34120DO001_201415) would account for the bimodal dis-
tribution of tuberculosis notifications seen in Figure 11.
Major risk factors contributing to notified cases of tuber-
culosis in Australia in 2013 were past travel or residency inFIGURE 11. Notification rate of tuberculosis in Australia in 2016, by ag
index.cfm).a high-risk country (81% of cases), household, or other close
contact with tuberculosis (11% cases), or current or previous
employment in the health industry (7%). Other risk factors
that were present in a small proportion of cases (5%) in-
cluded current or prior incarceration, current or prior resi-
dence in an aged care facility, current or prior employment
at a correctional facility, aged care facility or homeless shel-
ter, current or prior homelessness, parent born in a high-
risk country, or being treated with immunosuppression.273
Australia has had very few cases of multidrug-resistant tu-
berculosis, and these have occurred almost exclusively in the
overseas-born population. Of cases where drug sensitivity
testing was performed in 2013, 0.3% had resistance to rifam-
picin alone, 5.2% to isoniazid alone, and 2.4% to both rifam-
picin and isoniazid (MDR-TB).273 Zero cases of extensively
drug-resistant tuberculosis were reported in 2013—only 2
cases of XDR-TB have been reported since 1995.273,274 Fig-
ure 12 shows trends in the proportion of tuberculosis cases
that were multidrug-resistant since 1995. The spike in 2010
is accounted for by 10 patients with MDR-TB from Papua
New Guinea accessing healthcare services in the outer Torres
Strait Protected Zone.274
Tuberculosis in Organ Donors and Recipients
Incidence of tuberculosis among solid-organ transplant
recipients is much higher than the general population, es-
pecially among lung transplant recipients.275 Tuberculosise group and sex (data: http://www9.health.gov.au/cda/source/cda-
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to reactivation of latent infection—an audit at Westmead
Hospital Sydney estimated that 30% of waitlisted pa-
tients had latent tuberculosis (personal communication:
AWebster)—but it may also be acquired as a de novo infec-
tion posttransplant, or be transmitted via the donor organ.
In the United States, tuberculosis is one of the most common
donor-derived bacterial infections.1 Data from Europe and
the United States indicate that 0.4% to 7% of solid-organ re-
cipients develop tuberculosis, and donor-derived transmission
accounts for less than 5% of these cases.276 Risk factors for
tuberculosis among potential donors include (1) social
factors—country of origin or prior residence in an endemic
country, history of homelessness, incarceration or alcoholism,
and/or contact with persons infected with tuberculosis; and
(2) medical risk factors—history of untreated tuberculosis, ra-
diographic evidence of prior tuberculosis, body mass index
less than 18.5, diabetes mellitus, and/or cigarette smoking.277
A recent matched cohort study comparing the clinical fea-
tures and outcomes of tuberculosis in transplant recipients
versus the Spanish general population found that time from
clinical suspicion of tuberculosis to diagnosis (positive acid-
fast bacilli smear, histopathological pattern of tuberculosis,
positive NAT or M. tuberculosis culture) was longer in
transplant recipients than in the general population (median,
14 days vs 0 days) and more often required invasive proce-
dures.278 This study also found that rates of tuberculosis-
related mortality were higher among transplant recipients
than the general population (18% vs 6%), as were rates of
toxicity associated with antituberculosis treatment (38% vs
10%).278 Tuberculosis in transplant recipients often resists
timely diagnosis and is associated with worse outcomes than
observed in the general population.
One of the challenges for the detection of donor-derived
tuberculosis is that disease in donors and recipients may not
present as a primary respiratory infection and, therefore,
may not be recognized straight away, contributing to delays
in diagnosis and reporting.277 Pulmonary disease accounts
for approximately 60% of cases in the Australian general
population, with 40%being extrapulmonary.273 By compar-
ison, extrapulmonary disease accounts for closer to half of
tuberculosis cases in the transplant population, and dissemi-
nated tuberculosis is substantially more common.278,279Where
the donor was born in, or recently travelled to, an endemic
country, or where other tuberculosis risk factors are present,
the possibility of extrapulmonary tuberculosis should be consid-
ered in recipients presenting with an infection of unknown ori-
gin. This is of course dependent on the availability of a detailed,
accurate donor history,whichwill not exist in all circumstances.Donor Screening and Risk Minimization
In living donors, it is possible to perform tuberculosis
screening in accordance with recommended guidelines; how-
ever, in potential deceased donors, this is problematic be-
cause there are no proven methods for screening deceased
donors for tuberculosis. Chest X-ray and direct microscopy
of BAL for acid-fast bacilli have a low sensitivity, and cultures
may take up to 8 weeks to turn positive.277 Tuberculin skin
testing is also impractical in the context of deceased donation
given a turnaround time of at least 48 hours. NAT can iden-
tify M. tuberculosis in clinical specimens from donors withactive infection only. Therefore, when these tests are per-
formed, a negative/normal result does not definitively rule
out infection with M. tuberculosis, due to the high rate of
false negatives and because organisms can remain dormant
in the host without causing disease for decades, without
any detectable radiographic abnormality. Conversely, abnor-
mal pulmonary findings from a range of causes are common
in deceased donors and may confound donor evaluation.277
Interferon-gamma release assays (IGRAs)might theoretically
be useful given their shorter turnaround time (~24hours). These
assays work by stimulating peripheral blood cells with specific
antigens; in response, T cells recognizing these antigens are
rapidly activated and secrete a variety of cytokines, of which
interferon gamma is measured to indicate the pathogen-
specific activation of Tcells.277 Interferon gamma release assays
are available commercially as T-SPOT.TB (Oxford Immunotec,
UK) andQuantiFERON-TBGold in-Tube (Cellestis, Australia).
Drawbacks of these tests include high cost and indeterminate re-
sults in immunosuppressed persons; moreover, IGRAs have not
yet been validated for use in deceased donors, and it is not
knownwhether brain death impacts the performance of this as-
say.5,277 Further, false-positive results will be common in low-
risk populations, whereas false-negative may occur in cases of
miliary or disseminated tuberculosis. Therefore, the results of
IGRAs cannot be relied upon to either definitively exclude active
disease nor as grounds for rejecting a given donor.277
Given the limitations of tuberculosis screening tools in de-
ceased donors, it is important to evaluate social and medical
risk factors in the potential deceased donor. Country of ori-
gin and/or prior residence in a highly endemic country is a
key risk factor. Tuberculosis country profiles can be reviewed
at www.who.int/tb/data., Although difficult to obtain, pa-
tient histories for possible contacts with persons infectedwith
M. tuberculosis are important.
Given the global challenges of tuberculosis screening in po-
tential organ donors, an international consensus group was
formed to provide expert recommendations on this sub-
ject.277 A summary of the recommendations of this group is
provided in Table 28.
Current UK and European donor screening guidelines
make the following recommendations with respect to tuber-
culosis and organ donation:
SaBTO: Donation of organs, tissues and cells is contrain-
dicated from donors with active disease or within the first
6 months of antituberculosis treatment. However, organs
can be considered for transplant if a recipient has received a
6-month course of chemotherapy, unless the isolate is found
to be resistant to appropriate antituberculosis drugs. If there
is a history of tuberculosis at the site of the organ to be used
for donation, use of that organ is contraindicated by the do-
nation of other organs is acceptable.29
EDQM: Organs from donors with disseminated tubercu-
losis should not be used. Organs from donors with a history
of TB andwith successful treatment for at least 6monthsmay
be considered, with prophylaxis and/or empiric treatment
considered for the recipient in accordance with international
guidelines.5Transmission
Numerous cases of unexpected tuberculosis transmission
from donors to recipients have been reported in the literature
TABLE 28.
Summary consensus recommendations of the Donor-Derived Infections Consensus Conference onMycobacterium tuberculosis—
recommendations relating to deceased donors277
Tuberculosis epidemiology recommendations:
(1) Organ donors can be divided into low, moderate and high-risk categories for risk of tuberculosis infection or latent tuberculosis infection based on detailed history and prior
countries of residence/exposure. It should be noted that some donors thought to have latent tuberculosis infection might actually have undiagnosed active tuberculosis at the time they
became an organ donor. Individuals with active tuberculosis will likely pose a greater risk for transmission; therefore, it is especially critical to identify these patients before donation.
(2) Risk stratification based on donor social and medical history may be predictive of tuberculosis infection (either latent or unrecognized active tuberculosis) in donors and hence possible
risk of tuberculosis transmission to organ recipients.
(3) Diagnosis of latent tuberculosis infection and assessment of risk for transmission in organ donors optimally should be based on objective medical data such as prior historical results of
tuberculin skin testing, interferon-gamma release assays, or chest x-rays.
(4) The presence of tuberculosis disease in individuals currently residing in low risk countries is closely correlated with the donor's prior countries of origin and residence.
(5) Epidemiologic data can be used to target diagnostic evaluation of donors and recipients and formulate management algorithms. It, therefore, may be useful to include this information
when evaluating donors.
(6) It is currently unknown how recipient history modifies the impact of donor epidemiologic risk factors on the probability of transmission of tuberculosis through transplantation. Factors
such as recipient immunogenetics may confound donor risk stratification when evaluating transplant outcomes.
Tuberculosis screening recommendations—all donors
(1) Reasonable efforts must be made to rule out active tuberculosis in the donor with any identified historical or epidemiologic risk factors. For suspected or confirmed cases of
active tuberculosis, donation should be deferred except in dire circumstances.
(2) All solid-organ donors should have a careful epidemiologic and personal medical history, physical and chest radiograph. During the organ retrieval surgery the lungs must be
visually inspected and palpated for all donors where there is a concern. Abnormal lesions need to be biopsied and tissue sent for testing.
(3) Tuberculin skin test and interferon-gamma release assay test results should be cautiously interpreted taking into consideration the epidemiologic history and chest radiograph
findings. A negative result on an immunological test such as tuberculin skin test and interferon-gamma release assay does not rule out active tuberculosis.
(4) For lung donors, bronchoscopy specimens should be obtained for mycobacterial testing for tuberculosis and atypical mycobacteria (acid-fast bacilli smear and culture at a
minimum) before donation.
(5) Molecular methods from mycobacterial culture and species identification are preferred to standard culture if available, due to the shorter turnaround time.
(6) There is insufficient evidence to recommend interferon-gamma release assay testing of all solid-organ donors at this time. Further research into the utility of interferon-gamma release
assays in donors is needed. Interferon-gamma release assays have potential utility for identification of increased tuberculosis risk in deceased donors at moderate or high risk.
(7) Donation need not be deferred for the diagnosis of latent tuberculosis in any solid-organ donor including lung donors.
(8) Urinalysis with microscopy, genitourinary imaging and urine acid-fast bacilli smear and culture should be considered for all organ donors in intermediate- and high-risk countries.
This is particularly important for kidney donors.
Tuberculosis screening recommendations—deceased donors
(1) In deceased donors of solid organs other than lungs, who have an abnormal chest radiograph suspicious for active tuberculosis, specimens should be collected for acid-fast
bacilli smear and culture, and specimens should be sent for nucleic acid amplification testing. The results of these tests can be used to guide further investigations and treatment
in the recipients. Teams may have limited information when deciding whether to proceed to transplant.
(2) There is insufficient evidence to recommend routine interferon-gamma release assay testing of deceased donors. However, if interferon-gamma release assay is performed,
the following considerations should be taken into account:
(a) Results are generally not available for 24 hours; therefore, the decision to use the organs must be a clinical decision;
(b) Interferon-gamma release assays have relatively high rates of indeterminate results in different subpopulations; however, repeat testing of a donor is generally not feasible.
Therefore, interpretation of these results must be done cautiously as it has possible therapeutic implications for the recipient(s);
(c) If an interferon-gamma release assay is positive or indeterminate and the deceased donor of any organ except lung is from an area of low incidence for tuberculosis but
otherwise in a high-risk group for tuberculosis, clinical history and chest imaging should be carefully reviewed for correlation. This should precede donation if the positive
result is known before procurement. Regardless, the interferon-gamma release assay result alone should not influence suitability for donation, but may be used to
guide follow-up
assessments or tuberculosis therapy in the recipient;
(d) Literature suggests that cell-mediated immunity is depressed following head injury. Therefore, persons with head injury may not respond to mitogen. This situation has
not been specifically studied with interferon-gamma release assays;
(e) There is minimal published information regarding the performance characteristics of interferon-gamma release assays in infants and young children.
50 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.com(see Table 29). Given the difficulties of detecting tuberculosis
in deceased donors,many of these cases involved donors with
normal chest x-rays, no microscopic evidence of acid-fast ba-
cilli, and/or negative cultures for M. tuberculosis.288,290,294
For example, in a case of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis in
a lung transplant recipient in Hong Kong, the donor—a
51-year-old recent immigrant from China—had no history
of tuberculosis, and chest x-ray, microscopy of tracheal aspi-
rate, and cultures showed no evidence ofM. tuberculosis in-
fection.290 Other similar cases of donor-derived tuberculosis
in solid organ recipients, in which the donor was negativefor tuberculosis based on acid-fast bacilli stain, culture, and
chest x-ray, demonstrate the importance of donor history in
the assessment of potential tuberculosis risk.281,282,294
Table 29 summarizes the tuberculosis risk factors present
in donors who subsequently transmitted M. tuberculosis to
1 or more organ recipients. The most common risk factors
among reported cases were recent arrival from or previous
residence in an endemic country, followed by donor character-
istics such as homelessness, alcoholism, incarceration, and
health and hygiene status. Cases of drug-resistant tuberculosis
transmission further emphasize the importance of donor
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52 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comhistory: in a recent Australian case of donor-derived tuberculo-
sis in a lung transplant recipient, further investigation into the
donor revealed a history of latent tuberculosis 5 years before
death, which had been treated with 9 months of preventive
isoniazid therapy despite the index case demonstrating M.
tuberculosis resistance to isoniazid.16
A retrospective Spanish study of deceased donors used be-
tween January 1998 and June 2011 found that, of 11 de-
ceased organ donors with activeM. tuberculosis infection at
the time of transplantation, tuberculosis was transmitted to
the recipients in 2 cases (transmission rate of 18.2%).275
The risk of tuberculosis is greater for lung transplant recipients
than for recipients of other organs. Of cases of unexpected
donor-derived M. tuberculosis transmission identified from
the published literature, 15 (52%) of 29were in single or bilat-
eral lung transplant recipients. Moreover, in several cases of
donor-derivedM. tuberculosis transmission to lung recipients,
it was reported that none of the same-donor organ recipients
developed evidence of tuberculosis after several months of
observation.285,286 Based on a literature review of donor-
derived tuberculosis in lung transplant recipients reported
by Mortensen et al in 2014, the median time to tuberculosis
diagnosis was 88.5 days (range, 21–153 days).286 The most
common presenting symptoms among reported cases were
fever and dyspnea; however, in a large proportion of cases
(>30%) M. tuberculosis was detected by protocol acid-fast
bacilli smear or culture of respiratory specimens before the on-
set of symptoms (in these cases the median time to diagnosis
was 68.5 days).286 Of the identified cases of donor-derived tu-
berculosis in lung transplant recipients, 3 (20%) of 15were fa-
tal. Another lung recipient died from causes unrelated to
tuberculosis.286
In recipients of nonlung organs, M. tuberculosis infection
is more likely to present as extrapulmonary disease that is fre-
quently difficult to diagnose. The most common presenting
symptom is fever, though some patients may also experience
nausea, cough, headache or a deterioration of renal function
(see Table 29). Of the reported cases of donor-derived tuber-
culosis in kidney transplant recipients, 3 (27%) of 11were fa-
tal, with 1 additional death from unrelated causes.Recipient Management and Outcomes
Table 30 summarizes the 2012 recommendations of the
Donor-Derived Infections Consensus Conference on M. tu-
berculosis with regard to clinical management of solid organ
transplant recipients under different deceased donor scenar-
ios. In summary, potential donors with a history of tubercu-
losis may be considered on a case-by-case basis only if they
have received active treatment for at least 6 months. Donors
with latent tuberculosis need active tuberculosis to be ruled
out as far as possible and may be considered on a case-by-case
basiswith ongoing surveillance for the appearance of tuberculo-
sis in the recipient and consideration of recipient tuberculosis
prophylaxis. Prophylaxis should also be considered where the
donor has a history of latent tuberculosis that has not been
sufficiently treated or in the circumstance of unexplained pul-
monary apical fibrosis in the donor without cavitation and
without additional testing.277 At this time, IGRA testing in
donors is not suggested. Active tuberculosis in the donor
needs to be considered and investigated based on clinical
and epidemiological features and the decision to proceed to
TABLE 30.
Recommendations for clinical management of recipients under different scenarios of tuberculosis risk—deceased donors277
Clinical scenario Treatment history Risk for transmission Recommendations for deceased donor transplant recipients
Latent tuberculosis
History of tuberculosis exposure or significant
risk factors for tuberculosis, not tested
Variable Insufficient data, monitor clinically
History of latent tuberculosis Treated effectively Low Monitor recipient clinically
Treated insufficiently, not treated,
or treatment details unclear
OR new diagnosis of latent
tuberculosis*
Moderate Monitor recipient clinically, consider chemoprophylaxis of recipient
with clinical monitoring. Recommend chemoprophylaxis for lung
transplant recipient
Unexplained pulmonary apical fibrosis in
donor without cavitation and without
additional testing
Variable Consider testing donor—if tests are pending, consider whether
donor is high or low risk for tuberculosis before deciding whether
to proceed. If all definitive tests for tuberculosis are negative,
accept as organ donor but consider other possible causes of
apical fibrosis (endemic mycoses, malignancy etc). Consider
chemoprophylaxis and/or clinical monitoring in higher-risk
tuberculosis donors
History of active tuberculosis
History of active tuberculosis, site of infection
remote from the organ to be transplanted
(ie, pulmonary tuberculosis in a kidney donor)
Treated appropriately over
2 years ago
Low to moderate Monitor recipient clinically, consider cultures of previous tuberculosis
sites if possible. Verify adequate treatment. May consider
tuberculosis prophylaxis of recipient
Treated appropriately within the
past 2 years
Low to moderate Monitor recipient clinically, consider cultures of previous tuberculosis
sites if possible. Consider chemoprophylaxis of recipient, particularly
if adequacy of prior donor treatment cannot be verified
Treated insufficiently and/or with
other than standard regimen
High Monitor clinically, recommend chemoprophylaxis (as per
national guidelines), recommend cultures of previous tuberculosis
sites, consult ID specialist
History of active tuberculosis, same site as
transplant (ie, renal tuberculosis in
a kidney donor)
Treated appropriately Moderate Verify treatment, monitor clinically, recommend chemoprophylaxis
for recipient (as per local guidelines), recommend cultures of
previous tuberculosis sites, consult with ID specialist (NB organ
should be carefully evaluated for function, as tuberculosis lesions
may result in scarring and be inappropriate for transplant)
Treated insufficiently and/or
with nonstandard treatment
High Recommend rejecting, in dire circumstances accept and treat
recipient for active tuberculosis with informed consent and
involvement of ID specialist
Active tuberculosis—microbiologic or
pathologic diagnosis
Active tuberculosis at the time of proposed
donation OR positive tuberculosis culture
or positive NAT recognized pretransplant
High Strongly recommend rejecting, particularly if tuberculosis is in
the same site as the transplant organ. In dire circumstances accept
and treat recipient for active tuberculosis with informed consent
and involvement of ID specialist
Findings consistent with possible active
tuberculosis but no special cultures or
NAT available pretransplant
High Recommend rejecting, in dire circumstances accept and treat
recipient for active tuberculosis with informed consent and
involvement of infectious disease specialist. Strongly recommend
additional testing of donor, consider including IGRA, biopsy of
affected organ can be taken for pathologic examination and NAT
during organ procurement. Decision regarding recipient treatment vs
chemoprophylaxis will depend on final outcome of donor cultures.
Positive acid-fast bacilli stain, NAT or
tuberculosis culture, only known
posttransplant
High Treat recipient for active tuberculosis, and report test results to the
OPO immediately; consult with an ID specialist
Findings consistent with tuberculosis but no
cultures available, data only
known posttransplant
High Favor treating recipient for active tuberculosis. Pursue molecular
testing where possible, consult with an infectious
disease specialist
NAT, nucleic acid testing; IGRA, interferon-gamma release assays; OPO, organ procurement organization.
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 53organ transplantation based on the likelihood of active tuber-
culosis, the results of rapid tests (AFB microscopy and NAT
testing from donor samples), and the likelihood of therecipient receiving another donor offer. The location of the in-
fection in the donor is also relevant to the decision to proceed
with transplantation and subsequent recipient management,
54 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comas risk of transmission is lowerwhen the donor infection is at a
site other than the allograft (ie, pulmonary tuberculosis in a
kidney donor). If donation proceeds, there should be ongoing
surveillance for tuberculosis in the recipient and consideration
of recipient tuberculosis prophylaxis.
Treatment protocols are informed by drug susceptibility,
local drug resistance patterns, and possible drug interactions
with immunosuppressant medications (particularly rifampin/
rifampicin and rifabutin). A recent systematic review assessed
the benefits and harms of antibiotic prophylaxis to prevent
tuberculosis in solid organ transplantation, concluding that
prophylactic administration of isoniazid reduced the risk of
developing tuberculosis posttransplant by more than half
(risk ratio (RR), 0.35; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.14–
0.89).296 There was, however, no significant on all-cause mor-
tality (RR, 1.39; 95% CI, 0.70–2.78), whereas the risk of
liver damage was significantly increased (RR, 2.74; 95% CI,
1.22–6.17). The 3 primary studies included in this systematic re-
view were conducted in India and Pakistan—countries with a
high prevalence of tuberculosis—therefore, there remains an ab-
sence of evidence regarding the benefits and harms of tuberculo-
sis chemoprophylaxis for transplant recipients in area of low
tuberculosis prevalence.
When donor-derived, reactivated, or de novoM. tubercu-
losis infection is suspected in solid organ transplant recipi-
ents, clinicians will need to test for disease in the graft as
well as other sites, using microscopy, NAT, radiology, pathol-
ogy (acid-fast bacilli stains), as well as clinical judgment.277
Notably, the tuberculin skin test and IGRAs have poor sensi-
tivity in immunosuppressed persons after solid-organ trans-
plantation, and in any case are not recommended tests in
the diagnosis of active tuberculosis.
Multidrug-resistant Bacteria
Epidemiology
In cases where bacterial infections are transferred from
donor to recipient, these cases frequently involve resistant
bacteria—in particular MRSA, VRE, and multidrug-resistant
Gram-negative rods—that were not cleared by standard anti-
biotic prophylaxis.
Staphylococcus aureus
Staphylococcus aureus is common in hospital environ-
ments, and potential donors may become infected with a
resistant strain while in the intensive care unit (ICU). The
Australian Group on Antimicrobial Resistance (AGAR) has
conducted antimicrobial resistance surveillance since 1986,
and surveillance among hospital inpatients since 2005. Labo-
ratories participating in the surveillance network collect S.
aureus isolates from hospital inpatients and test then for an-
timicrobial susceptibility. Epidemiological typing is then per-
formed for isolates identified as MRSA. These surveys have
shown a substantial burden ofMRSA in Australian hospitals
overall, with significant interstate variation in the proportion
S. aureus isolates that were MRSA and in the specific MRSA
clones circulating in a given region.
In 2011, the proportion of S. aureus isolates that were
MRSAwas 30.3% nationwide, ranging from 19.9% inWestern
Australia to 36.8% in New South Wales/ACT.297 There
was wide variation between institutions in the proportion
of S. aureus that was MRSA, from 7% to 56%.297 The over-
all proportion of S. aureus isolates that were identified ashealthcare-associated MRSA was 18.2%, ranging from 4.5%
in Western Australia to 28.0% in New South Wales/ACT.
In 2011, the predominant hospital-acquired MRSA clone in
Australia was ST22-IV [2B] (EMRSA-15), although there
was significant interstate variation in the circulating clones
and in their susceptibility profile.297
Based on the 2011 AGAR survey data, resistance to the
non–β-lactam antimicrobials was common inMRSA isolates,
with the exception of fusidic acid, rifampicin, mupirocin, dap-
tomycin, vancomycin and linezolid (resistance levels below
4% nationally). Ceftaroline is also expected to be active.
More recently, the Staphylococcal Sepsis Outcome Pro-
gram looked at the proportion of S. aureus bacteremia iso-
lates in Australia that are antimicrobial resistant, reporting
that 18.8% of S. aureus bacteremia cases were MRSA—a
high relatively high proportion compared with several Euro-
pean countries.298
Enterococcus
Enterococci are among the leading causes of bacteremia,
and are intrinsically resistant to a broad range of antimicro-
bials. Moreover, their ability to acquire resistance through
plasmid transfer and transposons has allowed them to rap-
idly evolve additional resistance in the hospital environ-
ment. Although historically enterococcal infections were
primarily caused by Enterococcus faecalis, there has been
a worldwide increase in nosocomial infections with En-
terococcus faecium, which not only is innately resistant
to many classes of antibiotics but also extremely good at
evolving new antimicrobial resistances.299
AGAR commenced the Australian Enterococcal Sepsis
Outcome Program (AESOP) in 2011 for the surveillance of
E. faecalis and E. faecium bacteremia and to monitor evolving
patterns of antimicrobial susceptibility. Of the enterococcal
bacteremia cases identified by AESOP in 2014, 54.9% of iso-
lates were E. faecalis and 39.9% were E. faecium. Of the E.
faecalis bacteremia cases, 36.5%were hospital-acquired; how-
ever, of theE. faecium cases, 71.8%were hospital-acquired.299
ForE. faecalis, acquired resistancewas rarewith the exceptions
of erythromycin (87.4%), tetracycline (72.5%), ciprofloxacin
(25.6%), and high-level gentamicin (38.2%). In contrast, the
majority of E. faecium isolates were nonsusceptible to multiple
antimicrobials, including ampicillin (90%), erythromycin
(95%), tetracycline (53%), ciprofloxacin (92%), nitrofurantoin
(77%), and high-level gentamicin (62%), and 46.1%
were nonsusceptible to vancomycin.299 By comparison,
the population-weighted mean percentage of E. faecium
resistant to vancomycin in Europe is 9% (ranging from 0%
in Sweden, to 43% in Ireland).
Thus, not only isE. faecium a frequent cause of bacteremia
in Australia, the proportion of E. faecium that is resistant to
vancomycin is high by international standards.299 Vancomy-
cin resistance is usually acquired through the acquisition of
either the vanA or vanB operon. The first VRE case detected
in Australasia occurred in 1994 in a liver transplant patient at
Austin Health in Melbourne.300 Although this first case was
a vanA-positive E. faecium, the majority of VRE subse-
quently detected between 1994 and 2011 was vanB.300,301
In late 2013, however, a shift from vanB to vanA E. faecium
occurred across Australia.301 In contrast to the vanB gene,
which usually integrates into the E. faecium chromosome,
the vanA gene is often located on a plasmid, permitting easy
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 55horizontal transfer of resistance.302 In certain centers dra-
matic shifts occurred, with vanA almost entirely replacing
vanB between 2013 and 2014.301 A retrospective molecular
epidemiological study of VRE among patients admitted to
the ICU of Royal Prince Alfred Hospital, Sydney, between
January and November 2014 confirmed an increasing inci-
dence of VRE, attributed to multiple concurrent clonal out-
breaks of vanA VRE, with reusable medical equipment
demonstrated to be an important source of infection.302 Of
1729 patients admitted over the study period, 5.3% were col-
onized with VRE on admission (60% with vanB, 39% with
vanA, and 1% with both). VRE acquisition rates in the ICU
rose from 3.1 per 1000 patient days in 2013 to 7.0 per
1000 patient days in 2014, driven by an increase in vanA ac-
quisition.Overall, 3.6%of patients acquiredVREduring their
stay in the ICU: 55% acquired vanAVRE, and 45% acquired
vanB.302 The emergence of vanAVRE in Australian hospitals
will likely lead to a larger overall burden of VRE in Australia
and New Zealand.302 Recently, the rapid dissemination of
novel clone of vanB VRE (ST796) was also reported, first rec-
ognized at Austin Health at the beginning of 2012, then al-
most simultaneously appearing in Auckland, then appearing
in South Australia, Tasmania and then New South Wales.300
Drug-resistant Gram-negative Bacilli
AGAR has been monitoring sepsis due toE. coli and Kleb-
siella since 1992, with the addition of Enterobacter species to
the surveillance program in 2004. The 2014 survey reported
moderately high levels of ampicillin/amoxicillin resistance
in E. coli isolates (50%), with lower rates of resistance to
amoxicillin-clavulanate (8%).303 Moderate levels of resis-
tance were found in E. coli isolates toward cefazolin (21%)
and trimethoprim (29%).Multiresistance is on the rise, partic-
ularly in E. coli and E. cloacae isolates, with multiresistance
rates of 13% and 12% respectively. Also of concern: approx-
imately 25%ofE. coli isolates belonged to the ST131H30-Rx
subclone, which is associated with greater antibiotic resistance
and greater virulence.
Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates had higher levels of resistance
to piperacillin-tazobactam and ceftazidime compared with E.
coli, but lower rates of resistance to amoxicillin-clavulanate,
ticarcillin-clavulanate, cefazolin, ceftriaxone, ciprofloxacin, gen-
tamicin, and trimethoprim.
Among Enterobacter species, resistance was common to
ticarcillin-clavulanate, piperacillin-tazobactam, ceftriaxone,
ceftazidime and trimethoprim. Cefepime, ciprofloxacin, and
gentamicin resistance, however, were all less than 10%. In
2014, a total of 14 isolates from 14 patients in 9 institutions
across 5Australian states and territories were found to have a
carbapenemase gene. Thus, carbapenem resistance attributable
to acquired carbapenemases currently remains uncommon in
Australia, although 5 difference gene variants were detected
in 2014 (IMP, KPC, VIM, NDM, and OXA-181–like).303
Comparedwith other countries in the region, resistance rates
in Gram-negative bacteria in Australia are relatively low, but
are similar to those observed in Western Europe.304,305
Transmission and Recipient Outcomes
With the rise of multidrug-resistant bacteria in hospital en-
vironments, an increasing number of potential donors are be-
ing exposed tomultidrug-resistant bacteria in the ICU, whichmay then be transmitted to recipients by organ transplantation.
Of particular concern are VRE, multiresistant Pseudomonas
aeruginosa, ESBL-producing enterobacteriaceae, carbapenem-
resistant Acinetobacter baumannii, K. pneumoniae, and other
carbapenem-resistant enterobacteriaceae.5 Lanini et al306 have
described the incidence of carbapenem-resistantGram-negative
bacteria in Italian transplant recipients, reporting 0.63 isolates
of carbapenem-resistant Gram-negative bacteria per 1000 re-
cipient days (49 isolates from 887 recipients), and that carba-
penem resistance was most frequent among Klebsiella spp.
isolates (49%). Rates of nosocomial carbapenem-resistant bac-
terial infection are likely to be higher in Italy than in Australia
and New Zealand, given that carbapenemase-producing En-
terobacteriaceae are endemic in Italy and are regularly isolated
from patients in most hospitals.307 This study also reported
that mortality was 10.23 times higher in recipients who had
cultures positive for carbapenem-resistant Gram-negative bac-
teria after solid organ transplantation compared to those who
did not.306
Donor-related risk factors for infection or colonization by
multidrug-resistant bacteria include prolonged hospital stay
(7 days or longer), vasopressor use, and requirement for car-
diopulmonary resuscitation or abdominal packing.308,309
However, the absence of these risk factors does not preclude
nosocomial infection/colonization with multidrug-resistant
bacteria, as was demonstrated in a case of carbapenem-
resistant A. baumannii transmission from a donor with a
hospital stay of only 2 days.310 In addition, donor country
of origin/prior residence is also a potential risk factor: do-
nors from countries with high rates of gut colonization of
multidrug-resistant bacteria such as India pose a higher
risk of transmission (personal communication L Grayson).
Donor-derived Transmission of Carbapenem-resistant
Gram-negative Bacteria
In an Italian studyof the incidence andoutcomes of transplan-
tation using organs from donors with unknown carbapenem-
resistant Gram-negative bacterial infection, 10.5% of organ do-
nors were discovered posttransplant to be infected or colonized
with carbapenem-resistant Gram-negative bacteria, with proven
transmission to the organ recipient in 13% (4 of 30) of affected
transplants.311 The recipients in whom transmission did occur
all received antibiotic therapy that was late, short, or inap-
propriate. There was also a higher risk of transmissionwhere
the donors were bacteremic and the donor organ was culture-
positive. The first 2 transmission cases involved a donor who
died of cerebrovascular accident after 4 days in the ICU and
developed a fever after brain death; the day after organ trans-
plantation the donor's blood cultures became positive for
carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae. Liver, lungs, and pan-
creas were donated to 4 recipients. The recipient of an ex-
tended right graft of the donor liver received preemptive
treatment with meropenem alone for 3 days, starting on day
4 posttransplant. On day 7, samples from abdominal drainage
fluid were sent for microbiological testing and cultures were
positive for carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae. The patient
was treated with colistin and tigecycline, and the infection was
resolved by day 37 posttransplant. The lung recipient was
commenced on meropenem alone on day 2 posttransplant;
on day 10, cultures from BAL grew carbapenem-resistant K.
pneumonia and colistin was added to the treatment for
14 days. The patient did not develop infection, butwas found
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tially in the lung and later in the rectum.311
The third case identified by the Italian study involved a do-
nor who had experienced several episodes of fever while in the
ICU and was found to be positive for carbapenem-resistantK.
pneumoniae after organ retrieval and transplantation. The
kidney recipient, who received a full, targeted antibiotic treat-
ment regimen (gentamicin and meropenem for 8 days), re-
mained negative for carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae;
however, the liver recipient, who received only 3 days of full
antibiotic treatment (gentamicin and meropenem), developed
leukocytosis, pleural effusion and an intra-abdominal collec-
tion on day 12 posttransplant.311 On day 24, the liver recipi-
ent developed fever and infection of the abdominal wound;
cultures from the wound swabs grew carbapenem-resistant
K. pneumoniae. The wound infection was treated with a few
days of oral antibiotics, and on day 60, abdominal ultrasound
revealed a per-hepatic collection that had to be drained, with
the fluid culture testing positive for carbapenem-resistant K.
pneumoniae. After complete drainage and antibiotic treat-
ment, the infection was resolved, and the patient was alive
and well 18 months posttransplant.
The forth transmission case in this series involved a donor
who had been admitted to the ICU for septic cerebral emboliza-
tion from a methicillin-susceptible S. aureus driveline infection
and bacteremia, who subsequently died from cerebral hemor-
rhage. Known to be a rectal carrier of carbapenem-resistant
K. pneumoniae, urine cultures turned positive 2 days after
retrieval; however, this information was not properly com-
municated.311 One recipient received both kidneys, and on
posttransplant day 15 he was readmitted to hospital due
to high-grade fever which was confirmed to be due to
carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae infection of the graft.
The patient was treated with meropenem+colistin+tigecyline
but blood cultures remained positive so the antibiotic regimen
was changed to ertapenem+meropenem+colistin. Despite an
initial response, bacteremia returned, and the patient died
2 months later due to persistent carbapenem-resistant K.
pneumoniae infection of the graft.311
In a case reported from Israel, a donor whowas an asymp-
tomatic carrier of carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae in
the respiratory tract donated kidneys, liver, and lungs to 5 re-
cipients.312 The donor had been admitted to hospital in a
deep coma after a near drowning. After 5 days onmechanical
ventilation, he was declared brain dead. Routine BAL taken
at the time of organ donation grew carbapenem-resistant K.
pneumoniae 2 days after transplantation had taken place,
with antibiotic sensitivity limited to gentamicin, colistin,
and tigecycline. The recipient of the liver and the 2 kidney re-
cipients did not receive postoperative antibiotic treatment,
and none developed infectious complications. The 2 lung re-
cipients both received perioperative antibiotic prophylaxis
with piperacillin-tazobactam, and after the donor culture re-
sults, both received IV colistin for 5 days. One of the lung re-
cipients developed pneumonia 2 weeks after transplantation;
Proteus mirabiliswas cultured from sputum samples, and af-
ter treatment with IV colistin and ciprofloxacin the patient
made a full recovery. The second lung recipient was receiving
a second transplant due to cystic fibrosis. On day 19 post-
transplant, the patient developed tachypnea and dyspnea,
and a new infiltrate in the transplanted lung was revealed by
radiography. Given the results of donor cultures, the initialempiric antibiotic therapy with piperacillin-tazobactam was
changed to colistin and tigecycline; however, the patient con-
tinued to deteriorate. One week later, the patient was hypo-
tensive and oliguric, with decreased consciousness. At this
time, blood cultures were positive for carbapenem-resistant
K. pneumoniae, with antibiotic sensitivity profile the same
as the donor. Treatment was unsuccessful and the patient
died 4 weeks later.
In a 2007 case of carbapenem-resistant A.baumannii
transmission from a donor to a lung recipient in Brazil, the
donor had been in the hospital for only 2 days before pro-
curement, with partial pressure of oxygen/fraction of in-
spired oxygen greater than 300, normal chest x-ray, and no
evidence of bronchial aspiration by bronchoscopy.310 Periop-
erative antimicrobial prophylaxis consisted of vancomycin
plus cefepime. On day 2 posttransplant, the recipient devel-
oped fever, arterial hypotension, and respiratory failure, with
a chest x-ray revealing an infiltrate in the lower third of the
right hemithorax. The patient was reintubated and norepi-
nephrine infusion was started, and meropenem substituted
for cefepime. On the same day, the results of the donor's
BAL culture became available, yieldingA. baumannii suscep-
tible to ampicillin-sulbactam, meropenem, imipenem, and
amikacin; the result for carbapenems was, however, incor-
rect. Although the recipient's lung function improved, she
remained febrile and wound site infection was noted. On
day 9 posttransplant, carbapenem-resistant A. baumannii
was isolated from the recipient's BAL and from the surgical
wound specimen, and IV polymyxin B was substituted for
meropenem, and tacrolimus dosage was reduced. By day
29 posttransplant, the patient's serum creatinine had risen
to 2.1 mg/dL and the decision was made to stop polymyxin
B therapy. Serum creatinine level returned to baseline; how-
ever, on day 46, the patient presented with pneumonia and re-
currence of infection at the surgical wound; a transbronchial
lung biopsy showed coexistence of CMV pneumonia. Re-
sumption of polymyxin B together with inhaled amikacin
produced transient improvement, but the fever returned
and respiratory function progressively worsened. Empiric
amphotericin B therapywas started on day 57 and immuno-
suppression stopped on day 61; however, the patient died
on day 65 posttransplant.
Donor-derived Transmission of Other Multidrug-resistant
Bacteria
Deceased donors who have undergone traumatic injury re-
quiring abdominal packing to control major hemorrhage are
at particularly high risk of nosocomial infection with bacte-
rial or fungal pathogens, includingmultidrug-resistant bacte-
ria. In a case report published in 2012, a 21-year-old man
with a gunshot wound to his abdomen underwent damage
control laparotomy and abdominal packing, but subse-
quently deteriorated and was declared brain-dead 3 days af-
ter admission.309 He donated organs to 4 separate recipients;
all 4 of whom subsequently developed infections withMDRP.
aeruginosa. The donor had received piperacillin-tazobactam
and fluconazole before the laparotomy and packing, and at
the time of organ procurement showed no signs of active in-
fection. Blood, urine, and wound cultures from swabs taken
the day before procurement were all negative. Nonetheless,
preprocurement broad-spectrum empiric antibiotics (van-
comycin, piperacillin-tazobactam and fluconazole) were
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nor was checked for and cleared of any signs of intra-
abdominal infection.
Despite these precautions, the day after transplantation
cultures from peritoneal swabs obtained during procurement
was positive for Gram-negative rods. The relevant transplant
centers were contacted, and imipenem or meropenem were
added to the regimens of the recipients. On the fourth day af-
ter transplantation, the pathogen isolated from the donor
was confirmed to be MDR P. aeruginosa, with resistance to
extended spectrum penicillins, ceftazidime, fluoroquinolones,
and tobramycin.309
The heart recipient was hospitalized for dyspnea approxi-
mately 6 weeks posttransplant and was found to have a
loculated right pleural effusion requiring tube thoracostomy.
Culture of the drained fluid showed presence of P. aeruginosa
with the same resistance pattern as observed in the donor.
After treatment with IV meropenem for 2 weeks, the patient
recovered well and had no furtherMDR infections. The liver
recipient experienced coagulopathy at the time of transplan-
tation and required vasopressor support due to persistent
hypotension and low systemic vascular resistance. On day
8 posttransplant, a hepatojejunostomy leak was discovered
requiring debridement and reconstruction, and intraopera-
tive abdominal cultures taken at this time grew MDR P.
aeruginosa and vancomycin-resistantE. faecalis. The patient
progressed to multiple organ dysfunction syndrome and
died on day 38 posttransplant. The recipient of the first kid-
ney developed purulent drainage at the incision site approx-
imately 2 weeks posttransplant, and ultrasound revealed a
complex subcutaneous collection requiring the wound to
be opened and treated. Cultures from the abdominal wound
grew MDR P. aeruginosa and vancomycin-resistant E.
faecalis. The patient was due to be discharged; however, it
was discovered that asystolic and resuscitation was not suc-
cessful. A postmortem showed multiple fresh thromboemboli
in the left pulmonary artery. The recipient of the second kid-
ney had positive perioperative blood cultures for MDR P.
aeruginosa and vancomycin-resistant E. faecalis, and subse-
quently developed a perinephric collection requiring percuta-
neous drainage. The patient was discharged with home IV
polymixin and amikacin, but no further follow up informa-
tion was available.
In a second case report ofMDR P. aeruginosa transmission,
the donor was admitted to the ICU for intracranial bleeding,
and 6 days later, developed bilateral pneumonia with cultures
showing presence of P. aeruginosa.313 Meropenem was ad-
ministered, and 11 days later endotracheal, blood, and urine
cultures were all negative. The donor then deteriorated, and
died from severe intracranial hypertension 18 days after ICU
admission. Both kidneys were retrieved and transplanted into
2 recipients whowere given prophylaxis consisting of cefotax-
ime, amphotericin B, and trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole; P.
aeruginosa–specific antibiotics were not administered. MDR
P. aeruginosa was detected in both recipients approximately
1 week posttransplant, and both recipients died within
2 weeks of transplantation from massive hemorrhage as a
result of arterial anastomotic rupture.313
In a third case of donor-derivedMDR P. aeruginosa infec-
tion, the donor was a 21-year-old male gunshot victim who
died after a prolonged hospital course.314 The donor had de-
veloped pulmonary infiltrates and before procurement abronchoscopy was performed. Cultures from the BAL grew
MDR P. aeruginosa; however, results were not available at
the time of organ procurement. Urine and peritoneal cultures
taken during procurement also grew MDR P. aeruginosa
3 days after organ retrieval, at which point the recipients of
the donors organs were informed. The recipient of one of
the kidneys died from pseudomal infection shortly after;
however, the recipient of the second kidney was successfully
treated with 6 weeks of polymyxin B and amikacin, consis-
tent with the drug susceptibility profile of the isolated bacte-
ria, and 1 year later was alive with normal kidney function.
The heart recipient did not develop infection and the liver re-
cipient died from complications of the transplant surgery.
These cases highlight the risk of transmission of multidrug-
resistant pathogens from donors with undetected nosocomial
infections and also from donors with traumatic injuries
involving major blood loss and abdominal packing. In
open-abdominal cases, the injuries sustained typically require
significant volume and blood product replacement, which
may result in a washout effect of prophylactic antibiotics and
ineffective antibiotic coverage, leaving the potential donor sus-
ceptible to infection with multidrug-resistant bacteria.309 Al-
ternatively, antibiotic therapy may reduce the bacterial load
to a level that is undetectable by standard culture protocols
but is still able to transmit infection to an immunosuppressed
individual.313 Negative cultures before organ retrieval and
the absence of physical evidence of infection do not rule out
the presence of pathogens capable of transmitting infection:
in the 2 cases above, the donor received appropriate antibi-
otic therapy, cultures were negative, and there was no evi-
dence infection at the time of organ retrieval. In cases of
traumatic injury, the type of packing used and its duration
may further increase the risk of nosocomial infection, abscess
formation, and/or sepsis in the potential donor.315,316 Tem-
porary VAC closure for example may be associated with
lower risk of infection than intra-abdominal packing with
lap sponges or towel clip closure.315,317
Methicillin-resistant S. aureus is another drug-resistant
organism that has been transmitted by solid organ transplan-
tation. In a 2012 case, the donor—who had a history of
IVDU—was admitted to the emergency department after
2 days of progressive confusion and somnolence.318 He was
minimally responsive and had a fever, and was treated with
broad-spectrum antimicrobial therapy for presumed bacte-
rial meningitis. A CTscan showed a large right parietal intra-
cranial hemorrhage, and within 24 hours the donor was
declared brain dead. Peripheral blood cultures taken during
the emergency department evaluation revealed the presence
of MRSA, and by the time of organ donation 36 hours after
brain death, the donor had been treated with vancomycin
and had remained afebrile for 48 hours. Lungs, kidneys, pan-
creas, and liver were recovered and transplanted into 4 recip-
ients. The kidney and pancreas recipients received 5 doses of
vancomycin prophylaxis posttransplant and subsequently
showed no signs of MRSA infection. The liver recipient was
receiving daptomycin 4 mg/kg for cellulitis at the time of
transplantation; however, MRSA growth was observed on
blood cultures collected 3 hours after transplantation. Dap-
tomycin was continued at 6 mg/kg for 14 days, after which
blood cultures were negative for MRSA. However, on day
58 posttransplant, the patient was readmitted with fever
and chills. Blood cultures were positive for MRSA, and a
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symptoms resolved. The lung recipient was initiated on vanco-
mycin therapy at the time of transplantation given the donor
history; however, blood cultures collected 6 days posttransplant
revealed MRSA growth. Despite continued appropriate antibi-
otic therapy, MRSA continued to be detected on BAL cultures
until 99 days posttransplant. Sixmonths posttransplant, the pa-
tient was readmitted due to dyspnea on exertion, and a chest
CT suggested extensive right-sided multifocal consolidation.
Bronchoalveolar lavage cultures revealed MRSA, and vanco-
mycin therapy was resumed for another 4 weeks, after which
time symptoms resolved.
European guidelines recommend that organs from donors
returning positive cultures for multidrug-resistant bacteria
may be considered for transplantation in well-defined cir-
cumstances provided there is close recipient follow-up, unless
the organ to be transplanted is itself colonized.5
At this time, it is uncertain whether organ donors should
have enhanced microbiological screening for MDR bacteria,
over and abovewhat is standard practice inmost ICUs.Routine
rectal/fecal screening with results made available before trans-
plantation should be considered where not already performed.
If MDR bacteria are identified before transplantation, the risks
are highest for the bacteremic donor or where the positive cul-
ture is taken from the organ that is to be transplanted: in these
cases transplantation should be avoided. In all other circum-
stances, transplantation can be considered in consultation with
an infectious diseases physician, provided that the recipient re-
ceives a course of active antimicrobials.Recipient Management
Directed antimicrobial prophylaxis in recipients has been
shown to be effective in preventing transmission of multidrug-
resistant Gram-negative pathogens.312,319 In a case report from
the United States, Ariza-Heredia et al319 describe the use of or-
gans from a donor known to be infected with carbapenem-
resistant K. pneumoniae before organ procurement. The donor
was a 21-year-oldmanwho sustainedmultiple injuries in amo-
tor vehicle accident and was hospitalized for approximately
3 weeks before being declared brain dead. He developed pneu-
monia during treatment, an infected subdural hematoma, and
meningitis due to carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae, al-
though blood cultures remained negative. The donor was
treated with IV tigecycline for 9 days and received 3 doses
of intrathecal gentamicin at the time of death. As cultures
were still positive for carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae
at the time of death, the transplant teams were informed
and specific consent sought from the potential recipients
and their families. The liver, kidneys, heart, and a vein graft
were retrieved. The recipient of the right kidney received
pretransplant doses of IV gentamicin (4 mg/kg) and tigecyc-
line (100 mg), and posttransplant received a 10-day course
of IV tigecycline (50 mg every 12 hours). Surveillance cul-
tures of the preservation fluid were negative, and 5 months
posttransplant, the recipient was doing well. The heart recip-
ient received perioperative IV cefepime (2 g every 12 hours)
and tigecycline (100 mg loading does then 50 mg twice
daily). Antimicrobial prophylaxis received posttransplant in-
cluded valacyclovir, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, and in-
haled amphotericin B, and cultures remained negative for
carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae.The recipient of the liver and kidney in the case reported by
Ariza-Heredia developed a postoperative infected hematoma
and peritonitis due to carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae,
despite receiving prophylaxis with IV tigecycline (initial load-
ing dose of 100 mg, followed by 50 mg every 12 hours
planned for 2 weeks).319 On posttransplant day 10, the pa-
tient developed severe abdominal pain, tenderness and leuko-
cytosis, and cultures of the ascetic fluid were positive for
carbapenem-resistantK. pneumoniae. The patient underwent
exploratory laparotomy and washout, and IV amikacin was
added to the treatment regimen, along with ciprofloxacin
for possible synergy, and fluconazole to treat a concurrent
Candida albicans infection.On day 24, cultures were still pos-
itive for carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae, and the treat-
ment regimen was changed to meropenem (1 g IV every
8 hours), amikacin (500 mg IV every 12 hourly), ampicillin
(1 g IV every 6 hours), and fluconazole (200 mg p.o. daily)
for 4 weeks. Five months posttransplantation, the recipient
showed no recurrence of infection.
Source control is the first priority in the treatment of
multidrug-resistant bacteria, including drainage of collec-
tions and the removal of any infected devices. The choice of
antimicrobial treatment and dosage should take into account
pathogen susceptibility profile and local resistance patterns,
predicted drug levels at the site of the infection, cost, method
of administration, side-effect profile, severity of infection, and
any know multidrug-resistant colonizers in the recipient.320
Treatment recommendations for multidrug-resistant gram-
negative bacteria infections in solid organ transplant recipients
are given in Table 31.
Treponema pallidum
Epidemiology
The number of cases of infectious syphilis reported in
Australia in 2016 was 3367, of which 87% of diagnoses
were in males and 16% were in ATSI persons.37 In the non-
Indigenous population, male-to-male sex is the primary
transmission route, and over 90% of all notifications of in-
fectious syphilis are in males (see Figure 13). In contrast, only
54% of infectious syphilis notifications in ATSIs in 2006
were in males. The infectious syphilis notification rate in
Australia increased 107% from 2012 to 2016 (from 6.9 to
14.3 cases per 100000), driven largely by increased transmis-
sion among MSM and by an ongoing outbreak of infectious
syphilis among ATSI people living in northern Australia.37,321
This outbreak began in northern Queensland in January
2011, spread to the Northern Territory in July 2013, and to
the Kimberley region of Western Australia in June 2014.321
An outbreak in the western, Eyre and far north regions of
South Australia was declared in March 2017.321 By 2016,
the infectious syphilis notification rate in the ATSI popula-
tion living in remote and very remote areas was 135.4 per
100 000—50.1 times higher than the rate in the non-Indigenous
population.37 Also of note, this outbreak has primarily af-
fected young ATSI people—in 2016, 21% of infectious syph-
ilis notifications in the ATSI population were in the 15- to
19-year age group, compared to only 2%of the non-Indigenous
population.37
InNewZealand there has also been a steady increase in in-
fectious syphilis cases since 2002, with a notable jump in no-
tifications from 2013 to 2014 (from 82 to 140 cases).322 As
in Australia, the vast majority of cases (>90%) are in males,
TABLE 31.
Treatment recommendations for multidrug-resistant gram-negative bacteria infections in solid organ transplant recipients320
Pathogen Recommendation Evidence level
ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae Carbapenems
Alternative: cefepime or piperacillin/tazobactam (if susceptible and low inoculum infection)
I
III
Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae Systemic infections: individualized combination regimen with 2 or more of Colistin, Tigecycline,
Aminoglycosides or high-dose prolonged-infusion carbapenems
Uncomplicated UTI: oral fosfomycin or IV aminoglycosides
II-3
MDR Acinetobacter Carbapenems (except ertapenem) if susceptible
If carbapenem resistant, consider combination therapy with Colistin, Ampicillin/sulbactam,
tigecycline (if susceptible and no bloodstream or urinary infection), or rifampicin
II-3
MDR P. aeruginosa Individualized combination regimen with 2 or more of antipseudomonal beta-lactam (consider high
doses of prolonged or continuous infusion), aminoglycoside, ciprofloxacin, adjunctive aerosolized
colistin or tobramycina
II-2
Pan-resistant P. aeruginosa Individualized combination regimen with 3 or more of IV colistin, doripenem or another antipseudomonal
beta-lactam, aminoglycosides, fosfomycin, rifampicin, adjunctive aerosolized colistin or tobramycina
II-2
MDR B. cepacia complex High-dose TMP/SMX
Alternatives if susceptible: meropenem, ciprofloxacin
II-2
Trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole-resistant or
pan-resistant B. cepacia complex
Combination therapy with meropenem, aminoglycoside, ceftazidime (or trimethoprim sulfamethoxazole) II-2
MDR A. xylosoxidans Combination therapy with piperacillin/tazobactam, carbapenems (except ertapenem), trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole III
MDR S. maltophilia High-dose trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole
Alternatives: ticarcillin/clavulanate, moxifloxacin, doxycycline, tigecycline (consider combination therapy)
II-2
a Ceftolozane-tazobactam has become an option since this article was published.
UTI, urinary tract infection.
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proximately 90% of cases). The majority ethnicity reported
in MSM cases was NZ European (57% in 2014), followed
by Asian (13%), Māori (13%), other (12%), and Pacific Is-
landers (3%).322 Cases are concentrated among males aged
20 to 34 years, with the biggest increase in cases since 2011
occurring among males aged 20 to 24 years. The Auckland
region reported the highest number of infectious syphilis no-
tifications in 2014 (61% of the total).322
Donor Screening and Risk Minimization
Historically, syphilis screening has been based on nontre-
ponemal serological tests—either the RPR or Venereal Dis-
ease Research Laboratory (VDRL) test—which are sensitive
in newly infected individuals but can produce false-positiveFIGURE 13. Age and sex distribution of the syphilis notification rate (syp
health.gov.au/cda/source/cda-index.cfm).results due to factors such as other infections (eg, HIV), auto-
immune conditions, injecting drug use, or other causes of in-
flammation or immunological reactivity. In a retrospective
studyofRPR-positive deceased donors, Theodoropoulos et al
demonstrated a false-positive rate of 40.6% for RPR tests.51
Treponemal-specific tests have greater specificity but continue
to yield positive results after successful treatment.323 The
United States Centers for Disease Control specify that a di-
agnosis of syphilis requires positive results on both a
nontreponemal test and a treponemal-specific test.324
Treponemal-specific tests include FTA-ABS tests, the TP-PA)
assay, various EIAs, chemiluminescence immunoassays, im-
munoblots, or rapid treponemal assays. Test performance
characteristics of available syphilis tests, versus TP-PA as
the gold standard, are given in Table 32.hilis of <2 years duration), in Australia in 2016 (Source: http://www9.
TABLE 32.
Test performance characteristics of various syphilis tests as
compared to TP-PA51
Test Sensitivity Specificity
RPR* 79.2% (95% CI, 57.8–92.8%) 81.2% (95% CI, 69.9–89.6%)
FTA-ABS 87.5% (95% CI, 67.6–97.2%) 84.1% (95% CI, 73.3–91.8%)
MHA-TP 91.7% (95% CI, 73.0–98.7%) 100% (95% CI, 94.7–100%)
CLIA 100% (95% CI, 85.6–100%) 100 (95% CI, 94.7–100%)
RPR, rapid plasma reagin; FTA, fluorescent treponemal antibody.
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first with a nontreponemal test and then confirm positive re-
sults with a treponemal-specific test, though more recently
there has been a shift to a “reverse-sequence” approach,
whereby an initial treponemal-specific test is followed by a
nontreponemal test to confirm positive results.51 Current in-
ternational guidelines and state-based guidelines in Australia
recommend routine screening of deceased donors for syphilis
infection using a treponemal-specific EIA, with confirmation
by a nontreponemal serological test. If the nontreponemal
test is negative, then a second treponemal test based on differ-
ent antigens to the original test should be performed. This re-
verse sequence approach has the advantage of being able to
distinguish potential donors who have been previously treated
for syphilis, thosewith untreated or incompletely treated syphilis,
and those with a false-positive result.324 Treponemal test results
should be interpreted in the context of what is known about
the donor's history of treatment for syphilis and their sexual his-
tory, because there is always the possibility that previously treated
persons may have a new, recently reacquired syphilis infection.
A positive syphilis test does not necessarily preclude organ
donation; however, newly diagnosed syphilis indicates that
the donor is also at increased risk of having recently acquired
HIV, HBV, or HCV, and decisions regarding utilization
should be made accordingly.51 If the decision is made to pro-
ceed with transplantation, then the recipient will require ap-
propriate treatment.
Transmission Risk and Recipient Management
Only 4 cases of syphilis transmission via organ donation
have been reported—1 confirmed transmission reported to
the United States OPTN, and 3 reports in the published liter-
ature.1,325,326 In a 2003 case, a homosexual male with a his-
tory of treated syphilis donated kidneys to 2 recipients.325
Donor syphilis serology, available only after transplantation
had taken place, was reactive on TP-PA (titer, 1:1280) and
RPR (titer, 1:2), which was interpreted as consistent with a
history of treated infection. The 2 recipients were informed
and were administered a single dose of 2.4 g IV benzyl peni-
cillin instead of the recommended benzathine penicillin 2.4
MU administered intramuscularly. Recipient serum samples
collected on day 5 posttransplant were reactive on treponemal
EIA, and both recipients were then treated for early latent
syphilis according to the 2002 UK guidelines. After 2 years
of follow up, both recipients had excellent kidney function,
and 3 monthly RPR tests remained negative.
In 2011, a 55-year-old woman underwent liver transplanta-
tion with a graft from a deceased donor whose medical history
included schizophrenia and a 2-week history of ear infection,
which progressed to meningitis precipitating brain death.326Results of donor syphilis serology becameavailable 24hours af-
ter the transplant had taken place, and showed reactivity in the
treponemal EIAwith a negative VDRL test—consistent with la-
tent syphilis infection. The recipientwas immediately prescribed
treatment for latent syphilis as recommended by UK national
guidelines. Due to an allergy to penicillin, doxycycline 100 mg
BID was introduced for 28 days. There was evidence of recipi-
ent seroconversion for syphilis at 1month posttransplant; how-
ever, syphilis treatment was successful, and the patient was well
with stable graft function at 9 months posttransplant.326
The fourth reported case of donor-derived syphilis trans-
mission was in a lung transplant recipient whose donor, a
38-year-old woman who died of subarachnoid bleeding, re-
turned serology test results indicating past syphilis infection
1 day after transplantation had occurred.327 The recipient re-
ceived penicillin G intravenously 3 times per day for 10 days,
starting on day 1 posttransplant. Although immunoblot testing
detected T. pallidum–specific newly synthesized IgG antibodies
on day 29 posttransplant, the patient developed no clinical signs
of syphilis infection, and by 3 months posttransplant, the T.
pallidum hemagglutination titer had returned to negative. The
recipient recovered well over long-term follow-up and graft
function was normal.
In addition to these cases, there have been 4 cases of organ
transplantation involving a syphilis-positive donor that did
not result in transmission to the recipient after appropriate
therapy.328-331 Transplanted organs included kidney, heart,
lung, and liver, and in each case, there was no evidence of in-
fection in the recipients, who had all received treatment with
benzathine penicillin G.324 In the most recent of these cases,
the EIA results showing that the donor was seropositive for
syphilis were available only after transplantation had oc-
curred.331 Based on negative results on TP-PA and VDRL
confirmatory testing, it was not possible to differentiate be-
tween treated syphilis and late syphilis, and the decision
was made to treat the recipient. Three doses of benzathine
penicillin 2.4 MUwere administered intramuscularly weekly
for 3 weeks, and repeated serology at regular intervals post-
transplant showed that the recipient remained free of syphilis
infection at 3 months posttransplant.
These case reports suggest that, where the donor is found
to have latent syphilis, clinical manifestations of T. pallidum
can be successfully prevented with treatment of the recipient.
However, a donor with secondary syphilis may be bacteremic
with the involvement of many organs; hence, caution should
be taken if clinical manifestations of secondary syphilis are pres-
ent. The treatment regime of the recipient should be discussed
with an infectious diseases physician and may include use of
benzathine or IV penicillin (P Boan, personal communication).
Bacteremia and Meningitis
There is substantial evidence that organs from bacteremic
donors and donors with proven bacterial meningitis can be
safely used for transplantation provided that the bacteria are
confirmed to be susceptible to antibiotics and the donor and re-
cipient receive appropriate treatment pretransplantation and
posttransplantation.5,332 However, it is not uncommon for
bacteremia in the donor to be unrecognized until after trans-
plantation has occurred: in 1 study, 60% of bacteremic donors
were afebrile in the 24 hours before organ procurement.333
A retrospective study of organ donors in Spain found that
5% of liver and heart donors had bacteremia at the time of
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 61organ donation (including recognized and unrecognized in-
fections).333 Themost commonmicroorganisms isolated from
donors with bacteremia in were S. aureus, E. faecalis, A.
baumanni, and S. viridans. There were no documented inci-
dents of transmission of the isolated bacteria to recipients
in this study nor was there evidence of any negative clinical
impact on the outcomes of transplantation. The authors
note, however, that bacteremic donors may not be safe in
all circumstances, and their findings may in part be attribut-
able to a degree of selection bias, whereby patients with pos-
itive blood cultures and evident sepsis were never considered
as potential donors. It should also be noted that the risk of
transmission varies according to the type of bacteria causing
the infection—for example, Gram-negative bacilli (eg, E. coli)
pose a greater risk than Gram-positive bacteria.334 Given the
high rates of graft loss, morbidity and mortality associated
with transmission of bacteremia—especially in the case of in-
fection caused by Gram-negative bacilli—susceptibility testing
in the donor is important.335
Numerous other studies have demonstrated that transplant
outcomes in recipients of organs from bacteremic donors are
equivalent to outcomes from nonbacteremic donors, provided
that the donor is treated with appropriate antibiotic therapy
for at least 24 to 48 hours and shows some degree of clinical
response (eg, improved white cell blood count, improved he-
modynamics, defervescence), and tailored antibiotic treatment
is initiated in the recipient in a timely manner.49,332,335 Recip-
ients should be treated with tailored antibiotic therapy for at
least 7 days posttransplant, or longer if the organism is difficult
to treat (eg, S. aureus) or if there is the potential for infection to
disrupt an anastomosis or seed an endovascular source.332
Based on existing evidence, no particular organ from a bacter-
emic donor is more likely to transmit infection to the recipient
than another.335
There are also numerous published studies describing suc-
cessful transplantation using organs from donors who died
from microbiologically proven bacterial meningitis caused by
N. meningitidis, S. pneumoniae, Haemophilus influenzae, and
E. coli.336-340 A contributing factor to the low rate of transmis-
sion of infection from donors with bacterial meningitis is that
the most common meningeal organisms do not survive at the
low temperatures maintained during cold perfusion and stor-
age before transplantation.336 Before organ acceptance, menin-
gitis should be confirmed as the sole site of infection, and the
donor should ideally receive 48 hours of appropriate treatment
with evidence of clinical improvement before organ retrieval,
although successful outcomes have been reported after only
24 hours of antibiotic therapy where blood cultures were
negative on the day of donation.337 Tailored antibiotic ther-
apy in the recipient is recommended for at least 7 days
posttransplant.336,341
Exceptions exist; however, for example, meningitis caused
by Listeria species may cause disseminated infection that is
difficult to treat in the immunosuppressed patient, with a
high risk of relapse.5,342 Similarly, meningitis caused by dis-
seminated M. tuberculosis infection may be transmitted to
the recipient with fatal consequences and is a contraindication
to transplantation.284 Other organisms that are rare causes of
meningitis but are notable for establishingmetastatic infection,
adherence to endothelial surfaces, or for having other markers
of virulence—for example, S. aureus, P. aeruginosa, Salmo-
nella spp.—are contraindications to organ donation.343 Lastly,the time course of infection is relevant: persistent bacteremia
caused by any organism increases the risk of metastatic infec-
tion, and in such cases, organ transplantation may carry a
higher risk of disease transmission.343
European guidelines recommend that, in general, organs
from donors with bacteremia or bacterial meningitis should
only be considered for use after 48 hours of targeted and ef-
fective antibiotic therapy and with clinical evidence that the
infection has been cleared. Utilization of donors with ongo-
ing sepsis and positive blood cultures is not recommended,
especially if effective therapy cannot be confirmed. If the re-
sults of blood cultures are not available before transplantation
but clinical data indicate that antibiotic treatment has been ef-
fective, then it is recommended that a transplant infectious dis-
ease specialist be consulted before organs are discarded.5 Any
meningitis caused by an unknown pathogen is an absolute
contraindication for organ donation. A brain abscess is not a
contraindication per se; however, the potential causes of the
brain abscess should be evaluated before accepting the organs.
Extreme precaution should be used for donors with presumed
bacterial meningitis with negative cultures, especially when no
pathogen can be identified by culture or PCR—in this case, or-
gans should not be used for transplantation. In the case of a
nonreactive culture but where the bacteria are confirmed by
PCR as the pathogen causing themeningitis, it can be assumed
that after 48 hours of antibiotic treatment, infectionwill not be
transmitted.5
UKguidelines state thatwhere an organ donor has been di-
agnosed with bacteremia in the 5 days preceding the dona-
tion but there is no visible damage or local infection in the
organ at retrieval, donation of an organ is acceptable with
appropriate recipient antibiotic prophylaxis.29 Similarly, if
bacterial meningitis has been confirmed, but there is no visi-
ble damage or local infection in the organ or tissues required
at retrieval, the donation of the organs, tissues, and cells are
acceptable. Appropriated antibiotic prophylaxis covering
any organism from the donor should be considered for iden-
tifiable recipients, especially in the case of organs. However,
organs frommeningitis cases from whom no organism is cul-
tured should not be used.
Summarizing these international guidelines, organs from
bacteremic donors may be used provided the organism is
readily treatable (not MDR), the donor has received at least
24 hours effective antibiotic therapy with some improve-
ment, and a treatment course is administered to the recipient.
Organs may be used from donors with bacterial meningitis
with a treatment course given to the recipient, although cau-
tion is advised where the pathogen has not been confirmed.
Pulmonary Infections
Bacterial colonization of donor lungs is common as (1) the
lungs are in constant contact with the external environment
and the airways are normally colonized with multiple organ-
isms; (2) most donors require emergency intubation, which
may result in aspiration and pneumonia; and (3) the rate of
bronchopulmonary infections increases in proportion to the
length of time spent in the ICU (as does the rate of infection
with antibiotic-resistant organisms).5 Before donation, aspi-
ration and consequent pneumonia must, therefore, be ruled
out/treated.5 In particular, the potential transmission of any
MDR pathogens must be ruled out. European guidelines
state that, in the case of pneumonia without bacteremia, all
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fective antibiotic treatment and unimpaired pulmonary func-
tion, lungs may be considered for donation.5 In cases where
bacterial infection in the donor lungs is not detected before
transplantation, lung recipients should not suffer complica-
tions due to donor-derived bacteria as long as the transmitted
pathogens are not MDR and provided appropriate prophy-
laxis is given.344
A recent significant discovery has been the role of dissem-
inated Ureaplasma infection in hyperammonemia syndrome
after lung transplantation.345,346 Hyperammonemia syn-
drome is a fatal complication of immunosuppressed patients
in which serum ammonia levels progressively increase, lead-
ing to cerebral edema and death. It has been described in
bone marrow, lung, heart-lung, kidney, liver, intestinal, and
islet cell transplant recipients; however, it has most frequently
been reported in lung transplant recipients.347 A large retro-
spective case series performed at Barnes-Jewish Hospital in
St. Louis, Missouri, between 2000 and 2013 found an inci-
dence of hyperammonemia syndrome after lung transplanta-
tion of 1% (n = 8/807), with a mortality rate of 75%.347 A
smaller retrospective cohort study of 145 lung transplant re-
cipients found an incidence of hyperammonemia syndrome
of 4%.348
Hyperammonemia syndrome was first described in 1991
in a recipient of a bone marrow transplant.349 The cause of
the syndrome remained unknown, however, until 2015when
Bharat et al346 published preliminary evidence that the syn-
drome may be caused by donor-derived infection with
Ureaplasma species.346 Ureaplasma species are mollicutes
that depend on urea hydrolysis to ammonia and carbon for en-
ergy production, and are part of the normalmicrobiome of the
urogenital tract. Although the hydrolysis of urea and the gen-
eration of ammonia in the urine do not cause harm, dissemi-
nated ureaplasma infection might pose a severe threat by
releasing free ammonia into the circulation. The released am-
monia is then converted back into urea in the liver, which pro-
vides more substrate to Ureaplasma, and thus a cycle of urea
hydrolysis and hepatic urea production is established.346
In their initial study, Bharat et al346 performed microbio-
logic examination (PCR, specialized culture, and molecular
resistance profiling) of specimens taken from 6 lung trans-
plant recipients who developed hyperammonemia syndrome
posttransplantation. They found evidence of systemic infec-
tion withU. urealyticum orU. parvum in all 6 cases, but they
found no evidence of infection in 20 control lung transplant
recipients with normal ammonia concentrations.346
Ureaplasma is not known to colonize normal healthy
lungs, and why hyperammonemia is reported more fre-
quently in lung transplant recipients than recipients of other
solid organ transplants is not known. One theory relates to
aspiration at the time of injury causing death.345 Ureaplasma
is able to colonize the oral cavity, with possible routes of
transmission, including sexual transmission from the genito-
urinary tract of a partner.350 An aspiration event at the time
of injury could then cause the organism to be drawn down
into the lungs, and given that Ureaplasma does not grow in
routinely performed bacteriological cultures, it would not
be detected on standard BAL culture.345
NAT is the fastest detection method if Ureaplasma is
suspected, and culture is also available. Bharat et al reported
that Ureaplasma species are susceptible to macrolides,fluoroquinolones, and tetracyclines; however, they also ob-
served the emergence of resistance in their case series of
6 patients. At this time, routine donor testing forUreaplasma
is not suggested.
Urinary Tract Infections
Urinary tract infections (UTIs) and pyelonephritis are com-
mon among potential donors due to bacteria ascending along
the urethral catheter. Any suspected UTIs in potential donors
should be confirmed by urine culture, and potential kidney
donors with UTI should be investigated to rule out upper
tract infection. In case of a UTI restricted to the lower urinary
tract, kidneys may be used as they are not infected. All other
organs can be safely used for transplantation.
Before organ retrieval, the donor should be treated with
antibiotics for 24 to 48 hours or until there is documented
resolution of the infection.49 The final decision about organ
utilization should be made at the time of organ recovery.5
Posttransplant treatment of the recipient may reduce the risk
of donor-derived infection. In general, however, there is no
need to treat the recipient of a nonkidney organ from a de-
ceased donor with nonbacteremic, localized infection that
does not involve the transplanted organ (excluding meningi-
tis cases).49
European guidelines state that in the case of UTI without
bacteremia, all nonkidney organs can be used safely for
transplant, and that uncomplicated UTI/bacteruria is in most
cases not a contraindication for the utilization of kidneys,
provided adequate antibiotic treatment is given to the donor
and recipient.5
FUNGAL, PARASITIC, AND OTHER INFECTIONS
Toxoplasma gondii
Epidemiology
Toxoplasma gondii is a protozoan (coccidian) parasite of
mammals, which reproduces in cat species but has awide inter-
mediate host range.351 It is one of the most common parasitic
infections of humans and other warm-blooded animals.351 Ex-
posure is extremely common in all regions of the world, al-
though there is substantial geographical variation in rates of
T. gondii (see Table 33). It is estimated that 16% to 40% of
the populations of the United States and United Kingdom are
infected, whereas in Central and South America and parts of
Europe, infection rates are as high as 80%.353 A study of preg-
nant women in Australia found 35% had IgG antibodies to T.
gondii.354 Transmission can occur due to:
• ingestion of undercooked meat containing Toxoplasma cysts;
• ingestion of contaminated soil (eg, via unwashed fruit or veg-
etables) containing cat feces;
• ingestion of cat feces via cleaning a cat's litter box, gardening,
contact with sandpits, and so on;
• transplacental transfer from mother to fetus.
It is believed that themajority of infections that occur glob-
ally are due to ingestion of cysts in infected meat, or oocysts
in food or water contaminated with cat feces.351 Geographi-
cal variation in T. gondii infection is hypothesized to be due
to (i) the relative level of contamination in the environment
with oocysts, and (ii) local culinary traditions with respect
tomeat preparation (eg, a preference for raw or undercooked
TABLE 33.
Median rate of acquired T, gondii per 100000 population by WHO region with 95% CIs, 2010352
Region Africa Americas Eastern Mediterranean Europe South East Asia Western Pacific Region
Rate (95% CI) 229 (132–386) 159 (92–261) 195 (118–292) 119 (79–180) 137 (55–244) 116 (63–176)
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sporozoites from fecal oocysts transform into tachyzoites
and penetrate intestinal epithelial cells and divide rapidly in
the intestine. T. gondii is then spread to organs and tissues
by invasion of the lymphatics and blood, and is able to mul-
tiply in almost any cell in the body.351 In immunocompetent
hosts, symptoms are usually either absent or mild, such as
swollen lymph nodes, headache, fever, and fatigue.
The immune response to T. gondii infection involves both
humoral and cellular factors; however, immunity does not
eradicate infection as cysts can persist for years after acute infec-
tion. After proliferating, tachyzoites transform into bradyzoites,
which are less susceptible to proteolytic enzymes and form la-
tent intracellular cysts mainly in muscle tissues and the brain
(although visceral organs including lungs, liver, and kidneys
may also be affected).351 Intact cysts may persist for the life
of the host, and can, therefore, be transmitted directly by
solid organ transplantation. Intact cysts are unlikely to cause
harm in immunocompetent persons; however, in immuno-
compromised persons, the rupture of a tissue cyst may result
in bradyzoites being transformed into tachyzoites, followed
by renewed replication. Alternatively, if the donor has an acute
T. gondii infection at the time of donation, then tachyzoites
transmitted to the recipient may persist and continue prolifer-
ating, resulting in severe symptoms, complications, and death.
Donor Screening and Risk Minimization
Organs which contain tissue cysts infected with T. gondii
carry the risk of primary infection in a naive and immunosup-
pressed recipient. Hearts are at higher risk of containing T.
gondii cysts compared with other organs, and serological tests
for toxoplasma are usually included among standard screening
tests for heart donors in most jurisdictions.5,355 Although a posi-
tive serological test forT. gondii is not a contraindication todona-
tion, it may inform the need for prophylaxis in heart recipients.
Numerous serological tests exist for the detection of T.
gondii antibodies, including both IgM and IgG. IgM anti-
bodies appear sooner after infection than IgG, and disappear
faster after recovery. NAT can be used to diagnose active in-
fection356,357; however, given that active infection is rare and
the goal of donor screening is primarily to detect latent
toxoplasma in the heart and other organs resulting from
past infection, international guidelines recommend serologi-
cal testing only for pretransplant screening of potential organ
donors.5,29,32 Donor and recipient toxoplasma IgG are gen-
erally recommended as routine for cardiac transplant recipi-
ents, with donor testing for acute toxoplasma (IgM, NAT)
used only in an appropriate clinical context (ie, where there
is clinical suspicion of acute toxoplasmosis).
Transmission
Toxoplasma gondii transmission by organ transplantation
has been reported multiple times in the literature, most com-
monly by heart transplantation, followed by kidney and livertransplantation.19,358-362 Cases of toxoplasmosis after
bowel and pancreas transplantation have also been re-
ported.362,363 Presenting symptoms typically are nonspecific,
including fever, respiratory distress, neurological manifesta-
tions, and bone marrow suppression.362 Cerebral toxoplas-
mosis, although a well-known complication in HIV patients,
is extremely rare in transplant recipients.363 The majority
of cases are diagnosed within 90 days of transplantation,
although the median time to onset of symptoms in cases
of donor-acquired primary toxoplasmosis is shorter—
approximately 15 to 25 days posttransplant—than for re-
activation of latent infection.19,359,361,362,364 Primary toxoplas-
mosis is also significantly more lethal: a review of published
cases of primary toxoplasmosis after kidney transplantation
found a mortality rate of 50%, with fatal outcomes confined
to those patients who developed clinical evidence of toxoplas-
mosis less than 90 days posttransplant.364
Mortality from toxoplasmosis posttransplantation is highest
in those patients with disseminated disease, or where there is a
delay in diagnosis and targeted treatment.361 In 1 such case of
fatal disseminated toxoplasmosis after liver transplantation
from a seropositive donor to a seronegative recipient, the recip-
ient developed symptoms 12 days posttransplant and was ini-
tially treated for MRSA and then for CMV after this was
detected on BAL performed on day 26 posttransplant.365 The
patient's condition did not improve, and on day 40, she devel-
oped acute respiratory failure with shock. On admission to the
ICU, a second BAL was performed and direct microscopy
revealed T. gondii tachyzoites, at which point, therapy with
pyrimethamine and sulfadiazine was initiated. The patient,
however, died 5 days later. The recipients of the other organs
from the same donor (heart, lungs, kidneys and cornea) showed
no evidence of T. gondii infection more than 9 months
posttransplant: all of these recipients were seropositive for
toxoplasmosis before transplantation.365
In a similar case of a fatal outcomeafter delayeddiagnosis and
treatment, a 10-year-old recipient of a small bowel transplant de-
veloped fever, bilateral frontotemporal headaches, abdominal
pain, vomiting, and diarrhea 3 months posttransplant.362 Blood
and CSF bacterial, viral, and fungal cultures were all negative,
andCMVandEBVwere not detectable by PCR. Shewas treated
with beta-lactam antibiotics and briefly improved before de-
teriorating again. Treatment for steroid-resistant rejection on
day 23 of hospitalization precipitated respiratory distress and
acute deterioration 2 days later.Her antimicrobial regimenwas
changed to imipenem, fluconazole, liposomal amphotericin,
amikacin, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, and cidofovir, but
she died of multiorgan failure on hospital day 27. Autopsy
showed severe diffuse pulmonary edema for the lungs and
patchy recent hemorrhages, and microscopic examination
demonstrated small numbers of encysted T. gondii organ-
isms.362 Fatal cases of toxoplasmosis after delayed diagno-
sis and treatment have also been reported in heart and
multivisceral transplantation.363,366
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Australia after kidney transplantation from a common do-
nor.19 Both of the Australian cases died 5 weeks after trans-
plantation, within a few days of each other; neither was on
active toxoplasma prophylaxis.19 The first kidney recipient
experienced a rise in serum creatinine, liver function tests,
and lactate dehydrogenase on day 23 posttransplant, and a
MAG3 scan showed a lower pole infarct. He deteriorated
on day 29, becoming agitated and tachypneic, hypoxic, and
hypotensive. A chest x-ray revealed lower zone opacities
and broad-spectrum antibiotics were commenced, but the
patient's condition worsened, and he died on day 30 post-
transplant from cardiogenic shock. Post mortem examina-
tion showed intracytoplasmic inclusions in the heart, liver,
and lungs, but not in the transplanted kidney. The second
kidney recipient presented on day 28 with a fever, hypoten-
sion, thrombocytopenia, abnormal liver function tests, and
widespread, bilateral interstitial infiltrates were observed on
chest x-ray. Broad-spectrum antibiotics were commenced
but the patient developed multiorgan failure and died on
day 32 from cardiogenic shock. Post mortem examination
showed presence of T. gondii in the lungs, heart, liver and
brain, but not in the transplanted kidney.
The donor in the cases above was a 45-year-old woman
with a history of major depression, alcohol abuse and multi-
ple suicide attempts, whowas found collapsed at home, unre-
sponsive and cyanosed: there was no clinical suspicion that
the donor had died from acute toxoplasmosis. Retrospective
testing of donor serum showed positive IgG but indetermi-
nate IgM antibodies; analysis of sections of renal tissue from
the donor did not show signs of T. gondii infection and NAT
testing on post mortem liver tissue from the donor was nega-
tive forT. gondii. The authors concluded that the donor most
likely had an acute infection at the time of death, and that—
because T. gondii may reside inside leukocytes or mononu-
clear cells—transmission probably occurred at the time of
transplantation via transfer of these cells.19 Subsequent to this
unexpected transmission event, the center where these cases
occurred introduced trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole prophy-
laxis for 6 months posttransplant as standard practice.19Recipient Management and Outcomes
Prophylactic use of trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole
(co-trimoxazole), atovaquone, or combinations, including
pyrimethamine dapsone and folinic acid, or pyrimethamine-
sulfadiazine have been demonstrated to be effective against
T. gondii by multiple studies, and European guidelines recom-
mend their use for recipients at risk of T. gondii infection—
usually recipients of heart and vascularized composite
allografts where muscle tissue is involved.5,41,355 Trimethoprim-
sulfamethoxazole is additionally effective against Listeria
monocytogenes,Nocardia asteroids, and P. jeroveci. Trime-
thoprim-sulfamethoxazole prophylaxis for at least 3months
posttransplant (but usually 6 months or longer, depending
on the organ) is currently standard international practice
for recipients at risk of T. gondii transmission.367
Serological tests have poor sensitivity for toxoplasma anti-
bodies in immunosuppressed patients; therefore, in patients
with a clinical suspicion of primary toxoplasmosis post-
transplant, NAT is the best diagnostic strategy.364,365 A pos-
itive toxoplasmosis PCR of the BAL or CSF can make anearly diagnosis of disease; however, a positive PCR from a
blood sample without evidence of organ involvement does
not confirm diagnosis of acute disease: definitive diagnosis
of toxoplasmosis requires the identification of parasites in bi-
opsy samples.367
Combination therapywith oral sulfadiazine and pyrimeth-
amine or IV trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole is the preferred
treatment for acute toxoplasmosis. These drugs are beneficial
when administered in the acute stage of infection when
there is active replication, and synergistically act against
the tachyzoites during active infection or reactivation. Al-
ternative drugs for the treatment of clinicalT. gondii infection
include diaminodiphenylsulfone, atovaquone, spiramycin,
and clindamycin.351
Malaria
Epidemiology
There were 266 notifications of malaria in Australia in
2016, compared with 373 in the 2013/2014 season (June-
July), and compared to an average annual number of cases
of 434 over the 5 years from 2008/2009 to 2012/2013.257
This is consistent with a significant decline in malaria notifica-
tions overall in Australia since 2004 to 2005, corresponding to
a global decline in malaria incidence over the period from
2000 to 2015.
Australia remains free of endemic malaria: all cases were
reported in travellers ormilitary personnel returning from en-
demic areas or in refugee arrivals. Despite the current absence
of endemic malaria, suitable vector mosquitos are present in
northern Australia and the area is “malaria receptive”. Lim-
ited transmission does also sometimes occur in the Torres
Strait after importation. There was 1 case ofmalaria acquired
on Saibai Island in 2013, and 7 locally acquired cases in the
Torres Strait in 2011.257
The number and rate of malaria notifications in 2016 was
highest in the 35- to 39-year age group (23 cases, 2.9 per 100
000 population), and the majority of cases (64%) were in
males. Figure 14 shows the malaria notification rate in
Australia in 2016 by age and sex.
New Zealand is also free of endemic malaria. There were
42 notifications of malaria in New Zealand in 2017, the vast
majority of which were in the 20- to 39-year age group.368 By
comparison there were 26 malaria notifications in 2016, and
38 in 2015.368 All cases were acquired overseas, most com-
monly in sub-Saharan Africa countries, followed by India,
then Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.39
Donor Screening and Risk Minimization
The possibility of malaria infection should be considered
for donors with previous residence in or travel to endemic
areas, especially if the potential donor has unexplained fe-
brile illness. All 4 of the main plasmodia species that infect
humans—P. ovale, P. vivax, P. malariae, and P. falciparum—
have been described in solid organ transplantation.355
US guidelines recommend donor testing for malaria with
thick and thin blood smears if the donor is epidemiologically
at high risk for infection.355 This includes donors who have
spent time in malarious regions within the previous 3 years.
UK guidelines state that febrile donors with a recent travel
history (<1 year) require a malarial screen (blood film and
PCR) before donation.29 If a donor was born or has lived
FIGURE 14. Notification rate of malaria in Australia in 2016, by age group at sex (source: http://www9.health.gov.au/cda/source/cda-
index.cfm).
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life, a validated antimalarial antibody test should be per-
formed, but donation may proceed pending the results.
When a recipient has been found to have received an organ
from a donor whose serum contains malarial antibody, a risk
analysis must be undertaken with the assistance of the HPA
Malaria Reference Laboratory. This will require testing for
the presence of malarial parasitemia in both the donor and
the recipient. Follow-up of the recipients of organs from
high-risk donors for appearance of malarial symptoms is rec-
ommended, irrespective of the donor antibody status.
Because Australia and New Zealand are not endemic for
malaria, malaria antibody testing is not routinely available.
Donors with fever and a history of recent travel to an en-
demic country should have malaria excluded by thick/thin
films and PCR. Asymptomatic donors should be screened
by thick/thin films and PCR if there is a history of previous
residence in an endemic country. The decision to proceed to
transplantation will likely be made on the basis of negative
blood films as PCR is usually delayed. The recipient can be
treated routinely for malaria if the donor result returns
positive.
Transmission
Although malaria is a rarely reported complication of or-
gan transplantation outside of nonendemic countries, there
have been several documented cases of donor-derived ma-
laria transmission including recipients of kidneys (6 cases),
livers (4 cases), and hearts (4 cases).369-375 A donor history
of recent travel to or prior residence in an endemic country
should prompt suspicion of malaria in recipients with unex-
plained fever after transplantation.367
Based on published case reports, recipients of livers and
hearts with donor-derived malaria tend to have worse out-
comes compared to kidney recipients, which is thought to re-
late to the higher intensity of immunosuppressive regimen in
liver and heart transplantation.367 Additional hypotheses for
why kidney recipients fare better include longer cold ischemia
times for kidneys than other organs, which may decrease the
amount of active transmitted Plasmodium; similarly, as kid-
neys are retrieved at the end of the surgical procedure, they
may have been more thoroughly flushed than other organs,removing more of the before retrieval.369 Donor-derived
malaria is particularly fatal to liver recipients, as parasitized
hepatocytes are transplanted with the allograft, resulting in
high-level parasitemia; moreover, antimalarial therapy can
be hepatotoxic, contributing to graft failure.367 For example,
in a case of fatal P. falciparum transmission from a donor to
a liver recipient, the recipient became febrile day 20 post-
transplant and blood films revealed high-level parasitemia.372
Quinine therapy resolved the fever and parasitemia; however,
the recipient died on day 51 posttransplant. The donor in this
case was an 8-year-old child from the Ivory Coast who had ar-
rived in France 2 months before death. Retrospective exami-
nation of donor sera, liver and spleen samples showed high
antibody titers against P. falciparum, malarial pigment in both
organs, macrophage reactions in the spleen and a suspected
intraerthrocytic trophozoite in the liver.372
Demonstrating the different outcomes of malaria infection
for kidney versus heart and liver recipients, Chiche et al369
describe the outcomes for 4 recipients of organs from a donor
who was retrospectively confirmed to be infected with P.
falciparum. Eight days posttransplantation, schizonts were
observed on a routine blood sample taken from the liver re-
cipient, and diagnosis of malaria was confirmed by thin
and thick blood smears, which demonstrated high-level
parasitemia. The patient was treated with 25 mg/kg per day
of quinine; however, an alteration of neurological status
occurred, and they went into a deep coma within 3 days.
Vibramycin was added to quinine, but immunosuppressive
therapy was not altered. There was an improvement in status
5 days after starting quinine and parasitemia disappeared, but
there was a corresponding elevation of liver function tests.
Liver enzymes began to improve 1 month later, and after
3months, the patient had recovered. The heart recipient devel-
oped fever and neurological disorders on day 5 posttransplant,
along with acute renal failure with severe acidosis, abnormal
liver tests, cytolysis, anemia, and thrombopenia. At this point,
information about suspicion of malaria in the donor became
available, and the patient was rapidly treated. However, the
patient died from multiple organ failure caused by active ma-
laria infection 17 days posttransplant. The 2 recipients of the
donor's kidneys showed no signs of infection when diagnosis
was made in the liver and heart recipients. Prophylactic
66 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comantimalarial chemotherapy was given, and both patients re-
mained in good health.369
Plasmodium vivax infection tends to be less severe than P.
falciparum infection.367 In a case of P. vivax transmission
from a donor originally from Zaire to 2 Swiss kidney recipi-
ents, both recipients recovered quickly after treatment.370
The donor had been in good health before death from an in-
tracerebral hemorrhage 2 months after entry to Switzerland.
Blood smear was negative for parasites, and the donor's red
cells were Duffy-negative. Despite no indications of malaria
in the donor at the time of organ retrieval, the 2 kidney recip-
ients became febrile on days 9 and 16 posttransplant respec-
tively, with P. vivax detected on day 25. Both recipients
received chloroquine treatment for 3 days and subsequent
smears were negative.370 In a case of P. vivax transmission
by liver transplantation, parasitemia was successfully cleared
after antimalarial treatment; however, the patient died sev-
eral months later from graft failure as a result of hepatotoxic-
ity from chloroquine and primaquine therapy.371 The donor
in this case was originally from Cameroon, having immi-
grated to Germany 18 months before, with no clinical signs
of active malaria infection at the time of death. Retrospective
serological testing showed antibody titers against P. vivax
and P. falciparum. Both kidneys, the heart, and the liver were
transplanted: only the liver recipient and the recipient of one
of the kidneys developed febrile illness. The heart recipient
was suspected to have a subclinical malarial infection on
the basis of a positive titer for P. vivax 12 months after trans-
plantation, and again at 22 and 25 months posttransplant,
thoughwithout symptoms of infection. The liver recipient de-
veloped a high-grade fever on day 28 posttransplant, at
which point, P. vivax were found in a Giemsa-stained thin
smear taken for blood count. The patient was treated with
8 days of oral chloroquine, followed by 14 days of oral
primaquine, which resolved the fever within 4 days although
a slow rise of bilirubin and liver enzymes was noted in paral-
lel with antimalaria therapy. Elevation of liver function tests
was progressive, and liver biopsies showed increasing cen-
trolobular toxic parenchymal cell damage and persisting
malaria pigment deposits. After progressive cholestasis, the
patient died of liver failure 6 months posttransplant.371 The
kidney recipient who developedmalaria infectionwas treated
with a 1-day course of mefloquine (total dose, 1500 mg), af-
ter which the patient was no longer febrile, and there was no
further evidence of malaria infection.Recipient Management
Although malaria can be fatal in transplant recipients,
early detection and appropriate specific therapy will usually
result in prompt recovery. Patient outcomes will depend on
the species (P. falciparum is associated with worse outcomes),
the presence of any other infections, and any issues with drug
toxicity.355 Quinine can interact with cyclosporine metabo-
lism, lowering cyclosporine blood levels.376
Treatment of malaria requires the identification of the spe-
cific plasmodium species and knowledge of the geographical
distribution of sensitivity patterns.355 Chloroquine can be used
to treat P. vivax, P. malariae, P. ovale, and uncomplicated P.
falciparum from chloroquine-susceptible regions. Uncompli-
cated P. falciparum originating from a chloroquine-resistant
region may be treated with an artemisinin combinationtherapy, atovaquone-proguanil, quinine-based regimen, or
mefloquine.355 Quinine and mefloquine, however, significantly
interact with calcineurin inhibitors.367 Severe cases of P.
falciparum should be treated with IV artesunate, followed
by doxycycline, tetracycline, or clindamycin. In cases of P.
vivax andP. ovale infection, primaquine should be administered
to prevent relapse (after excludingG6PDdeficiency).355P. vivax
resistant to chloroquine has been observed in Oceania.355
Strongyloides stercoralis
Epidemiology
Strongyloides is an intestinal nematode that is endemic to
tropical or subtropical regions of the world. Infection is
transmitted by skin contact with soil contaminated with hu-
man waste, and prevalence is, therefore, directly related to
sanitation and hygiene conditions. Outside of the endemic re-
gions of Southeast Asia, Central and South America, and
Africa, Strongyloides infection is also found in poor communi-
ties, former war veterans, refugees, immigrants and travelers,
and people occupationally exposed to soil (eg, farmers and
miners) in parts of the United States, Europe, United
Kingdom, and Australia.377,378 A study of Vietnam veterans
resident in South Australia found Strongyloides seropositivity
of 11.6% in this cohort.379 Similarly, a high prevalence
(27.5%) of Strongyloides larvae in stool samples fromAustra-
lian ex-prisoners of war held in Southeast Asia during World
War II has been reported.380 Cross-sectional surveys of se-
lected immigrant/refugee groups in Australia has found posi-
tive or equivocal serology for S. stercoralis of 11% among
East Africans, 42% among Cambodians, and 24% among
Laotians.381,382 Additional risk factors for Strongyloides infec-
tion include individual-level low socioeconomic status, institu-
tionalization, and alcoholism.367
In a retrospective review of clinical records from Royal
Darwin Hospital conducted in 1993, a total of 68 cases of
Strongyloides stercoralis confirmed by stoolmicroscopywere
identified, of which 64 were aboriginal persons, and more
than half of which were children younger 5 years.383 A simi-
lar retrospective analysis conducted in Queensland found an
overall infection rate between 1972 and 1991 of 1.97%, al-
though there was wide geographic variation in prevalence.
Prevalence was highest in northern regions of Queensland
with summer wet seasons: the highest average prevalence
was observed at Doomadgee (12%), with a peak of 27.5%
in the wet season. Aswas observed in the Northern Territory,
children were the major reservoirs of Strongyloides infection
in this study.384
The Strongyloides life cycle has both free-living and para-
sitic stages. Adult female worms infecting the human small
intestine lay eggs in the intestinal mucosa that hatch into
rhabditiform larvae, which are then excreted in the stool.385
In moist, warm conditions, environmental rhabditiform lar-
vae can molt into infective filariform larvae or develop into
free-living adult worms. Infection in humans generally occurs
through dermal penetration by filariform larvae, which enter
the blood stream and then migrate to the small intestine. This
migration frequently occurs via the pulmonary route: larvae
are carried by the bloodstream to the lungs, where they pen-
etrate the alveolar spaces and then ascend the tracheobron-
chial tree migrate to the pharynx/trachea where swallowing
allows them to enter the gastrointestinal tract.385 Hence, in
acute strongyloidiasis, the first sign of infection is typically
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 67a local reaction at the infection site, followed by pulmonary
symptoms (cough, tracheal irritation, dyspnea) several days
later, then gastrointestinal symptoms (abdominal pain, diar-
rhea, constipation, nausea and vomiting, and anorexia) ap-
proximately 2+ weeks after infection as larvae migrate to
the gastrointestinal tract.385 As some rhabditiform larvae
transform into invasive filariform larvae before they are ex-
creted in the stool, Strongyloides has the ability to reinfect
the host by invading the intestinal wall or perianal skin. This
cycle of autoinoculation allows Strongyloides infection to
persist in the host indefinitely.
Althoughmost chronically infected individuals are asymp-
tomatic, in immunocompromised patients the rate of molting
of rhabditiform larvae into filariform larvae is increased such
that the autoinoculation cycle can accelerate to the level of
life-threatening hyperinfection.385,386 In solid organ trans-
plant recipients, Strongyloides infection may initially present
with vague gastrointestinal symptoms. Hyperinfection symp-
toms include pyrexia, gastrointestinal pain, bloody diarrhea,
ileus, anorexia, nausea, vomiting, sore throat, difficulty swal-
lowing, dyspnea, pneumonitis with bilateral infiltrates, and
in rare cases, intestinal or pulmonary obstruction.367,385
The numerous larvae may cause mucosal ulceration at any
level of the gastrointestinal tract, and esophagitis, gastritis,
duodenitis, jejunitis, ileitis, colitis, and proctitis have all
been reported in association with hyperinfection.385 Purpu-
ric rash may be present, and eosinophilia may be a clue to
Strongyloides infection in some cases; however, it is usually
absent with steroid therapy.367 The defining characteristic
of hyperinfection is a huge increase in the numbers of larvae
in the stool or sputum. Disseminated infection occurs when
the larvae migrate to organs outside of those normally in-
volved in the pulmonary autoinfective cycle (gastrointestinal
tract, peritoneum, lungs).385 Organs affected in reported
cases of disseminated Strongyloides infection include mesen-
teric lymph nodes, gallbladder, liver, heart, pancreas, skele-
tal muscle, kidneys, ovaries, and brain.385 Disseminated
Strongyloidesmay be complicated by bacteremia andmenin-
gitis resulting from gram-negative bacteria migrating outside
of the intestinal tract by attachment to filariform larvae or
via disrupted intestinal mucosa.385 Gram-negative sepsis is
also life-threatening—moreover, it may obscure the underly-
ing diagnosis of strongyloidiasis.387 Hyperinfection is fatal
in approximately 50% of cases; the mortality rate in dissem-
inated strongyloidiasis is up to 80%.385
Glucocorticoids, at any dosage, are directly associated
with the transformation of chronic strongyloidiasis to hyper-
infection.385,388 The majority of cases of Stongyloides hyper-
infection in organ transplant recipients appear to have been
precipitated by increased glucocorticoid doses in response
to rejection.385,389 Donor preconditioning with high-dose
steroids may also reactivate Stongyloides in the latently in-
fected donor, causing disseminated disease that may then be
transmitted by solid-organ transplantation.390
Infection with HTLV-1 is associated with increased preva-
lence of S. stercoralis infection, and with a greater likelihood
of hyperinfection syndrome.391,392Donor Screening and Risk Minimization
US guidelines recommend routine screening of donors
coming from endemic regions for Strongyloides IgG and thatrecipients of organs from deceased donors testing positive for
Strongyloides antibodies should receive ivermectin post-
transplant.393 Because of the longevity of the parasitic infec-
tion, screening is warranted even for very remote histories
of travel to endemic regions or for residence in places where
the disease was considered endemic decades ago should
prompt screening.385 Eosinophilia is a common marker of
helminth infections, and thus donors with unexplained eosin-
ophilia or with gastrointestinal symptoms should also be
evaluated for Strongyloides.355,387
The CDC guidelines recommend testing with Strongyloides
IgG ELISA; stool screening is recommended only when sero-
logical testing is unavailable or when serological findings are
negative in a patient with symptoms, eosinophilia, or a known
history of exposure.387 Stool testing has poor sensitivity as lar-
vae are excreted intermittently and in small quantities; the sen-
sitivity of a single specimen is only 15% to 30%, although this
increases to nearly 100% if stool specimens are collected and
examined in an expert laboratory on seven consecutive days
(obviously unfeasible in the context of organ donation).394 Al-
though useful for detecting chronic/latent infections, serologi-
cal testing is less sensitive in the detection of new infections
(~85%)367 Negative serology results should be interpreted
with caution in the context of the potential donor's medical
and social history.387
The New York Organ Donor Network commenced
targeting screening for Stronglyoides in 2010.395 From 2010
to 2013, of 1103 potential donors, 233 (21%) were identified
as being at increased risk andwere tested for Stronglyoides an-
tibody before procurement. Of this number, 10 (4.3%) tested
positive, of which 7 became organ donors, with organs
transplanted into 18 recipients. Fourteen recipients received
prophylaxis; none developed strongyloidiasis.395Transmission
In the context of transplantation, Strongyloides is most
commonly seen as reactivation of dormant disease in the re-
cipient. Although donor-derived Strongyloides transmission
is rare, cases have been reported involving kidney, kidney-
pancreas, liver, heart, and intestinal allografts (though it should
be noted that several of these cases the attribution of transmis-
sion as donor-derived was not proven).387,389,390,395–400 One
of the reasons that cases of donor-derived Strongyloides trans-
mission are not reported more commonly—which is surprising
given the high rates of chronic infection in endemic regions and
the difficulties of screening—is that cyclosporine is strongly
parasiticidal against Strongyloides. After cyclosporine became
a standard part of immunosuppressive regimens in the 1990s,
a corresponding decline in case reports of Strongyloides
hyperinfection was noted; there is also experimental evidence
to support an anthelmintic effect of cyclosporine A on S.
stercoralis.385 A case of Strongyloides hyperinfection occur-
ring in a kidney transplant recipient immediately after cyclo-
sporine A withdrawal due to an episode of acute rejection
provides further evidence of an anthelmintic effect of cyclo-
sporine A.397
Table 34 presents summaries of cases of donor-derived
Strongyloides transmission reported in the peer-reviewed lit-
erature (deceased donors). In the vast majority of reported
cases of donor-derived Strongyloides infection, the donor
was originally from an endemic country and thus was at
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70 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comincreased risk of latent Strongyloides infection. Not all recipi-
ents of organs from infected donors go on to have symptom-
atic Strongyloides infection—in a review of US cases
reported to the CDC between 2009 and 2013, 11 of 20 recip-
ients was symptomatic, with the most common symptom be-
ing gastrointestinal complaints.395,398 As Strongyloides is not
commonly seen in high-income countries, symptoms in trans-
plant recipients are often initially misattributed to primary
CMV infection or CMV reactivation, to bacterial infection,
or to a reaction to immunosuppressive medications, delaying
diagnosis and appropriate treatment.395,396,400 The median
time to onset of symptoms for the cases reported in Table 34
is 49 days compared with a median time to diagnosis of
69 days. Of 18 recipients with donor-derived Stronglyoides in-
fection, there were 3 reported deaths: 2 from bacteremia/
septicemia and 1 from respiratory failure. In each of the fatal
cases, the patient had developed Strongyloides hyperinfection
syndrome.
Where treatmentwas administered only until parasitological
cure, Strongyloides infection recurred weeks or months later in
some cases.400 There was also a high risk of Strongyloides re-
currence after episodes of rejection treated with high-dose ste-
roids, even if microscopic and PCR evidence indicated that
the previous infection had been resolved.396
Recipient Management
Given the risks of reinfection and hyperinfection associated
with Strongyloides, the goal of treatment is the total eradica-
tion of the parasite, not just symptom management.385 Iver-
mectin is the first-line drug of choice against Strongyloides.
Albendazolemay also be used to treat Strongyloides, but is less
effective and has a worse side effect profile than ivermec-
tin.385,403,404 A reduction in immunosuppression is neces-
sary, and it is particularly important that steroids be
tapered rapidly.387 Broad-spectrumantibioticsmay be indicated
if bacteremia,meningitis, or pneumonitis are suspected.367Mal-
absorption of drugs can be a barrier to effective treatment—for
those patients with ileus, alternative methods of medication de-
livery may be required, such as via nasogastric tube, intrave-
nously, or by enema or subcutaneous administration. In a case
of disseminated infection in a patient with severemalabsorption
and paralytic ileus, veterinary IV ivermectin (3 doses of 200
μg/kg, 48 hours apart and a follow-up dose 1 week later)
was effective.405 The patient recovered but relapsed a month
later, at which point an additional 2-week course of daily
oral ivermectin was administered, after which all further
stool samples were negative. Treatment is recommended to
continue for at least 2 weeks after the parasite is no longer de-
tectable in stool or sputum.390 In patients with hyperinfection
syndrome, ivermectin is the drug of choice, and longer treat-
ment courses may be required.
Other Fungal and Parasitic Infections
Trypanosoma cruzi
Chagas disease, caused by the parasite T. cruzi, is endemic
to Central and South America. Asymptomatic parasitemia is
more common than symptomatic disease in potential do-
nors.355 Antibodies against T. cruzi indicate a former infec-
tion; however, an issue for donor screening is the high rate
of false positives yielded by current serological assays. Acute
parasitemia may be detected by PCR or the Strout test, butthese are generally not sufficiently sensitive for screening of
organs and donors because parasitemia is intermittent.5
US guidelines recommend targeted T. cruzi screening for
potential donors born in Mexico, Central America, and
South America, with positive test results to be confirmed by
secondary testing.393 Because T. cruzi has a predilection for
muscle, heart, and neurological cells, the utilization of hearts
fromdonors infectedwithT. cruzi is not recommended; how-
ever, transplantation of kidneys and livers from infected do-
nors may be considered with the informed consent of the
recipient(s).60 UK guidelines are more restrictive, and state
that the following individuals are contraindicated from do-
nating organs (unless they have been shown to not have anti-
body in their blood by a validated test for T. cruzi performed
within the past 6 months)29:
• those born in South America or Central America (including
Southern Mexico);
• those whose mothers were born in these countries;
• those who may have received a blood transfusion in
these countries;
• thosewho have lived and/or worked in rural subsistence farm-
ing communities in these countries for a continuous period of
4 weeks or more.
Prophylactic treatment (benznidazole) in D+/R− combina-
tions has had some success.406 All recipients of organs from
Chagas disease-positive donors should be closely monitored
for evidence of disease transmission, with testing by PCR ormi-
croscopy of blood.407,408 Treatment (benznidazole, nifurtimox)
should be initiated promptly upon recognition of parasitemia.
Adjustments to immunosuppression may also be warranted,
and certain immunosuppressive therapies (eg, thymoglobine
or mycophenolate) may need to be substituted in recipients of
organs from Chagas disease-positive donors.409
InAustralia andNewZealand,T. cruzi serology is unlikely
to be available in a timely fashion. In the case of donors born
in Central or South America, hearts should not be used (un-
less a negative antibody test is available) but other organs
may be considered with informed consent.
Leishmaniasis
Leishmaniasis is a protozoan parasite that is spread by the
bite of a sandfly, with dogs being its major animal reservoir.
There are about 20 different species of Leishmania, affecting
an estimated 12 million people worldwide.367 Leishmania
infection is clinically classified as (1) cutaneous leishmaniasis,
predominantly occurring in Afghanistan, Algeria, Brazil,
Colombia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Peru,
Saudi Arabia, and the SyrianArabRepublic; (2)mucocutane-
ous leishmaniasis, 90%ofwhich is found in the Plurinational
State of Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru; and (3) visceral leishmani-
asis, 90% of which is found in Brazil, Ethiopia, India,
Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan.410 No autochthonous
cases of leishmaniasis have been reported in Australia; how-
ever, imported cases are reported relatively regularly, affect-
ing refugee populations and persons who have lived in or
travelled to endemic regions. A study of patient biopsies
and bone marrow specimens sent to St Vincent's Hospital
Sydney from July 2008 toMarch 2014 found that cutaneous
leishmaniasis was the most common manifestation in this
population (94%), and approximately 47% of affected pa-
tients in this study had a history of travel to or residence in
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 71Afghanistan.411 Imported cases of leishmaniasis are becom-
ing increasingly common in nonendemic locations including
Australia, North America, and Northern Europe as a conse-
quence of increased international travel and international
migration.412,413
In the general population, visceral leishmaniasis is usually
subclinical and establishes lifelong latency, with only approx-
imately 10% to 20%of affected persons developing clinically
overt disease.414Clinical visceral leishmaniasis ismore common
in immunocompromised persons: data from HIV-infected per-
sons show the rate of clinically overt disease to be increased at
least 100 times in this population.414 Leishmaniasis is rarely re-
ported in transplant recipients, butwhen it does occur, it ismost
commonly the result of reactivation of preexisting asymptom-
atic leishmaniasis in the recipient.414 Cutaneous or mucocuta-
neous leishmaniasis are rarely reported in organ transplant
recipients.355,367 The majority of leishmaniasis cases reported
in transplant recipients have occurred in countries of the Med-
iterranean basin (especially Spain, France, and Italy), where
there are a large number of migrants from endemic countries
and highly active transplant programs.414
Donor-transmittedLeishmaniahas been reported twice.367,414
In 1 case, aMacedonian kidney recipientwho had purchased the
organ from an Indian vendor developed visceral leishmaniasis
and died.415 In a Swiss case from 1990, visceral leishmaniasis
was detected in a liver transplant recipient 1 year posttransplant
after the patient developed fever, pancytopenia, and persistent
splenomegaly.416 She was treated with pentavalent antimony
for42days, thoughalthough symptoms improved, bonemarrow
cultures remained positive for Leishmania and significant side
effects developed. Treatment with antimony was stopped and
replaced by ciprofloxacin, then by amphotericin B, with ther-
apy continued for another 40 days, after which the patient re-
mained well.416
Acute visceral leishmaniasis is characterized by fever, he-
patosplenomegaly, bone marrow suppression and hepatic
dysfunction. Presentation in organ transplant recipients is
similar to that of immunocompetent persons: fever with
hepatosplenomegaly, wasting, hypoalbumineuria, and pancyto-
penia. Disseminated leishmaniasis involves infection of the
spleen, liver and bone marrow and, without prompt treatment,
results in multiorgan failure and death.367 An issue for the diag-
nosis of leishmaniasis in the context of transplantation is that
symptomsmaybemisdiagnosedor the diseasemaybe concealed
by the presence of opportunitistic infections with similar symp-
toms, leading to delayed treatment. Without antileishmanial
treatment, visceral leishmaniasis is a fatal disease, with death
caused by intercurrent infections or bleeding.414
Direct examination of amatigotes on bone marrow and
spleen aspiration is the gold standard for diagnosis of visceral
leishmaniasis.414 Antibody detection and NAT have a higher
sensitivity for detection of visceral leishmaniasis in its early
stages, and should be used as an adjunct to diagnosis.363
The recombinant kinesin antigen (rK39) has a sensitivity of
94% for visceral leishmaniasis in solid organ transplant re-
cipients, whereas Leishmania PCR has an estimated sensitiv-
ity of 91%.414
Liposomal amphotericin B is a well-tolerated and effec-
tive treatment for visceral leishmaniasis, with cure rates of
up to 95% in immunocompetent persons, and 84% in
transplant recipients.414,417 Antimony compounds are also
used.Miltefosine has also been shown to be highly effective,but is not currently approved for use in transplant recipi-
ents.367 As relapse is relatively common, secondary prophy-
laxis with intermittent amphotericin or miltefosine may be
warranted.355,367
Given the rarity of donor-derived infection, and the poor
performance, limited availability and lengthy turnaround
time of noninvasive assays,Leishmania testing is not recom-
mended in the evaluation of potential organ donors.354
Candidiasis
Candidiasis in Kidney Transplantation
Donor-derived candidiasis occurs in approximately 1 in
every 1000 kidney transplants, typically as a result of con-
tamination of the preservation fluid before or at the time of
organ procurement.418 Rupture of an abdominal viscus is of-
ten the likely source of the contamination.419 Transmission
from donors with candidemia have also been reported.31
In kidney recipients, donor-derived candidiasis may pres-
ent as candidemia, infected urinoma, perineal hematoma, ab-
scess, or a fungus ball. Vascular complications, for example,
mycotic aneurysm, anastomotic rupture, may also occur. Flu-
conazole is the preferred drug for treatment or prevention
of donor-derived candidiasis.418 In the absence of clinical in-
fection, empiric antifungal therapy can be discontinued after
2 weeks. For patients with clinical or microbiological evi-
dence of infection, therapy should be extended for 4 to
6 weeks, depending on the results of imaging, cultures and
clinical data. If vascular complications are present, a mini-
mum of 6 weeks of antifungal treatment is recommended.418
Where Candida is visualized on stains or grown in preser-
vation fluid, or in cases of documented intestinal perforation
in the donor, prophylactic antifungal treatment should be
commenced in the recipient. United States guidelines state
that donor candiduria is not a contraindication to kidney do-
nation provided the recipient received appropriate antifungal
therapy. Utilization of kidneys from donors with untreated
candidemia, however, is not recommended.418
Candidiasis in Abdominal Organ Transplantation
Contamination of the preservation fluid with Candida
occurs relatively frequently in liver transplantation (~4%
of preservation fluids), and antifungal prophylaxis is commonly
administered to liver transplant recipients considered at risk of
invasive fungal infections.418WhenCandida is grown in preser-
vation fluid cultures or when there is intestinal contamination
during organ recovery, liver transplant recipients should receive
empiric antifungal therapy for 2 weeks.
Studies of the microbiology of donor duodenal contents in
pancreas transplants have also indicated frequent contamination
with Candida, although there are limited data on donor-derived
fungal infections in pancreas transplantation. Treatment as for
kidney transplant recipients is recommended.418
Candidiasis in Thoracic Organ Transplantation
Candida species frequently colonize the oropharynx and
commonly appear in respiratory tract cultures. Antifungal
prophylaxis for approximately 3 months is commonly ad-
ministered in lung transplantation420; however, if prophy-
laxis is not given and donor bronchopulmonary secretions
yield Candida, then empiric therapy should be considered
and continued until the integrity of the bronchial anastomo-
sis is confirmed.
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Cryptococcosis occurs in 0.3% to 5% of transplant recip-
ients,421 primarily as a result of reactivated infection, although
rare cases of de novo donor-derived cryptococcosis infection
have also been described.422-424 Donors with cryptococcosis at
any site have the potential to transmit infection, and the possibil-
ity of cryptococcosis should be considered in donors with undi-
agnosed neurological illness or meningoencephalitis.418 There
has been at least 1 case of disseminated cryptococcosis transmit-
ted by a donor with unrecognized meningoencephalitis.422
Risk factors for cryptococcosis in the donor include the
administration of corticosteroids, iatrogenic immunosup-
pressants, sarcoidosis, end-stage liver or kidney disease, and
rheumatologic disorders.418 Donors withmeningoencephali-
tis and donors with unexplained pulmonary lesions of fever
of unknown cause should be tested for serum cryptococcal
antigen. For donors with meningoencephalitis, evaluation
for cryptococcosis should additionally include CSF crypto-
coccal antigen testing, cultures, neuroimaging, and histopath-
ologic examination of any abnormal tissue.418 As serum
antigen has been demonstrated to have a lower diagnostic
yield for isolated pulmonary cryptococcosis, in cases with fo-
cal disease, histopathological evaluation of biopsy material
should be performed.
United States guidelines recommend that organs from do-
nors with untreated cryptococcal disease be avoided, except
in lifesaving circumstances. In cases where the donor is re-
ceiving antifungal treatment for cryptococcal disease, it is rec-
ommended that organ utilization be considered on a case-by-
case basis, preferably after documentation of mycological
eradication.418 If transmission of cryptococcosis does occur,
mild-to-moderate extraneural infections may be treated with
fluconazole. Treatment for moderate to severe, disseminated
and CNS Cryptococcus consists of induction with a lipid for-
mulation of amphotericin B and flucytosine, followed by
consolidation and maintenance therapy with fluconazole
for a duration of at least 6 to 12 months.418Aspergillus
Donor-derived invasive aspergillosis has been described in
several case reports and is associated with a high rate of graft
loss and mortality. Two case series describe the transmission
of Aspergillus fumigatus by solid organ donors who subse-
quently became multiorgan donors themselves.425,426 The
first case series involved a heavily immunosuppressed liver
transplant recipient who died 15 days posttransplant from
intracerebral hemorrhage and then donated their kidneys
and heart.426 Three weeks after transplantation, the 2 kidney
recipients developed a fever, and both experienced a decrease
in kidney function that was treated with high-dose methyl-
prednisolone. Urine cultures were positive for A. fumigatus.
The first kidney recipient was treated with itraconazole
200 mg/d, but 1 week later was admitted to hospital with a
grand mal seizure, and repeat blood and urine cultures were
positive for CMV and A. fumigatus. Intravenous amphote-
ricin Bwas commenced (0.7mg/kg per day) and immunosup-
pression reduced. Fever persisted and the patient developed
progressive respiratory distress. Transplant nephrectomy
was performed 3 weeks later, and amphotericin B treatment
continued for another 4 weeks. At month 25 posttransplant,
the patient was alive and well on hemodialysis. The secondkidney recipient was commenced on IV amphotericin B
(0.7 mg/kg per day) when A. fumigatus was detected, but
fever persisted and urine cultures remained positive for
A. fumigatus, and transplant nephrectomy was performed
2 months posttransplant. Amphotericin B treatment was
continued to a cumulative dose of 2 g. At month 25
posttransplant, the patient was also alive and well on he-
modialysis. The heart transplant recipient had an unevent-
ful postoperative course, and a thorough investigation
prompted by the clinical course of the kidney recipients
showed no sign of Aspergillosis. However, 5 months
posttranspalntation, the patient was admitted to hospital
with blurred vision and a tender nodule on his right palm.
A pars plana vitrectomy of the right eye was performed,
and a fungal culture of vitreous humor grew A. fumigatus.
A transesophageal echocardiogram showed a large vegeta-
tion on the aortic valve, and an urgent thoracotomy was
performed. The patient was treated with amphotericin B
(intraocular, then systemic, then liposomal), followed by
oral itraconazole, and was well 18 months after the aortic
valve replacement.426
The second case, reported by Mueller et al in 2009, in-
volved a recipient of a heart transplant who died of cerebellar
hemorrhage 5 days posttransplantation and subsequently
donated their kidneys, liver, lungs and islet cells.425 On donor
autopsy, invasive aspergillosis of the brain was found, which
may have been related to repeated infections of the donor's
ventricular assist device experienced before her heart trans-
plant, although repeated tests for fungi were consistently neg-
ative. The first kidney recipient was admitted to hospital on
day 40 posttransplant with weakness, symptoms of UTI,
and diarrhea. Ultrasound revealed renal congestion, and a
cystoscopy showed white floating masses. A direct smear of
a urine sample showed fungal hyphae, and liposomal
amphotericin B was commenced. A CT scan of the abdomen
showed multiple abscesses in the graft, and a transplant ne-
phrectomy was performed on day 46. Antifungal treatment
was switched to voriconazole, and the patient was well at
the end of follow-up (duration not specified). The recipients
of the second kidney recipient and the liver were examined
for aspergillosis on day 48 posttransplant, in response to
the clinical course of the other kidney recipient. Urine cul-
tures from the second kidney recipient yielded A. fumigatus
and voriconazole was commenced. The patient was treated
for 10 months and did not show any signs of aspergillosis.
The liver recipient received voriconazole for 5 months and
showed no signs of aspergillosis. The lung recipient died on
the operating day due to primary nonfunction of the graft,
unrelated to infection.425
Invasive aspergillosis has also been described on multiple
occasions in association with commercial kidney transplan-
tation, with rates of graft loss or death reaching nearly
80%.427
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies are a group of
rare, transmissible, and lethal neurodegenerative disorders
that can occur sporadically, due to genetic causes, or due to ex-
posure to the transmissible agent (prion). Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease (CJD) is the most common human TSE, and can occur
in both sporadic CJD (sCJD) and acquired SJD (vCJD) forms.
In the hospital setting, sCJD has been transmitted through
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ments, brain electrodes, tissue (human cornea and dura mater
grafts) and tissue extracts (human pituitary hormones).29 Al-
though there have been no known transmissions of vCJD via
surgery or tissue or organ donation to date, there have been
cases of vCJD transmission via transfusion of red blood cells
and plasma.29
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease is invariably fatal and duration
of illness is typically short. Of definite and probable cases in
Australia, median duration of illness was 3.7 months for spo-
radic cases (range, 0.9–60 months), 6.3 months for acquired
cases (range, 2–25 months), and 6 months for genetic cases
(range, 1.3–192 months).428 Of sporadic, acquired, and ge-
netic cases respectively, 72%, 56%, and 51% were deceased
6 months after the onset of symptoms.428
Prospective CJD surveillance in Australia has been per-
formed since 1993. Persons with suspected CJD are notified
to the AustralianNational Creutzfeldt-JakobDisease Registry,
typically as a result of referral for diagnostic CSF 14-3-3 pro-
tein detection, or alternatively via personal communications
from clinicians, hospitals, families, or CJD-related groups,
and through health record searches.428 Once notified, refer-
rals are assessed and if the suspicion of prion disease is sup-
ported, then the case is added to the register. Sixty-six
persons with suspected human prion disease were added to
the CJD surveillance register in 2015, and the average crude
rate of prion disease-related post mortems in Australia is 1.4
per million per year.428 The current annual rate of CJD
deaths in the general Australian population is 1.15 per mil-
lion population.313 vCJD has not been reported in
Australia to date. The most common risk factor for CJD in
Australia is having received a human pituitary hormone
product before 1986.313 Many of those affected would have
received a “Medical in Confidence” letter from the Chief
Medical Officer regarding this risk.
There is currently no minimally invasive test to detect TSE
before the onset of symptoms nor is the prevalence of asymp-
tomatic TSE known. Definitive diagnosis can only be made,
if at all, by neuropathological examination of brain tissue af-
ter biopsy or autopsy. In symptomatic patients, investigations
that may assist in the differential diagnosis of TSE include
electroencephalograph, identification of protein 14-3-3 in
CSF, magnetic resonance imaging, or direct amplification
of misfolded prion protein in the CSF using Real-Time-
Quaking Induced Conversion.313 In the context of deceased
organ donation, minimizing the risk of donor-derived TSE
transmission relies on screening the patient's history for
symptoms consistent with TSE, exposure to human blood,
dura mater grafts, pituitary-derived hormones, contact with
contaminated surgical instruments and/or prior notification
from the department of health as being at increased risk of
TSE due to exposure to 1 or more risk factors.
The risk of transmitting TSE associated with a given do-
nor can be defined as high, low, or background risk. The
Australian Government Department of Health defines these
risk categories as follows:
• High-risk: people who represent a definite risk of CJD trans-
mission (see Table 35). These patients typically report neuro-
logical symptoms and display neurological signs of disease.
• Low-risk: people who represent a potential risk of CJD trans-
mission (see Table 36). These patients may report neurologicalsymptoms or be showing neurological signs or may have an
identified risk factor.
• Background risk: the general population who represent no
identified increased risk of CJD transmission.313
Australian Infection Control Guidelines for Creutzfeldt-
Jakob recommend that the following people at risk of TSE
should be excluded from the routine donation of organs
and tissues (including blood and plasma):
• people classified as high-risk;
• people classified at low-risk (tissues are excluded from dona-
tion but organs may be donated if the informed consent of
the recipient is obtained);
• people who die in psychiatric establishments, with the excep-
tion of those in whom CJD has been specifically excluded;
• people who die of dementia;
• people who die with any obscure undiagnosed neurolog-
ical disorder.313
UK guidelines state that organ and tissue donation is con-
traindicated for individuals with confirmed or suspected
TSE, with a neurological disease of unknown etiology, or
anyone who is blood relatives with persons with familial
CJD. Exception is made if a donor has 2 or more blood rela-
tives who have developed TSE but has been informed by a ge-
netic counselor that they are not at risk. Previous exposure to
human dura mater grafts, human pituitary-derived growth
hormone and/or gonadotrophin are considered by the UK
guidelines to be relative contraindications to organ trans-
plantation, to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Where
donation and transplantation would be lifesaving, donor ex-
posure to TSE risk factors is taken into account but does not
necessarily preclude donation.
European guidelines consider that risk of TSE exists where
(1) CJD or vCJD has been observed frequently within the
family, (2) treatment has occurred with pituitary gland hor-
mones or growth hormone of human origin, and (3) dura
mater has been used during an operative procedure.5 It is rec-
ommended that the informed consent of the recipient be ob-
tained where such risk factors exist.EMERGING PATHOGENS AND OTHER PATHOGENS
OF SPECIAL INTEREST
Zika
Epidemiology and Transmission Risk
Zika is a flavivirus transmitted mainly by mosquitos in the
genus Aedes. It was first isolated from rhesus monkeys in
1947, with the first human cases confirmed by neutralizing
antibodies in sera detected in Uganda (1948), Tanzania
(1952), India (1952), Malaysia (1953), Borneo (1953),
Philippines (1953), Egypt (1954), Vietnam (1954) then
Mozambique (1957), followed by numerous other coun-
tries in equatorial Africa.429 Until 2007, only sporadic
cases of Zika virus infection in humans were reported, al-
though it is likely that this low level of reporting is at least
partly due to the clinical similarities between Zika virus in-
fection, dengue, and chikungunya resulting in misattribu-
tion of the pathogen.
The first large outbreak of Zika virus–associated disease
was reported from the Micronesian island of Yap in 2007,
TABLE 35.
Definition of high-risk category for CJD transmission313
Classification of CJD Clinical signs and risk factors
1. Sporadic TSE
1.1 Definite: Neuropathologically/immunocytochemically confirmed
1.2 Probable:
1.2.1 Clinical sign I plus at least 2/4 of signs in groups II and III
1.2.2 Possible I plus positive 14-3-3 CSF assay
1.2.3. Possible I plus 2/4 of II and duration <2 years
Clinical signs:
I Rapidly progressive dementia
II Myoclonus
Visual or cerebellar problems
Pyramidal or extrapyramidal features
Akinetic mutism
III Typical EEG
2. Accidentally transmitted (iatrogenic) TSE
2.1 Definite: Definite TSE with a recognized healthcare acquired risk factor
2.2 Probable:
2.2.1 Progressive predominant cerebellar syndrome in human pituitary
hormone recipients
2.2.2 Probable TSE with recognized healthcare-associated risk factor
Recognized healthcare acquired risk factors:
Treatment with human cadaver-derived pituitary growth hormone, human cadaver-derived
pituitary gonadotrophin or human dura mater graft.
Corneal graft in which the corneal donor has been classified as definitely or probably having
a human prion disease.
Exposure to surgical instruments that have come into contact with higher-infectivity tissues
previously used in a case of definite or probably human prion disease.
The relevance of any exposure to disease causation must take into account the timing of
exposure in relation to disease onset.
(This list is provisional, as previously unrecognized mechanisms of human prion
diseases may occur.)
3. Genetic prion diseases/TSE
3.1 Definite
1.1.1 Definite TSE and definite or probable TSE in first-degree relative
1.1.2 Definite TSE with a pathogenic PRNP mutation
3.2 Probable
1.2.1 Progressive neuropsychiatric disorder and definite or probable
TSE in first-degree relative
1.2.2 Progressive neuropsychiatric disorder and pathogeneic PRNP mutation.
Prion protein gene (PRNP) mutations
PRNP mutations associated with GSS neuropathological phenotype: P102L, P105L, A117V,
G131V, F198S, D202N, Q212P, Q217R, M232T, 192bpi
PRNP mutations associated with CJD neuropathological phenotype: D178N-129V, V180I,
V180I + M232R, T183A, T188A, E196K, E200K, V203I, R208H, V210I, E211Q, M232R,
96 bpi, 120 bpi, 144 bpi, 168 bpi, 48 bp deletion
PRNP mutations associated with FFI neuropathological phenotype: D178N-129M
PRNP mutation associated with vascular PRP amyloid: Y145S
PRNP mutations associated with proven but unclassified prion disease: H187R, 216 bpi.
CJD, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease; TSE, transmissible spongiform encephalopathies.
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fected. In Africa and Asia, Zika virus continues to be reported
relatively rarely and is associatedwithmild symptoms; by con-
trast, a lack of population immunity is thought to have con-
tributed to widespread outbreaks over the past decade in the
Pacific Islands (including French Polynesia, the Cook Islands
and New Caledonia) and the Americas.
It was during the outbreak in French Polynesia in 2013 to
2014, causing disease in approximately 11%of the population,TABLE 36.
Definition of low-risk category for CJD transmission313
People with a progressive neurological illness of less than 1 year's duration, with or without d
cannot be made following competent professional review.
People with a progressive neurological illness of less than 1 year's duration, with or without
background risk status.
Patients undergoing a diagnostic brain biopsy for progressive brain disease or patients under
progressive disorder that includes dementia if <1 year duration and where professional re
All genetically related members of any family in which there is a strong family history (2 or m
affected individuals have not been competently and completely assessed, specifically for C
Recipients of cadaver-derived human pituitary hormones (growth hormone and gonadotrophi
Recipients of dura mater homografts or transdural neurosurgery before 1990, or neurosurgic
to patient records.
Individuals who have been contacted by a Health Department as part of a look-back procedu
medium infectivity tissues from patients later found to have contracted CJD are likely to h
risk. Until further information on the likely risk of these individuals is available, they are co
CJD, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.that the first link wasmade betweenGuillain Barré syndrome
and Zika virus infection.430 Microcephaly cases were also
retrospectively linked to this outbreak. The World Health
Organization received first reports of locally transmitted in-
fections in Brazil in May 2015.429 On February 1, 2016,
the Director General of the World Health Organization de-
clared the epidemic of Zika virus infection in Brazil, and its
association with clusters of microcephaly and other neuro-
logical disorders, a Public Health Emergency of Internationalementia for whom a determination to assign a high-risk status or background risk status
dementia awaiting the outcome of a professional review to assign a high-risk status or
going neurosurgical investigations (including brain biopsy) or therapeutic procedures for a
view is unable to assign a high-risk status or a background risk status.
ore first- or second-degree relatives) of dementia or neurological illness, and in which
JD.
ns) before 1986.
al patients for whom the use of dura mater homografts cannot be excluded by reference
re from exposure to surgical instruments that had previously been used on high or
ave a very low, but unquantifiable risk for CJD that is thought to be above background
nservatively placed in a low risk category.
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 75Concern.429 As of July 25, 2017, 48 countries and territories
have had confirmed cases of local vector-borne transmission
of Zika virus, and another 5 countries have reported cases of
sexually transmitted Zika virus.430,431
The growing evidence of the severity of the potential com-
plications of Zika virus and theWHOdeclaration of a Public
Health Emergency in relation to the current Zika epidemic in
Brazil and Central America prompted concerns regarding the
implications for blood, tissue, and organ donation. However,
at the time of the 2016 outbreak, there were few data on the
natural history of Zika virus infection—the incubation pe-
riod, time to serological conversion, time to symptom onset,
and time to viral clearance were unknown. It is now under-
stood that Zika virus infections are symptomatic in only ap-
proximately 20% of cases, that it is shed in blood, saliva,
urine, and semen, and that it is sexually transmissible. A re-
cent retrospective analysis that included all case reports of
Zika virus infection since 1956 that captured temporal data
estimated the median incubation period of Zika virus–
associated disease was 5.9 days (95% credible interval, 4.4–
7.6) with a dispersion of 1.5 days (95% credible interval,
1.2–1.9). Thus, 95% of all symptomatic cases would be ex-
pected to develop symptoms within 11.2 days of infection
(95%credible interval, 7.6–18.0).432 The estimatedmean time
to seroconversion was 9.1 days after infection (95% credible
interval, 7.0–11.6): 5% of cases would have detectable anti-
bodies within 4.4 days (95% credible interval, 1.3–7.0) and
95%would have detectable antibodies within 13.7 days of in-
fection (95% credible interval, 10.6–21.7). The mean time to
viral clearance was estimated to be 9.9 days (95% credible in-
terval, 6.9–21.4) after infection: 5%would have no detectable
virus within 2.4 days (95% credible interval, 0.009–5.9), 95%
within 18.9 days (95%credible interval, 13.6–79.4), and 99%
within 23.4 days (95% credible interval, 14.3–154.3). Thus, a
300-day window from donation to the last date of travel in an
endemic country would correspond to twice the upper 95%
credible interval for viral clearance from 99% of infected individ-
uals.432A relevant caveat to these findings is that the data are from
people presumed to have been infected viamosquito bite, whereas
the timing of incubation, seroconversion, and viral clearancemay
be different for cases with an alternative transmission route.432
Australia and New Zealand do not have local transmis-
sion of Zika virus. The mosquito that carries Zika virus, Ae-
des aegypti, is present only in some parts of Central and
North Queensland. Health authorities in Queensland have
programs to manage mosquitos in their state and have specific
riskmitigation strategies in place in relation to Zika virus, thus
Zika virus should be considered in potential donors with a his-
tory of recent travel to Zika-affected countries. The number of
confirmed/probable cases of Zika virus diagnosed in Australia
peaked in 2016 at 102 cases; in 2017, the total number of no-
tified cases dropped to 9.256 The majority of cases were ac-
quired in Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, Mexico, or Brazil. The number
of confirmed/probable cases of Zika virus diagnosed in New
Zealand in 2016 was 100, with the majority of cases having
been acquired in either Tonga, Samoa, or Fiji.433
An up-to-date list of countries with newZika outbreaks or
ongoing transmission can be found at theWorldHealth Orga-
nization website (http://www.who.int/emergencies/zika-virus/
classification-tables/en/—last accessed 20 March 2018). The
World Health Organization defines 4 categories of Zika virus
transmission.Category1 defines countrieswith new introductionor reintroduction with ongoing transmission; category 2 defines
countries with evidence of virus circulation before 2015 or coun-
tries with ongoing transmission that is no longer in the new or
reintroduction phase, but where there is no evidence of in-
terruption; category 3 defines countries with interrupted
transmission and the potential for future transmission; cat-
egory 4 defines countries with an established competent
vector but no known documented past or current transmis-
sion. The CDC maintains a regularly updated map of coun-
tries and territories with risk of Zika virus infection (https://
wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/page/world-map-areas-with-zika).
Clinical symptoms of Zika virus infection are usually mild
and include fever, rash, joint pain, conjunctivitis, muscle pain
and retroocular headache. Few data are available on the clin-
ical course of Zika virus infection in immunocompromised
patients; the first reported case series of Zika virus infection
in transplant recipients were published in 2017 from a hospi-
tal in Brazil.434 Between January 2015 and April 2016, 187
kidney and 58 liver transplants were performed at Hospital
de Base in São José do Rio Preto, northwest of São Paulo
State, of which 40 recipients were suspected and screened
for dengue virus. Four of these dengue-suspected screened re-
cipients (2 liver recipients and 2 kidney recipients) were con-
firmed by RT-PCR to have Zika virus infection. The patients
presented with fever, myalgia, adynamia, anemia, and
thrombocytopenia, but none of the patients exhibited con-
junctivitis, exanthema, or neurological symptoms. The mean
time to onset of symptoms and hospital admission for these
4 patients was 7.25 days (range, 5–10).434 All patients presented
with complications, in particular bacterial superinfection, and all
required hospitalization until symptoms had resolved. One of
the liver transplant recipients required retransplantation due
to hepatic artery thrombosis and biliary stenosis 91 days after
Zika virus detection. All 4 patients had evidence of acute liver
or kidney damage, and both kidney recipients needed to have
their immunosuppression regimen altered.434 More data are
needed to establish whether Zika virus increases rejection
rates, either via direct biological mechanisms, or indirectly
due to the need to reduce immunosuppression.435
Direct-acting agents for the treatment of Zika virus infection
are not yet available, nor has a vaccine yet been developed, and
current treatment is supportive, including rest, fluids, and use of
analgesics and antipyretics. Australian Department of Health
recommendations are that aspirin and other nonsteroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs should be avoided until dengue can be
ruled out to reduce the risk of hemorrhage. http://www.health.
gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/ohp-zikavirus.
Little is currently known about the risk of Zika transmission
through solid organ transplantation. Although it is known that
Zika virus can be transmitted by blood exposure, there are few
data onwhich specific organs can be infectedwith Zika or how
long Zika virus might persist in these organs. In 1 fatal case of
Zika virus infection in an adult with lupus erythematosus,
rheumatoid arthritis, chronic use of corticosteroids and alco-
holism, Zika virus RNA was detected in brain, liver, spleen,
kidney, lung, and heart tissue.436 However, it is unclear how
infectious the virus would be infectious if these organs were
to be transplanted.
Donor Screening and Risk Minimization
Using serology to diagnose Zika virus infection is compli-
cated by the fact that Zika virus cross-reacts with antibodies
76 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comgenerated in response to other flaviviruses, such as dengue,
yellow fever, WNV, and chikungunya, which cocirculate
with Zika and have the same vectors.437,438 Existing
antibody-based assays are, therefore, labor-intensive and
generally confined to research laboratories/specialist pub-
lic health facilities.437 Detection of Zika virus RNA is a
more specific way of diagnosing Zika virus infection, and
commercial Zika virus NAT systems were given investiga-
tional new drug approval by the US FDA in 2016.439-441
However, false-negative NAT results are common due to the
short duration of viremia and low viral loads soon after symp-
tom onset—a study from Brazil found that only 45% of pa-
tients with suspected Zika infection returned a positive result
on RT-PCR.442 For this reason, the development of accurate
commercial antibody tests for the diagnosis of Zika virus has
been a priority.437 In a recent publication, a multinational re-
search team reported on the successful validation of the Zika
NS1 blockade-of-binding (BOB) ELISA, demonstrating sensi-
tivity of 91.8%and specificity of 88.9%at longer than10days
postsymptom onset.443
According to the guidelines of the CDNA, a case of Zika
virus infection is considered confirmed only where there is
laboratory definitive evidence of infection.444 Laboratory de-
finitive evidence may include:
• detection of Zika virus by NAT or virus isolation, OR
• IgG seroconversion or a significant increase in antibody level
or a fourfold or greater rise in titer of Zika vrus specific IgG,
and recent infection by dengue or other epidemiologically pos-
sible flaviviruses has been excluded, OR
• detection of Zika virus-specific IgM in CSF, in the absence of
IgM to other possible infecting flaviviruses.
Zika virus NAT may be performed on blood or urine (or
amniotic fluid or CSF): it is unclear whether there is any dif-
ference in viral loads between blood and urine, although
there is some evidence that Zika virus RNA appears to be de-
tectable for longer in urine.432,445,446
A probable case, as defined by the CDNA, is one where
there is both laboratory suggestive evidence and epidemio-
logical evidence. Laboratory suggestive evidence includes de-
tection of Zika virus–specific IgM in the absence of IgM to
other epidemiologically possible flaviviruses or flavivirus
vaccination within the 3 weeks before testing (if exposure
was >4 weeks before the specimen was taken, then Zika
virus-specific IgG must also be positive; if Zika-specific IgG
was initially negative and subsequent testing longer than
4 weeks after exposure fails to demonstrate seroconversion,
the case should be rejected). Epidemiological evidence in-
cludes travel to or residence in a Zika-receptive country or
area in Australia, or sexual exposure to a confirmed or prob-
able case within the previous 2 weeks (where symptoms are
present) or 2 months (where symptoms are absent).
A clinical case is defined by the CDNAas a patient who de-
velops an acute illness within 2 weeks of exposure, with 2 or
more of the following symptoms:
• fever,
• headache,
• myalgia,
• arthralgia,• rash,
• nonpurulent conjunctivitis.
International guidelines do not recommend routine screen-
ing of potential organ donors for Zika virus, but instead gen-
erally recommend targeted Zika screening for447:
• people with a recent medical diagnosis of Zika virus disease,
• residents of affected areas,
• travellers returning from affected areas,
• sexual contacts of men who have been diagnosed with Zika
virus infection or who have travelled to or lived in a Zika-
affected area during the 3 months before the sexual contact.
Summaries of published international recommendations
regarding Zika virus and organ transplantation are given
in Table 37 and Table 38.
West Nile Virus
Epidemiology
West Nile virus is an arbovirus that is maintained in nature
in a transmission cycle between birds and mosquitos and is
transmitted to humans and other mammals via bites from in-
fected mosquitoes of the genus Culex. First identified in
Uganda in 1937, WNV is commonly found in Africa, parts
of Europe, the Middle East, North America and West Asia.
The largest historical outbreaks have occurred in Greece,
Israel, Romania, Russia and the United States, with the loca-
tion of outbreak sites corresponding with major bird migra-
tory routes.449 WNV was imported into the United States in
1999 from the Middle East, causing an outbreak that spread
throughout the continental United States, establishing WNV
from Canada to Venezuela over a period of 10 years.449
Risk of infection transmission increases during times of
year with the highest probability of mosquito bites. In tem-
perate climates, therefore, WNV is seasonal as mosquitoes
need air temperatures above 15°C to fly.450 To date, there
have been no documented cases of human-to-human WNV
transmission via casual contact; however, infections have oc-
curred through organ transplantation, blood transfusions
and breast milk.449WNV infection is asymptomatic or associ-
ated with only mild flu-like symptoms in most cases (>99%);
however, in some cases,WNVcauses severe neuroinvasive dis-
ease, includingmeningitis, encephalitis and acute flaccid paral-
ysis.449 Immunocompromised persons have a much higher
risk (~50%) of developing severe disease, and a much higher
risk of death as a result.450 Compared to a mortality rate of
4% among symptomatic WNV cases in the general popula-
tion, the mortality rate among transplant recipients with
symptomatic WNV is approximately 25%.451
Kunjin virus is a variant of WNV that is endemic to tropi-
cal northern Australia, and tends to result in less severe dis-
ease compared to WNV variants endemic to other parts of
the world. Most people with the Kunjin lineage of WNV
have mild or no symptoms; when symptoms do occur, they
may include fever, malaise, headache, muscle aches, swollen
lymph nodes, fatigue, rash, and swollen and aching joints.452
In rare cases, infectionmay progress to encephalitis. Therewas
an average of 1.6 notifications of WNVor Kunjin virus infec-
tion per year in Australia for the past decade (see Figure 15).
Some of these cases were acquired internationally in endemic
TABLE 37.
International guidelines on Zika virus and organ donation
Guideline
Date
last updated Recommendation
Scanditransplanta February 15, 2016 For donors with recent travel history to Latin America or other affected areas who do not have any symptom of viral infection, the risk of
Zika infection is low. The low-risk of Zika should be balanced against the harms of declining the organs.
Patients with Zika virus infection are viremic for a short period (approximately 14 days) but the virus can be found in other tissues after the
viremia has cleared. There is no possibility to screen for the Zika virus infection in deceased donors since PCR diagnosis can take several
days and IgM antibodies against Zika virus have strong cross-reactivity, which may generate false-positive results in serological tests.
It is probable that infection can be transmitted by organ transplantation but the impact of immunosuppression on the natural history
of Zika virus infection is not known.
OPTNb February 8, 2016 OPOs should focus on recent travel history and epidemiologic risk factors, as well as recent donor symptoms. Although infected potential
donors may possibly transmit Zika virus to recipients, DTAC, AST and ASTS do not believe concern for Zika virus infections should summarily
exclude donors from transplantation; rather, the risk of donor-derived infection should be balanced with the benefits of transplantation in
each potential recipient. In the case of potential living donors with a history of travel to Zika-endemic areas, donation should be deferred where
possible. Routine donor laboratory screening is not currently recommended (for either living or deceased donors). Recommended screening
protocols for donors (living or deceased) with a recent history of travel to an affected area and clinically compatible illness are as follows:
– Specimens collected <4 days after symptom onset should be subjected to molecular testing (RT-PCR) for Zika, dengue, and chikungunya
– Specimens collected 4–7 days after symptom onset should be subjected to molecular testing and serologic testing for virus-specific
IgM antibodies, with a convalescent-phase sample also sent later
– Specimens collected >7 d after symptom onset should be subjected to serologic testing for virus-specific IgM antibodies.
Because of the cocirculation of Zika, dengue and chikungunya viruses, it is recommended that testing for all 3 viruses should be
performed where appropriate.
a Guidelines for prevention of transmission of infectious diseases from organ donors to recipients. Scandiatransplant, April 2016.
b Guidance for organ donation and transplantation professionals regarding the Zika virus. OPTN/UNOS, February 2016; Guidance on Zika virus. OPTN/UNOS, July 2016.
PCR, polymerase chain reaction; OPTN, Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network; OPO, organ procurement organization; DTAC, Disease Transmission Advisory Committee; AST, aspartate aminotrans-
ferase; RT-PCR, reverse transcriptase PCR.
© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 77countries (the 3 cases reported in 2013/2014 were acquired in
Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and Djibouti, and the 2007
case was acquired in Israel); however, the cases reported be-
tween 2008 and 2013 were all locally acquired.257,453-457 In
2017, Western Australia experienced an outbreak of Kunjin
in the Kimberly region involvingmultiple clinical cases, althoughTABLE 38.
Generalized recommendations for prevention of donor-derived Z
of donor exposure
Donor exposure
Deceased donors
Asymptomatic donor with travel to area of Zika transmission in the preceding 4 weeks M
Asymptomatic donor with history of unprotected sexual activity with men who had
been to area of Zika transmission in the preceding 4 weeks
M
Potential donor with symptoms suggestive of Zika virus infection and with travel to
area of Zika transmission in the preceding 6 months
D
Donor with symptoms suggestive of Zika virus infection and with history of
unprotected sexual activity with men who had been to area of Zika transmission
in the preceding 6 months
D
Living donors
Asymptomatic living donors with history of travel to area of Zika transmission D
Asymptomatic living donors with history of unprotected sexual activity with men
who had been to area of Zika transmission in the preceding 4 weeks
D
Living donors with Zika virus infection D
Adapted from Silveira and Campos.448
PCR, polymerase chain reaction.it is likely that for every notified case in this outbreak there
were also many more subclinical, potentially viremic, cases
(personal communication V Sheppeard).
Suitable vectors for WNV do not exist in New Zealand,
and to date, there have been no notified cases of WNV in
New Zealand, including cases acquired abroad.ika virus transmission in solid organ transplantation, by nature
Recommendation
ay be considered for organ donation after discussion about risks and benefits and
informed consent
ay be considered for organ donation after discussion about risks and benefits
and informed consent
o not use donor organs unless symptoms can be attributed to a condition other than
Zika virus and this other condition does not preclude donation
o not use donor organs unless symptoms can be attributed to a condition other
than Zika virus and this other condition does not preclude donation
efer donation for 4 weeks after return. If no symptoms develop in 4 weeks, may donate
after discussion about risks and benefits and informed consent
efer donation for 4 weeks after last unprotected sexual encounter. If no symptoms
develop, may donate after discussion of risks and benefits and informed consent.
efer donation for 6 months after onset of symptoms. If recipient's clinical condition does
not allow the delay in transplantation, obtain Zika virus PCR 4 weeks after resolution of
symptoms and consider donation only if PCR is negative and after discussion of risks
and benefits of potential donor-derived infection and informed consent.
FIGURE 15. Number of notifications ofWest Nile/Kunjin virus infection received fromAustralian State and Territory health authorities from2001
to 2017.36 NSW, New South Wales; NT, Northern Territory; QLD, Queensland; VIC, Victoria; WA, Western Australia.
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to recipients have been reported in the published literature,
with a high rate of adverse outcomes (see Table 39). Of 23 re-
cipients of solid organs from 8 WNV-infected donors, 20
(87%) developed WNV infection, of whom 14 (70%) devel-
oped encephalitis. The most common presenting symptoms
among recipientswith donor-derivedWNVwere fever, myal-
gias, arthralgias, fatigue or diarrhea.458With the exception of
1 case (Morelli et al), the potential for WNV infection in the
donorwas not suspected, and diagnosis was onlymade retro-
spectively after clinical symptoms developed in the recipient
(s). To date, there have been no cases of the Kunjin lineage
of WNV being transmitted by organ transplantation.
Donor Screening and Risk Minimization
The incubation period for WNV is approximately 3 to
15 days, and infected individuals are viremic for up to a week.
The majority of viremic persons (~80%) are asymptomatic.
Laboratory studies for WNV diagnosis include analysis of se-
rum and CSF by:
• IgG antibody seroconversion (or significant increase in anti-
body titers) in 2 serial specimens collected at 1 week intervals
by ELISA,
• IgM antibody capture ELISA,
• neutralization assays,
• viral detection by reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reac-
tion (RT-PCR) assay,
• virus isolation by cell culture.
IgMcanusually be detectedwithin ~8 days after initial expo-
sure in CSF and serum samples taken from WNV-infected pa-
tients who present with clinical symptoms.449 Serum WNV
IgG is produced ~3 to 4 days after IgM, and the presence of se-
rum IgG confers lifelong protection against reinfection.467
Serological screening in the context of deceased donation
is complicated by the fact that transmissible WNV may be
present in potential donors who test negative on both serol-
ogy andNATat the time of donation. Because viremia is tran-
sient, WNV-NAT may be negative even during the acute
phase of infection.451 Retrospective screening of stored do-
nor serum in cases of donor-derived WNV transmission
found that only 50% of donor serum tested positive for
WNV by RT-PCR, and only 38% of donor serum tested
positive for WNV IgM.458 Given the complexities of virusdynamics and the antibody response, testing of paired se-
rum and CSF WNV IgM and IgG in conjunction with
RT-PCR would improve WNV detection in potential do-
nors.468 Conversely, false-positive results are possible and
positive serology may result from cross-reacting antibodies
from other prior flavivirus infections in the donor.5 Urine
testing may prove to be more useful than blood testing, be-
cause the kidney is a site of WNV replication and WNV is
shed for longer in the urine and at a higher viral load. Cur-
rently, however, there are no studies confirming the clinical
utility of urine screening for WNV.5
Routine WNV screening is neither practical nor cost-
effective outside of endemic areas.450 Targeted screening re-
stricted to potential donors who display symptoms of WNV
is also problematic, as most infected persons will be asymp-
tomatic. In most published cases of donor-derived West Nile
transmission, the donors did not show any signs or symptoms
of WNV infection in the period leading up to donation that
might have prompted screening.458 Given these consider-
ations, European guidelines recommend routine screening
for WNVonly when locally increased rates of WNVare de-
tected, and for potential donors coming from regions with
ongoing outbreaks.5 Organs from such donors may be used
before test results are available; however, prophylactic monitor-
ing of recipients of organs from donor with confirmedWNV is
recommended. Where a donor is known to be viremic for
WNV,European guidelines state that a transplant infectious dis-
ease expert should be consulted before such organs are used.
This approach has been successful in detecting WNV in a
timely manner—for example in the Italian case of donor-
derived WNV transmission reported by Morelli et al.462 As
the donation occurred in an endemic area during aWNVout-
break, routineWNV screening of the donor by NATwas per-
formed on the day after organ transplantation occurred. The
positive result in the donor was followed by WNV detection
in the recipient by NAT on day 3 posttransplant, at which
point, immunosuppression was reduced and prophylaxis
with fresh frozen plasma infusion of WNV IgG was com-
menced. After 23 days of prophylaxis, the patient developed
a WNV IgM antibody response that reached 1:1600, at
which point, the immunoprophylaxis was stopped. The pa-
tient was discharged from hospital on posttransplant day
45, without having developed clinical symptoms ofWNV.462
In those OPOs in the United States that test for WNV, test-
ing is generally performed during seasons when WNV is
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© 2018 Wolters Kluwer White et al 81predicted to be active in the donor service area.469 Modeling
indicates that universal screening for WNV in the United
States would be associated with a net loss of life due to missed
opportunities for organ donation, therefore, as in Europe, rec-
ommendations at the current time are to screen donors using
NAT when there are WNV cases in the region, and to avoid
donors with unexplained encephalitis at all times.393,470 The
use of WNV serology or urine testing for donor screening is
not recommended in the United States at this time.393 UK
guidelines recommend donor screening for WNV using NAT
only in the presence of symptoms in the potential donor com-
patiblewithNAT infection, or travel history to an areawith an
ongoing outbreak.450
There is no effective therapy forWNVand treatment is largely
supportive. Case reports of WNV in transplant recipients have
described clinical improvement with IVIG +/− interferon-alpha
2b (see Table 39). There is some evidence that early versus late
administration of IVIGmay improve the outcome.467 Tempo-
rary reduction of immunosuppression to restore any natural
immunity to WNV is also recommended, although evidence
to support this is minimal and the strategy is unlikely to be ef-
fective in nonendemic areas where natural immunity is
unlikely.450,467
In the Australian context, WNV is an uncommon patho-
gen. Routine screening is not required and testing would only
need to be considered in a donor with a compatible clinical
illness with history of travel to an endemic area.
RECIPIENT CONSENT
It is a legal requirement in Australia and New Zealand to
inform potential organ recipients of all risks associated with
acceptance or nonacceptance of a particular organ. At the
time of an organ offer, decisions about whether to accept
the organmay be made too quickly for the potential recipient
to adequately consider the risks and benefits. For this reason,
the possibility of accepting an organ that carries a risk of infec-
tious disease transmission should be discussed with the recipi-
ent at the time of waitlisting, and then periodically thereafter.
It is the responsibility of the transplant team to ensure that
the potential transplant recipient understands the following
before an organ offer being made44,471:
• no pathology test that is performed on a donor is entirely capa-
ble of reducing risk of transmission to nil, although all efforts
are taken to reduce risk of BBV transmission, effectively
resulting in extremely low risk;
• there is a small chance that screening of the donor has not
identified a serious infectious disease;
• tests are not performed for all known infectious diseases;
• false-positive and false-negative test results are possible;
• it is not possible to know everything about an individual do-
nor, and donor histories reflect only the knowledge of the per-
son providing the history;
• there are rare instances where transplantation results in the
transmission of infections that have not been described before;
• all transplantation carries risks, but often not performing the
transplant carries a higher risk of death than the risk of mor-
bidity and mortality attributable to a donor-derived infection.
Discussions with the potential recipient should acknowl-
edge that different patients would have different views of
the risks of infectious disease transmission, depending ontheir current health status and risk of death without a timely
transplant. Each patient will weight the risks differently ac-
cording to their personal circumstances and preferences. Po-
tentially, patient views about infectious disease risks will also
evolve as they spend longer on this waiting list or their med-
ical status changes—hence it is necessary to periodically re-
visit the discussion of consent.
At the time of organ offer, the transplant team should dis-
cuss the risks and benefits with the potential recipient, present-
ing case-specific information. Information should include:
• the infection(s) that may be transmitted and the likely risk
of transmission;
• the potential severity of infection;
• the ease of treating the infection should transmission occur;
• whether all testing of the donor has been completed;
• the risk of significant morbidity or mortality without trans-
plantation at this time; and
• the benefit of accepting this organ at this time.
Transplant physicians are responsible for ensuring that re-
cipients give their valid consent to accept a particular organ
immediately before transplantation. The consent form com-
pleted at the time of transplant must expressly include recipient's
acceptance of a potentially infectious organ. For consent to be
valid, the person must (i) have the capacity to give consent
and understand the implications of their consent to trans-
plantation; (ii) give that consent freely, without pressure from
hospital staff, medical practitioner, or family; (iii) consent
specifically to receive the particular organ in question.472 Suf-
ficient information must be provided for there to be genuine
understanding of the risks involved in proceeding or not pro-
ceedingwith transplantation, and themore likely a specific risk,
the more detail that should be provided about that risk.472
Informed Consent in the Context of the
Transplantation of Organs at Known Risk of BBV
A major challenge for transplant systems is how to safely
maximize the utilization of organs from donors at known
risk of BBV while respecting individual patient preferences.
Communicating to the potential recipient the actual risks of
infectious disease transmission in the case of a donor with so-
cial risk factors for BBV can be complex, and the proper goal
must be education rather than coercion.
Northwestern University has developed a mobile web ap-
plication, InformMe, to increase knowledge about increased
risk donors among kidney transplant candidates.473 The app
can be accessed at https://informme.cbits.northwestern.edu/
system/index.html (last accessed May 13, 2018). A trial of
the app in 288 kidney transplant candidates demonstrated
that it was successful in increasing knowledge about
increased-risk donors compared with routine transplant
education.473 Although it was hypothesized that greater
knowledge would be associated with greater willingness
to accept increase-risk kidneys, this was not observed,
which may be a function of the fact that InformMewas de-
signed a neutral decision aid, not intended to exert overt
influence on treatment choice.473
The Victorian and Tasmanian Renal Transplant Advisory
Committee has taken an “opt-in” approach to increased-
risk donors, whereby an additional waiting list has been cre-
ated for those kidney transplant candidates who specifically
82 Transplantation DIRECT ■ 2018 www.transplantationdirect.comconsent to receiving an organ from a donor who is at in-
creased risk of BBV infection. Kidney transplant candidates
are provided with educational materials as part of the con-
sent process; these materials explain which donors are con-
sidered increased viral risk donors, what the risks are of
catching a bloodborne viral infection from an increased-risk
donor, and what treatment is available in the event of disease
transmission. The current Victorian and Tasmanian Renal
Transplant Advisory Committee patient information and
consent form for accepting a kidney from an increased viral
risk donor is given in Materials and Methods 2, SDC,
http://links.lww.com/TXD/A153. By choosing to be added
to the additional waiting list for kidneys from increased viral
risk donors, the patient's position in the standard waiting list
is not affected. This, therefore, frames the offer of an in-
creased viral risk donor as an additional opportunity for
transplantation, rather than as an offer of a risky or inferior
organ. The additional waiting list of preconsented individ-
uals is also intended to encourage more frequent organ re-
trievals from increased viral risk donors.
An emerging issue with respect to recipient consent and the
risk of BBV is the utilization of HCV-viremic donors. The
availability of DAAs for HCV and the use of organs from
HCV-viremic donors for HCV nonviremic recipients will require
its own specific consent process. Using HCV-NAT–positive
organs has the potential to reduce waiting times and improve
survival for those recipients who would not be expected to
receive another organ offer in a timely manner. However, be-
cause this practice is new, there are minimal data on which to
base informed consent. The potential concerns related to
transplanting HCV-viremic organs into nonviremic recipi-
ents include increased rates of infection, increased rates of re-
jection, HCV-related fibrosis in the allograft, or infection
with a more difficult to treat genotype.162 Questions that
need to be addressed include: which patients should be en-
couraged to accept HCV-positive organs, what are the cost
implications, and what are the residual risks of viral compli-
cations or unsuccessful DAA therapy, and what are the risks
of transmission to a sexual partner?474 Although the avail-
able data from clinical trials conducted so far suggest these
risks are minimal, they are still unknown in the setting of in-
tentional HCV transmission. As more clinical trial data be-
come available, it will hopefully be possible to answer some
of these questions and for consent processes in this context
to be improved.46REFERENCES
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